diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/Makefile b/security/openssh-portable/Makefile index 0b2b33626d6e..abbc35b5a7ca 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/Makefile +++ b/security/openssh-portable/Makefile @@ -1,271 +1,271 @@ PORTNAME= openssh -DISTVERSION= 10.2p1 -PORTREVISION= 6 +DISTVERSION= 10.3p1 +PORTREVISION= 0 PORTEPOCH= 1 CATEGORIES= security MASTER_SITES= OPENBSD/OpenSSH/portable PKGNAMESUFFIX?= -portable MAINTAINER= bdrewery@FreeBSD.org COMMENT= The portable version of OpenBSD's OpenSSH WWW= https://www.openssh.com/portable.html LICENSE= OPENSSH LICENSE_NAME= OpenSSH Licenses LICENSE_FILE= ${WRKSRC}/LICENCE LICENSE_PERMS= dist-mirror dist-sell pkg-mirror pkg-sell auto-accept CONFLICTS?= openssh-3.* ssh-1.* ssh2-3.* openssh-portable-devel USES= autoreconf compiler:c11 cpe localbase ncurses \ pkgconfig ssl GNU_CONFIGURE= yes GNU_CONFIGURE_MANPREFIX= ${PREFIX}/share CONFIGURE_ARGS= --prefix=${PREFIX} \ --without-zlib-version-check \ --with-ssl-engine \ --with-mantype=man ETCOLD= ${PREFIX}/etc CPE_VENDOR= openbsd FLAVORS= default hpn gssapi default_CONFLICTS_INSTALL= openssh-portable-hpn openssh-portable-gssapi \ openssh-portable-x509 hpn_CONFLICTS_INSTALL= openssh-portable openssh-portable-gssapi \ openssh-portable-x509 hpn_PKGNAMESUFFIX= -portable-hpn gssapi_CONFLICTS_INSTALL= openssh-portable openssh-portable-hpn \ openssh-portable-x509 gssapi_PKGNAMESUFFIX= -portable-gssapi OPTIONS_DEFINE= DOCS PAM TCP_WRAPPERS LIBEDIT BSM \ HPN KERB_GSSAPI \ LDNS NONECIPHER FIDO_U2F BLACKLISTD OPTIONS_DEFAULT= BLACKLISTD LIBEDIT PAM TCP_WRAPPERS LDNS FIDO_U2F .if ${FLAVOR:U} == hpn OPTIONS_DEFAULT+= HPN NONECIPHER .endif .if ${FLAVOR:U} == gssapi OPTIONS_DEFAULT+= KERB_GSSAPI MIT .endif OPTIONS_RADIO= KERBEROS OPTIONS_RADIO_KERBEROS= MIT HEIMDAL HEIMDAL_BASE TCP_WRAPPERS_DESC= tcp_wrappers support BSM_DESC= OpenBSM Auditing KERB_GSSAPI_DESC= Kerberos/GSSAPI patch (req: GSSAPI) HPN_DESC= HPN-SSH patch LDNS_DESC= SSHFP/LDNS support HEIMDAL_DESC= Heimdal Kerberos (security/heimdal) HEIMDAL_BASE_DESC= Heimdal Kerberos (base) MIT_DESC= MIT Kerberos (security/krb5) NONECIPHER_DESC= NONE Cipher support FIDO_U2F_DESC= FIDO/U2F support (security/libfido2) BLACKLISTD_DESC= FreeBSD blacklistd(8) support OPTIONS_SUB= yes PAM_EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-pam-sshd_config TCP_WRAPPERS_EXTRA_PATCHES=${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-tcpwrappers LDNS_CONFIGURE_WITH= ldns=${LOCALBASE} LDNS_LIB_DEPENDS= libldns.so:dns/ldns HPN_CONFIGURE_WITH= hpn NONECIPHER_CONFIGURE_WITH= nonecipher MIT_LIB_DEPENDS= libkrb5.so.3:security/krb5 HEIMDAL_LIB_DEPENDS= libkrb5.so.26:security/heimdal PAM_CONFIGURE_WITH= pam TCP_WRAPPERS_CONFIGURE_WITH= tcp-wrappers LIBEDIT_CONFIGURE_WITH= libedit LIBEDIT_USES= libedit BSM_CONFIGURE_ON= --with-audit=bsm FIDO_U2F_LIB_DEPENDS= libfido2.so:security/libfido2 FIDO_U2F_CONFIGURE_ON= --with-security-key-builtin FIDO_U2F_CONFIGURE_OFF= --disable-security-key BLACKLISTD_EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-blacklistd ETCDIR?= ${PREFIX}/etc/ssh .include PATCH_SITES+= http://mirror.shatow.net/freebsd/${PORTNAME}/:DEFAULT,hpn,gsskex # Must add this patch before HPN due to conflicts .if !${PORT_OPTIONS:MBLACKLISTD} . if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHPN} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNONECIPHER} # Needed glue for applying HPN patch without conflict EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-no-blocklistd-hpn-glue . endif .endif # Must add this patch before HPN due to conflicts .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MKERB_GSSAPI} || ${FLAVOR:U} == gssapi # BROKEN= KERB_GSSAPI No patch for ${DISTVERSION} yet. . if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHPN} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNONECIPHER} # Needed glue for applying HPN patch without conflict EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-hpn-gss-glue . endif # - See https://sources.debian.org/data/main/o/openssh/ for which subdir to # pull from. -GSSAPI_DEBIAN_VERSION= 10.2p1 +GSSAPI_DEBIAN_VERSION= 10.3p1 GSSAPI_DEBIAN_SUBDIR= ${GSSAPI_DEBIAN_VERSION:U${DISTVERSION}}-1 # - Debian does not use a versioned filename so we trick fetch to make one for # us with the ?=/ trick. PATCH_SITES+= https://sources.debian.org/data/main/o/openssh/1:${GSSAPI_DEBIAN_SUBDIR}/debian/patches/gssapi.patch?dummy=/:gsskex # Bump this when updating the patch location -GSSAPI_DISTVERSION= 10.2p1 +GSSAPI_DISTVERSION= 10.3p1 PATCHFILES+= openssh-${GSSAPI_DISTVERSION:U${DISTVERSION}}-gsskex-all-debian-rh-${GSSAPI_DISTVERSION}.patch:-p1:gsskex EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-gssapi-kexgssc.c EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-gssapi-kexgsss.c .endif .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MBLACKLISTD} CONFIGURE_LIBS+= -lblacklist .endif # https://www.psc.edu/hpn-ssh https://github.com/rapier1/openssh-portable/tree/hpn-openssl1.1-7_7_P1 .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHPN} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNONECIPHER} #BROKEN= HPN: Not yet updated for ${DISTVERSION} yet. PORTDOCS+= HPN-README HPN_VERSION= 14v15 HPN_DISTVERSION= 7.7p1 #PATCH_SITES+= SOURCEFORGE/hpnssh/HPN-SSH%20${HPN_VERSION}%20${HPN_DISTVERSION}/:hpn #PATCHFILES+= ${PORTNAME}-${HPN_DISTVERSION}-hpnssh${HPN_VERSION}.diff.gz:-p1:hpn EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-hpn:-p2 .elif !${PORT_OPTIONS:MHPN} && !${PORT_OPTIONS:MNONECIPHER} # Apply compatibility patch EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-hpn-compat .endif CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --disable-utmp --disable-wtmp --disable-wtmpx --without-lastlog # Keep this last EXTRA_PATCHES+= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-version-addendum .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHEIMDAL_BASE} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MKERB_GSSAPI} BROKEN= KERB_GSSAPI Requires either MIT or HEMIDAL, does not build with base Heimdal currently .endif .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHEIMDAL_BASE} && !exists(/usr/lib/libkrb5.so) IGNORE= you have selected HEIMDAL_BASE but do not have heimdal installed in base .endif .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MMIT} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHEIMDAL} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHEIMDAL_BASE} . if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHEIMDAL_BASE} CONFIGURE_LIBS+= -lgssapi_krb5 CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-kerberos5=/usr . else CONFIGURE_LIBS+= -lgssapi_krb5 CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-kerberos5=${LOCALBASE} . endif . if ${OPENSSLBASE} == "/usr" CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --without-rpath LDFLAGS= # empty . endif .else . if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MKERB_GSSAPI} IGNORE= KERB_GSSAPI requires one of MIT HEIMDAL or HEIMDAL_BASE . endif .endif .if ${OPENSSLBASE} != "/usr" CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-ssl-dir=${OPENSSLBASE} .endif EMPTYDIR= /var/empty USE_RC_SUBR= openssh # After all CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --sysconfdir=${ETCDIR} --with-privsep-path=${EMPTYDIR} .if !empty(CONFIGURE_LIBS) CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-libs='${CONFIGURE_LIBS}' .endif CONFIGURE_ARGS+= --with-xauth=${LOCALBASE}/bin/xauth RC_SCRIPT_NAME= openssh VERSION_ADDENDUM_DEFAULT?= ${OPSYS}-${PKGNAME} CFLAGS+= ${CFLAGS_${CHOSEN_COMPILER_TYPE}} CFLAGS_gcc= -Wno-stringop-truncation -Wno-stringop-overflow SSH_ASKPASS_PATH?= ${LOCALBASE}/bin/ssh-askpass post-patch: @${REINPLACE_CMD} \ -e 's|install: \(.*\) host-key check-config|install: \1|g' \ ${WRKSRC}/Makefile.in @${REINPLACE_CMD} \ -e 's|$$[{(]libexecdir[})]/ssh-askpass|${SSH_ASKPASS_PATH}|' \ ${WRKSRC}/Makefile.in ${WRKSRC}/configure.ac @${REINPLACE_CMD} \ -e 's|\(VersionAddendum\) none|\1 ${VERSION_ADDENDUM_DEFAULT}|' \ ${WRKSRC}/sshd_config @${REINPLACE_CMD} \ -e 's|%%SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD_PORT%%|${VERSION_ADDENDUM_DEFAULT}|' \ ${WRKSRC}/sshd_config.5 @${ECHO_CMD} '#define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD_PORT "${VERSION_ADDENDUM_DEFAULT}"' >> \ ${WRKSRC}/version.h post-configure-BLACKLISTD-on: @${ECHO_CMD} "#define USE_BLACKLIST 1" >> ${WRKSRC}/config.h post-install: ${MV} ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/moduli \ ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/moduli.sample ${MV} ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/ssh_config \ ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/ssh_config.sample ${MV} ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/sshd_config \ ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/sshd_config.sample ${MKDIR} ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/ssh_config.d \ ${STAGEDIR}${ETCDIR}/sshd_config.d .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MHPN} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNONECIPHER} ${MKDIR} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR} ${INSTALL_DATA} ${WRKSRC}/HPN-README ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR} .endif # percent test does not work unless user's $HOME is set properly. SKIP_LTESTS= percent # A tempdir is used to avoid unix socket namelen issues. # TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS is because /tmp is world-writable, but # the actual test dir is not. # Some TEST_SSH_* paths are passed in because test-exec.sh defaults to base # versions for them due to being outside of PATH. test: build @rtmp=$$(mktemp -dt ssh-regress); \ chmod o-rx "$${rtmp}"; \ trap "'${RM} $${rtmp}'; exit 1" 1 2 3 5 10 13 15; \ ${TAR} -cf - -C ${WRKSRC} . | ${TAR} -xf - -C $${rtmp}; \ cd $${rtmp} && ${SETENV} -i \ ${MAKE_ENV:NHOME=*:NPATH=*} \ TEST_SHELL=${SH} \ ${SUDO:DSUDO="${SUDO}"} \ LOGNAME="${LOGNAME}" \ HOME="$${rtmp}" \ TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1 \ TEST_SSH_TRACE=yes \ TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL=yes \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER=$${rtmp}/sftp-server \ TEST_SSH_SSHD_SESSION=$${rtmp}/sshd-session \ TEST_SSH_SSHD_AUTH=$${rtmp}/sshd-auth \ PATH=$${rtmp}:${PREFIX}/bin:${PREFIX}/sbin:${PATH} \ ${MAKE_CMD} ${MAKE_FLAGS} ${MAKEFILE} ${MAKE_ARGS} tests \ BUILDDIR="$${rtmp}" \ abs_top_srcdir="$${rtmp}" \ abs_top_builddir="$${rtmp}" \ .OBJDIR="$${rtmp}" \ ${LTESTS:DLTESTS="${LTESTS}"} \ ${SKIP_LTESTS:DSKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}"}; \ ${RM} -R "$${rtmp}" .include diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/distinfo b/security/openssh-portable/distinfo index 6aa27b76a8c8..14b3b9a55b8d 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/distinfo +++ b/security/openssh-portable/distinfo @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -TIMESTAMP = 1760240447 -SHA256 (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz) = ccc42c0419937959263fa1dbd16dafc18c56b984c03562d2937ce56a60f798b2 -SIZE (openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz) = 1974519 -SHA256 (openssh-10.2p1-gsskex-all-debian-rh-10.2p1.patch) = a02ab012657477a85dc7e4dca90a568ff5f13199221cda888608e9d0290454a0 -SIZE (openssh-10.2p1-gsskex-all-debian-rh-10.2p1.patch) = 126336 +TIMESTAMP = 1777161775 +SHA256 (openssh-10.3p1.tar.gz) = 56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4 +SIZE (openssh-10.3p1.tar.gz) = 2007369 +SHA256 (openssh-10.3p1-gsskex-all-debian-rh-10.3p1.patch) = 58f2d59009442572107f6e02c43145676d4ee6461907f719820c77b07adb6612 +SIZE (openssh-10.3p1-gsskex-all-debian-rh-10.3p1.patch) = 126667 diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-blacklistd b/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-blacklistd index 698c109ccfe6..70c6efd8c6ab 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-blacklistd +++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-blacklistd @@ -1,415 +1,426 @@ --- Makefile.in.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ Makefile.in 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS) FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \ @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@ + +LIBSSH_OBJS+= blacklist.o all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) --- auth-pam.c.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ auth-pam.c 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "srclimit.h" +#include "blacklist_client.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; @@ -936,6 +937,8 @@ sshbuf_free(buffer); return (0); } + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(NULL, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + "PAM illegal user"); error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost); --- auth.c.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ auth.c 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "channels.h" +#include "blacklist_client.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; @@ -283,8 +284,12 @@ authmsg = "Postponed"; else if (partial) authmsg = "Partial"; - else + else { authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; + if (authenticated) + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK, + "Authenticated"); + } if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) { if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) @@ -332,6 +337,7 @@ { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Maximum attempts exceeded"); error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2", authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", @@ -492,6 +498,8 @@ aix_restoreauthdb(); #endif if (pw == NULL) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + "Invalid user"); logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d", user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN --- blacklist.c.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ blacklist.c 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2015 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2016 The FreeBSD Foundation + * All rights reserved. + * + * Portions of this software were developed by Kurt Lidl + * under sponsorship from the FreeBSD Foundation. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Christos Zoulas. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include +#include "blacklist_client.h" + +static struct blacklist *blstate = NULL; + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* internal definition from bl.h */ +struct blacklist *bl_create(bool, char *, void (*)(int, const char *, va_list)); + +/* impedence match vsyslog() to sshd's internal logging levels */ +void +im_log(int priority, const char *message, va_list args) +{ + LogLevel imlevel; + + switch (priority) { + case LOG_ERR: + imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; + break; + case LOG_DEBUG: + imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + break; + case LOG_INFO: + imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + break; + default: + imlevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2; + } + do_log2(imlevel, message, args); +} + +void +blacklist_init(void) +{ + + if (options.use_blacklist) + blstate = bl_create(false, NULL, im_log); +} + +void +blacklist_notify(struct ssh *ssh, int action, const char *msg) +{ + + if (blstate != NULL && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) + (void)blacklist_r(blstate, action, + ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), msg); +} --- blacklist_client.h.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ blacklist_client.h 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2015 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (c) 2016 The FreeBSD Foundation + * All rights reserved. + * + * Portions of this software were developed by Kurt Lidl + * under sponsorship from the FreeBSD Foundation. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Christos Zoulas. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef BLACKLIST_CLIENT_H +#define BLACKLIST_CLIENT_H + +#ifndef BLACKLIST_API_ENUM +enum { + BLACKLIST_AUTH_OK = 0, + BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + BLACKLIST_ABUSIVE_BEHAVIOR, + BLACKLIST_BAD_USER +}; +#endif + +#ifdef USE_BLACKLIST +void blacklist_init(void); +void blacklist_notify(struct ssh *, int, const char *); + +#define BLACKLIST_INIT() blacklist_init() +#define BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh,x,msg) blacklist_notify(ssh,x,msg) + +#else + +#define BLACKLIST_INIT() +#define BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh,x,msg) + +#endif + + +#endif /* BLACKLIST_CLIENT_H */ --- monitor.c.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ monitor.c 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "monitor.h" +#include "blacklist_client.h" + #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif @@ -343,16 +345,24 @@ } } if (authctxt->failures > options.max_authtries) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + "Too many authentication attempts"); /* Shouldn't happen */ fatal_f("privsep child made too many authentication " "attempts"); } } - if (!authctxt->valid) - fatal_f("authenticated invalid user"); - if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) + if (!authctxt->valid) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + "Authenticated invalid user"); + fatal_f("authenticated invalid user"); + } + if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + "Authentication method name unknown"); fatal_f("authentication method name unknown"); + } debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user); auth_attempted = 0; --- servconf.c.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ servconf.c 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; + options->use_blacklist = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; @@ -449,6 +458,8 @@ options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 0; + if (options->use_blacklist == -1) + options->use_blacklist = 0; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) @@ -567,6 +568,7 @@ sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sUseBlacklist, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize, sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList, @@ -700,6 +712,8 @@ { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "useblacklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "useblocklist", sUseBlacklist, SSHCFG_GLOBAL } /* alias */, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -1782,6 +1796,10 @@ intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; + case sUseBlacklist: + intptr = &options->use_blacklist; + goto parse_flag; + case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av); @@ -3279,6 +3297,7 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseBlacklist, o->use_blacklist); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding); --- servconf.h.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ servconf.h 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int max_sessions; char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ int use_dns; + int use_blacklist; int client_alive_interval; /* * poke the client this often to * see if it's still there ---- sshd-session.c.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 -+++ sshd-session.c 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 -@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ +--- sshd-session.c.orig 2026-04-02 01:09:03.000000000 -0700 ++++ sshd-session.c 2026-04-25 16:49:54.889134000 -0700 +@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ #include "sk-api.h" #include "srclimit.h" #include "dh.h" +#include "blacklist_client.h" - #ifdef LIBWRAP - #include -@@ -1175,6 +1176,8 @@ + /* Re-exec fds */ + #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) +@@ -1147,6 +1148,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + + BLACKLIST_INIT(); /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do -@@ -1249,8 +1271,10 @@ - } - - if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, -- options.version_addendum)) != 0) -+ options.version_addendum)) != 0) { -+ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Banner exchange"); - sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); -+ } - - ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); - -@@ -1395,7 +1419,10 @@ +@@ -1361,8 +1364,11 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif /* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */ -- if (i == 255 && auth_attempted) -+ if (i == 255 && auth_attempted) { +- if (i == 255 && monitor_auth_attempted()) ++ if (i == 255 && monitor_auth_attempted()) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(the_active_state, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, + "Fatal exit"); _exit(EXIT_AUTH_ATTEMPTED); + } + if (i == 255 && monitor_invalid_user()) + _exit(EXIT_INVALID_USER); _exit(i); - } --- sshd_config.5.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ sshd_config.5 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -2009,6 +2009,20 @@ is to never expire connections for having no open channels. This option may be useful in conjunction with .Cm ChannelTimeout . +.It Cm UseBlacklist +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +attempts to send authentication success and failure messages +to the +.Xr blacklistd 8 +daemon. +The default is +.Cm no . +For forward compatibility with an upcoming +.Xr blacklistd +rename, the +.Cm UseBlocklist +alias can be used instead. .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 --- sshd_config.orig 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 +++ sshd_config 2025-10-02 12:00:00.000000000 @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none +#UseBlacklist no #VersionAddendum none # no default banner path +--- sshd-auth.c.orig 2026-04-25 16:47:09.675535000 -0700 ++++ sshd-auth.c 2026-04-25 16:48:05.928839000 -0700 +@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ + #include "srclimit.h" + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "dh.h" ++#include "blacklist_client.h" + + /* Privsep fds */ + #define PRIVSEP_MONITOR_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) +@@ -812,8 +813,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + free(hkalgs); + + if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, +- options.version_addendum)) != 0) ++ options.version_addendum)) != 0) { ++ BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Banner exchange"); + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); ++ } + mm_sshkey_setcompat(ssh); /* tell monitor */ + + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn b/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn index 037930f981b4..6601e745cdf9 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn +++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn @@ -1,1304 +1,1302 @@ diff -urN -x configure -x config.guess -x config.h.in -x config.sub work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/HPN-README work/openssh-6.8p1/HPN-README --- work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/HPN-README 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600 +++ work/openssh-6.8p1/HPN-README 2015-04-01 22:16:49.869215000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +Notes: + +MULTI-THREADED CIPHER: +The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations +on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption. +Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up +to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to +achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this +more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single +thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal +performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection. +The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same +nomenclature. +Use examples: ssh -caes128-ctr you@host.com + scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you@host.com:~/file + +NONE CIPHER: +To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and +you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE +feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not +spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will +be disabled. + +The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning +on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need +at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The +HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail. + +http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh + +BUFFER SIZES: + +If HPN is disabled the receive buffer size will be set to the +OpenSSH default of 64K. + +If an HPN system connects to a nonHPN system the receive buffer will +be set to the HPNBufferSize value. The default is 2MB but user adjustable. + +If an HPN to HPN connection is established a number of different things might +happen based on the user options and conditions. + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set +HPN Buffer Size = up to 64MB +This is the default state. The HPN buffer size will grow to a maximum of 64MB +as the TCP receive buffer grows. The maximum HPN Buffer size of 64MB is +geared towards 10GigE transcontinental connections. + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set +HPN Buffer Size = TCP receive buffer value. +Users on non-autotuning systesm should disable TCPRcvBufPoll in the +ssh_cofig and sshd_config + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set +HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCP receive buffer and HPNBufferSize. +This would be the system defined TCP receive buffer (RWIN). + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf SET +HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize. +Generally there is no need to set both. + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set +HPN Buffer Size = grows to HPNBufferSize +The buffer will grow up to the maximum size specified here. + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET +HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize. +Generally there is no need to set both of these, especially on autotuning +systems. However, if the users wishes to override the autotuning this would be +one way to do it. + +Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET +HPN Buffer Size = TCPRcvBuf. +This will override autotuning and set the TCP recieve buffer to the user defined +value. + + +HPN Specific Configuration options + +TcpRcvBuf=[int]KB client + set the TCP socket receive buffer to n Kilobytes. It can be set up to the +maximum socket size allowed by the system. This is useful in situations where +the tcp receive window is set low but the maximum buffer size is set +higher (as is typical). This works on a per TCP connection basis. You can also +use this to artifically limit the transfer rate of the connection. In these +cases the throughput will be no more than n/RTT. The minimum buffer size is 1KB. +Default is the current system wide tcp receive buffer size. + +TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server + enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life +of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled +for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista) +default is yes. + +NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server + enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used +when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However, +it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted +even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default. + +NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client + Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after +authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client +and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE +cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an +error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly +have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in +interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default. + +HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server + In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact +of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is +helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no. + +HPNBufferSize=[int]KB client/server + This is the default buffer size the HPN functionality uses when interacting +with nonHPN SSH installations. Conceptually this is similar to the TcpRcvBuf +option as applied to the internal SSH flow control. This value can range from +1KB to 64MB (1-65536). Use of oversized or undersized buffers can cause performance +problems depending on the length of the network path. The default size of this buffer +is 2MB. + + +Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier@psc.edu) + The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed + by Michael Stevens (mstevens@andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was + implemented by Ben Bennet (ben@psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota + (tasota@gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013. + This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National + Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation. --- channels.c.orig 2023-02-02 04:21:54.000000000 -0800 +++ channels.c 2023-02-03 10:45:34.136793000 -0800 @@ -229,6 +229,12 @@ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels * /* Setup helper */ static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); + +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +static int hpn_disabled = 0; +static int hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024; +#endif + /* -- channel core */ void @@ -495,6 +501,9 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, in c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + c->dynamic_window = 0; +#endif c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->ctl_chan = -1; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ @@ -1190,6 +1199,30 @@ channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +static int +channel_tcpwinsz(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0; + socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz); + int ret = -1; + + /* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */ + if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) + return 128 * 1024; + + ret = getsockopt(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), + SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz); + /* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */ + if ((ret == 0) && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) + tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + + debug2("tcpwinsz: tcp connection %d, Receive window: %d", + ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), tcpwinsz); + return tcpwinsz; +} +#endif + static void channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) { @@ -2301,18 +2334,29 @@ channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { + u_int addition = 0; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + u_int32_t tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz(ssh); + /* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */ + if (c->dynamic_window && (tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) { + /* grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain pressure */ + addition = 1.5 * (tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max); + c->local_window_max += addition; + debug("Channel: Window growth to %d by %d bytes", c->local_window_max, addition); + } +#endif if (!c->have_remote_id) fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed + addition)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self); } debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, - c->local_window, c->local_consumed); - c->local_window += c->local_consumed; + c->local_window, c->local_consumed + addition); + c->local_window += c->local_consumed + addition; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; @@ -3709,6 +3753,17 @@ channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *lis return addr; } +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +void +channel_set_hpn(int external_hpn_disabled, int external_hpn_buffer_size) +{ + hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled; + hpn_buffer_size = external_hpn_buffer_size; + debug("HPN Disabled: %d, HPN Buffer Size: %d", hpn_disabled, + hpn_buffer_size); +} +#endif + static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, @@ -3848,6 +3903,17 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + /* + * explicitly test for hpn disabled option. if true use smaller + * window size. + */ + if (!hpn_disabled) + c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, + -1, hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "port listener", 1); + else +#endif c = channel_new(ssh, "port-listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); @@ -5016,6 +5082,14 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_displ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (!hpn_disabled) + nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, + hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); + else +#endif nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11-listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, --- work/openssh-7.7p1/channels.h.orig 2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh-7.7p1/channels.h 2018-06-27 16:38:40.766588000 -0700 @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ struct Channel { u_int local_maxpacket; int extended_usage; int single_connection; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + int dynamic_window; +#endif char *ctype; /* type */ @@ -335,5 +338,10 @@ void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +/* hpn handler */ +void channel_set_hpn(int, int); +#endif #endif --- work/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c.orig 2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c 2018-06-27 16:55:43.165788000 -0700 @@ -212,7 +212,12 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names) for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { c = cipher_by_name(p); +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + if (c == NULL || ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0 && + (c->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)) { +#else if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) { +#endif free(cipher_list); return 0; } --- work/openssh/clientloop.c.orig 2023-12-18 06:59:50.000000000 -0800 +++ work/openssh/clientloop.c 2024-01-08 16:27:47.806586000 -0800 @@ -1813,6 +1813,15 @@ client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *reques sock = x11_connect_display(ssh); if (sock < 0) return NULL; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + /* again is this really necessary for X11? */ + if (!options.hpn_disabled) + c = channel_new(ssh, "x11-connection", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + options.hpn_buffer_size, + CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); + else +#endif c = channel_new(ssh, "x11-connection", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); @@ -1848,6 +1857,14 @@ client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *requ else debug2_fr(r, "ssh_agent_bind_hostkey"); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (!options.hpn_disabled) + c = channel_new(ssh, "agent-connection", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, + "authentication agent connection", 1); + else +#endif c = channel_new(ssh, "agent-connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, @@ -1876,6 +1893,12 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode, } debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (!options.hpn_disabled) + c = channel_new(ssh, "tun-connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, + options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); + else +#endif c = channel_new(ssh, "tun-connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; --- work/openssh/compat.c.orig 2021-04-15 20:55:25.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/compat.c 2021-04-28 14:37:33.129317000 -0700 @@ -149,6 +149,14 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version) debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); ssh->compat = check[i].bugs; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + /* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */ + if (strstr(version,"OpenSSH") != NULL && + strstr(version,"hpn") == NULL) { + ssh->compat |= SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW; + debug("Remote is NON-HPN aware"); + } +#endif return; } } --- work/openssh/compat.h.orig 2015-05-29 03:27:21.000000000 -0500 +++ work/openssh/compat.h 2015-06-02 09:55:04.208681000 -0500 @@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 #define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 #define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW 0x80000000 +#endif void enable_compat13(void); void enable_compat20(void); --- work/openssh/configure.ac.orig 2020-03-22 11:06:53.034550000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/configure.ac 2020-03-22 11:07:10.017487000 -0700 @@ -4778,6 +4778,25 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], ] ) # maildir +#check whether user wants HPN support +HPN_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(hpn, + [ --with-hpn Enable HPN support], + [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HPN_ENABLED,1,[Define if you want HPN support.]) + HPN_MSG="yes" + fi ] +) +#check whether user wants NONECIPHER support +NONECIPHER_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(nonecipher, + [ --with-nonecipher Enable NONECIPHER support], + [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE(NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED,1,[Define if you want NONECIPHER support.]) + NONECIPHER_MSG="yes" + fi ] +) + if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) disable_ptmx_check=yes @@ -5459,6 +5478,8 @@ echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11" echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk" +echo " HPN support: $HPN_MSG" +echo " NONECIPHER support: $NONECIPHER_MSG" echo "" --- work/openssh/kex.c.orig 2023-12-18 06:59:50.000000000 -0800 +++ work/openssh/kex.c 2024-01-08 16:24:07.547292000 -0800 @@ -1252,6 +1252,20 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) peer[ncomp] = NULL; goto out; } +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name); + if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) { + int auth_flag; + + auth_flag = ssh_packet_authentication_state(ssh); + debug("Requesting NONE. Authflag is %d", auth_flag); + if (auth_flag == 1) { + debug("None requested post authentication."); + } else { + fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed."); + } + } +#endif debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s", ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", newkeys->enc.name, @@ -1462,7 +1476,7 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeo */ int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms, - const char *version_addendum) + const char *version_addendum, int hpn_disabled) { int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch, oerrno = 0; size_t len, n; @@ -1479,8 +1493,13 @@ kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeo sshbuf_reset(our_version); if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0') version_addendum = NULL; - if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%s%s%s\r\n", + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%s%s%s%s\r\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN, +#else + "", +#endif version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ", version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; --- work/openssh-7.7p1/packet.c.orig 2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh-7.7p1/packet.c 2018-06-27 16:42:42.739507000 -0700 @@ -926,6 +926,24 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) return 0; } +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED +/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */ +int rekey_requested = 0; +void +packet_request_rekeying(void) +{ + rekey_requested = 1; +} + +int +ssh_packet_authentication_state(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + + return(state->after_authentication); +} +#endif + #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) static int ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) @@ -944,6 +962,14 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbou /* Peer can't rekey */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) return 0; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + /* used to force rekeying when called for by the none + * cipher switch methods -cjr */ + if (rekey_requested == 1) { + rekey_requested = 0; + return 1; + } +#endif /* * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to --- work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/packet.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500 +++ work/openssh-6.8p1/packet.h 2015-04-03 16:10:34.728161000 -0500 @@ -206,6 +206,11 @@ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); void sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l); const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED +void packet_request_rekeying(void); +int ssh_packet_authentication_state(struct ssh *ssh); +#endif + #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) # undef BIGNUM # undef EC_KEY --- work/openssh/readconf.c.orig 2025-04-09 00:02:43.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/readconf.c 2025-04-10 22:29:45.138038000 -0700 @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +#include "sshbuf.h" +#endif /* Format of the configuration file: @@ -172,6 +175,12 @@ typedef enum { oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, oVisualHostKey, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull, +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize, oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf, +#endif +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + oNoneSwitch, oNoneEnabled, +#endif oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, @@ -323,6 +332,16 @@ static struct { { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */ { "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */ +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled }, + { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch }, +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll }, + { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf }, + { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled }, + { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize }, +#endif { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider }, @@ -1332,6 +1351,44 @@ parse_time: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + case oHPNDisabled: + intptr = &options->hpn_disabled; + goto parse_flag; + + case oHPNBufferSize: + intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size; + goto parse_int; + + case oTcpRcvBufPoll: + intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll; + goto parse_flag; + + case oTcpRcvBuf: + intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf; + goto parse_int; +#endif + +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + case oNoneEnabled: + intptr = &options->none_enabled; + goto parse_flag; + + /* we check to see if the command comes from the */ + /* command line or not. If it does then enable it */ + /* otherwise fail. NONE should never be a default configuration */ + case oNoneSwitch: + if(strcmp(filename,"command-line") == 0) { + intptr = &options->none_switch; + goto parse_flag; + } else { + error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename); + error("Continuing..."); + debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename); + return 0; + } +#endif + case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; @@ -2742,6 +2799,16 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + options->none_switch = -1; + options->none_enabled = -1; +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + options->hpn_disabled = -1; + options->hpn_buffer_size = -1; + options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1; + options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1; +#endif options->session_type = -1; options->stdin_null = -1; options->fork_after_authentication = -1; @@ -2916,6 +2983,34 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + if (options->none_switch == -1) + options->none_switch = 0; + if (options->none_enabled == -1) + options->none_enabled = 0; +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (options->hpn_disabled == -1) + options->hpn_disabled = 0; + if (options->hpn_buffer_size > -1) { + /* if a user tries to set the size to 0 set it to 1KB */ + if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0) + options->hpn_buffer_size = 1; + /* limit the buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */ + if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) { + options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + debug("User requested buffer larger than 256MB. Request reverted to 256MB"); + } else + options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024; + debug("hpn_buffer_size set to %d", options->hpn_buffer_size); + } + if (options->tcp_rcv_buf == 0) + options->tcp_rcv_buf = 1; + if (options->tcp_rcv_buf > -1) + options->tcp_rcv_buf *=1024; + if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1) + options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1; +#endif if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { --- work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/readconf.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500 +++ work/openssh-6.8p1/readconf.h 2015-04-03 13:47:45.670125000 -0500 @@ -105,6 +105,16 @@ int clear_forwardings; int enable_ssh_keysign; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */ + int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */ +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + int tcp_rcv_buf; /* user switch to set tcp recv buffer */ + int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */ + int hpn_disabled; /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */ + int hpn_buffer_size; /* User definable size for HPN buffer window */ +#endif int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; --- work/openssh/scp.c.orig 2020-09-27 00:25:01.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/scp.c 2020-11-10 10:31:03.060729000 -0800 @@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerr; - char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; + char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[COPY_BUFLEN], visbuf[COPY_BUFLEN]; char **patterns = NULL; size_t n, npatterns = 0; struct timeval tv[2]; --- work/openssh/servconf.c.orig 2025-04-09 00:02:43.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/servconf.c 2025-04-10 22:30:44.919047000 -0700 @@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +#include "sshbuf.h" +#endif #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE "sshd" @@ -204,6 +207,14 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + options->none_enabled = -1; +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1; + options->hpn_disabled = -1; + options->hpn_buffer_size = -1; +#endif options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; @@ -471,6 +482,57 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + if (options->none_enabled == -1) + options->none_enabled = 0; +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (options->hpn_disabled == -1) + options->hpn_disabled = 0; + + if (options->hpn_buffer_size == -1) { + /* + * option not explicitly set. Now we have to figure out + * what value to use. + */ + if (options->hpn_disabled == 1) { + options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + } else { + int sock, socksize; + socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize); + + /* + * get the current RCV size and set it to that + * create a socket but don't connect it + * we use that the get the rcv socket size + */ + sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &socksize, &socksizelen); + close(sock); + options->hpn_buffer_size = socksize; + debug ("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options->hpn_buffer_size); + } + } else { + /* + * we have to do this incase the user sets both values in a + * contradictory manner. hpn_disabled overrrides + * hpn_buffer_size + */ + if (options->hpn_disabled <= 0) { + if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0) + options->hpn_buffer_size = 1; + /* limit the maximum buffer to SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX (currently 256MB) */ + if (options->hpn_buffer_size > (SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 1024)) { + options->hpn_buffer_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + } else { + options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024; + } + } else + options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + } +#endif + if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) @@ -573,6 +635,12 @@ typedef enum { sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sInclude, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + sNoneEnabled, +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize, +#endif sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, @@ -727,6 +795,14 @@ static struct { { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + { "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL }, +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + { "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL }, +#endif { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -1568,6 +1644,25 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *option intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + case sNoneEnabled: + intptr = &options->none_enabled; + goto parse_flag; +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + case sTcpRcvBufPoll: + intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHPNDisabled: + intptr = &options->hpn_disabled; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHPNBufferSize: + intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size; + goto parse_int; +#endif + case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; --- work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/servconf.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500 +++ work/openssh-6.8p1/servconf.h 2015-04-03 13:48:37.316827000 -0500 @@ -169,6 +169,15 @@ int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + int none_enabled; /* enable NONE cipher switch */ +#endif +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/ + int hpn_disabled; /* disable hpn functionality. false by default */ + int hpn_buffer_size; /* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */ +#endif + int permit_tun; int num_permitted_opens; --- work/openssh-7.7p1/serverloop.c.orig 2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh-7.7p1/serverloop.c 2018-06-27 16:53:02.246871000 -0700 @@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) goto done; debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (!options.hpn_disabled) + c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); + else +#endif c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; @@ -600,6 +606,10 @@ server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh) c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "server-session", 1); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll && !options.hpn_disabled) + c->dynamic_window = 1; +#endif if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); channel_free(ssh, c); --- work/openssh-7.7p1/session.c.orig 2018-04-01 22:38:28.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh-7.7p1/session.c 2018-06-27 17:01:40.730347000 -0700 @@ -2116,6 +2116,14 @@ session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (!options.hpn_disabled) + channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid, + fdout, fdin, fderr, + ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, + 1, is_tty, options.hpn_buffer_size); + else +#endif channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, --- work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/sftp.1 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500 +++ work/openssh-6.8p1/sftp.1 2015-04-01 22:16:49.921688000 -0500 @@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will increase memory usage. -The default is 64 outstanding requests. +The default is 256 outstanding requests providing for 8MB +of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer. .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. Note that --- work/openssh/ssh.c.orig 2025-10-05 19:25:16.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/ssh.c 2025-10-06 08:20:57.445863000 -0700 @@ -1092,6 +1092,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + /* + * ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a + * null cipher switch on an interactive session + * so explicitly disable it no matter what. + */ + options.none_switch = 0; +#endif break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); @@ -2235,6 +2243,78 @@ ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int succes NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ); } +static void +hpn_options_init(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + /* + * We need to check to see if what they want to do about buffer + * sizes here. In a hpn to nonhpn connection we want to limit + * the window size to something reasonable in case the far side + * has the large window bug. In hpn to hpn connection we want to + * use the max window size but allow the user to override it + * lastly if they disabled hpn then use the ssh std window size. + * + * So why don't we just do a getsockopt() here and set the + * ssh window to that? In the case of a autotuning receive + * window the window would get stuck at the initial buffer + * size generally less than 96k. Therefore we need to set the + * maximum ssh window size to the maximum hpn buffer size + * unless the user has specifically set the tcprcvbufpoll + * to no. In which case we *can* just set the window to the + * minimum of the hpn buffer size and tcp receive buffer size. + */ + + if (tty_flag) + options.hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + else + options.hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024; + + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW) { + debug("HPN to Non-HPN Connection"); + } else { + int sock, socksize; + socklen_t socksizelen; + if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll <= 0) { + sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + socksizelen = sizeof(socksize); + getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &socksize, &socksizelen); + close(sock); + debug("socksize %d", socksize); + options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize; + debug("HPNBufferSize set to TCP RWIN: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size); + } else { + if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) { + /* + * Create a socket but don't connect it: + * we use that the get the rcv socket size + */ + sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + /* + * If they are using the tcp_rcv_buf option, + * attempt to set the buffer size to that. + */ + if (options.tcp_rcv_buf) { + socksizelen = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf); + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &options.tcp_rcv_buf, socksizelen); + } + socksizelen = sizeof(socksize); + getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &socksize, &socksizelen); + close(sock); + debug("socksize %d", socksize); + options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize; + debug("HPNBufferSize set to user TCPRcvBuf: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size); + } + } + } + + debug("Final hpn_buffer_size = %d", options.hpn_buffer_size); + + channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size); +} + /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) @@ -2253,9 +2333,17 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + window = options.hpn_buffer_size; +#else window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; +#endif + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; +#endif window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } @@ -2265,6 +2353,12 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO); if (tty_flag) channel_set_tty(ssh, c); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) { + c->dynamic_window = 1; + debug ("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling"); + } +#endif debug3_f("channel_new: %d%s", c->self, tty_flag ? " (tty)" : ""); channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); @@ -2280,6 +2374,15 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_in { int r, id = -1; char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL; + +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + /* + * We need to initialize this early because the forwarding logic below + * might open channels that use the hpn buffer sizes. We can't send a + * window of -1 (the default) to the server as it breaks things. + */ + hpn_options_init(ssh); +#endif /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) --- work/openssh-7.7p1/sshbuf.h.orig 2018-06-27 16:11:24.503058000 -0700 +++ work/openssh-7.7p1/sshbuf.h 2018-06-27 16:12:01.359375000 -0700 @@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0xF000000 /* Hard maximum size 256MB */ +#else #define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */ +#endif #define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */ #define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */ #define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */ --- work/openssh/sshconnect.c.orig 2025-04-09 00:02:43.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/sshconnect.c 2025-04-10 22:32:59.573577000 -0700 @@ -341,6 +341,31 @@ check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct } } return -1; +} +#endif + +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +/* + * Set TCP receive buffer if requested. + * Note: tuning needs to happen after the socket is + * created but before the connection happens + * so winscale is negotiated properly -cjr + */ +static void +ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(int sock) +{ + void *buf = (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf; + int sz = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf); + int socksize; + socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize); + + debug("setsockopt Attempting to set SO_RCVBUF to %d", options.tcp_rcv_buf); + if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, buf, sz) >= 0) { + getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &socksizelen); + debug("setsockopt SO_RCVBUF: %.100s %d", strerror(errno), socksize); + } else + error("Couldn't set socket receive buffer to %d: %.100s", + options.tcp_rcv_buf, strerror(errno)); } #endif @@ -370,6 +395,11 @@ ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai) if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX) set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) + ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(sock); +#endif + /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL) return sock; @@ -1605,7 +1635,7 @@ ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, - options.version_addendum)) != 0) + options.version_addendum, options.hpn_disabled)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ --- work/openssh/sshconnect2.c.orig 2023-03-15 14:28:19.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/sshconnect2.c 2023-05-19 14:20:01.965073000 -0700 @@ -83,7 +83,13 @@ extern Options options; extern char *client_version_string; extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED +/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */ +/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */ +extern int tty_flag; +#endif + /* * SSH2 key exchange */ @@ -482,6 +488,34 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, if (!authctxt.success) fatal("Authentication failed."); +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + /* + * if the user wants to use the none cipher do it + * post authentication and only if the right conditions are met + * both of the NONE commands must be true and there must be no + * tty allocated. + */ + if ((options.none_switch == 1) && (options.none_enabled == 1)) { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; + char *s = NULL; + const char *none_cipher = "none"; + + if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */ + debug("Requesting none rekeying..."); + kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, none_cipher, + options.macs, + compression_alg_list(options.compression), + options.hostkeyalgorithms); + kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal); + packet_request_rekeying(); + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n"); + } else { + /* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */ + debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated"); + fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n"); + } + } +#endif if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), --- work/openssh/sshd.c.orig 2024-06-30 21:36:28.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/sshd.c 2024-07-01 14:03:40.471948000 -0700 @@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ #include "log.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED +#include "channels.h" +#endif #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "digest.h" @@ -742,6 +742,10 @@ listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) int ret, listen_sock; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + int socksize; + socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize); +#endif for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) @@ -786,6 +790,13 @@ listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); + +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &socksize, &socksizelen); + debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize); + debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size); +#endif /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) { @@ -1409,6 +1420,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + if (options.none_enabled == 1) { + char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers; + + xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers); + free(old_ciphers); + } +#endif + /* Check that options are sensible */ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && @@ -1742,6 +1762,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); +#ifdef HPN_ENABLED + /* set the HPN options for the child */ + channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size); +#endif + /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't ---- work/openssh/sshd-session.c.orig 2025-10-11 10:19:18.935826000 -0700 -+++ work/openssh/sshd-session.c 2025-10-11 10:20:11.460279000 -0700 -@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - } - - if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, -- options.version_addendum)) != 0) { -+ options.version_addendum, options.hpn_disabled)) != 0) { - BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Banner exchange"); - sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); - } --- work.clean/openssh-6.8p1/sshd_config 2015-04-01 22:07:18.248858000 -0500 +++ work/openssh-6.8p1/sshd_config 2015-04-01 22:16:49.932279000 -0500 @@ -111,6 +111,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server +# the following are HPN related configuration options +# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels +#TcpRcvBufPoll yes + +# disable hpn performance boosts +#HPNDisabled no + +# buffer size for hpn to non-hpn connections +#HPNBufferSize 2048 + + +# allow the use of the none cipher +#NoneEnabled no + # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no --- work/openssh/version.h.orig 2025-10-05 19:25:16.000000000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/version.h 2025-10-06 08:19:38.217160000 -0700 @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE +#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v15" --- work/openssh/kex.h.orig 2019-07-10 17:35:36.523216000 -0700 +++ work/openssh/kex.h 2019-07-10 17:35:41.997522000 -0700 @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ char *kex_alg_list(char); char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); -int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *); +int kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *, int); struct kex *kex_new(void); int kex_ready(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); ---- work/openssh/sshd-auth.c.orig 2025-04-10 22:36:29.699636000 -0700 -+++ work/openssh/sshd-auth.c 2025-04-10 22:36:33.770235000 -0700 -@@ -827,6 +827,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) +--- work/openssh/sshd-auth.c.orig 2026-04-25 16:58:23.868827000 -0700 ++++ work/openssh/sshd-auth.c 2026-04-25 16:59:29.116215000 -0700 +@@ -799,6 +799,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) struct kex *kex; int r; +#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED + if (options.none_enabled == 1) { + debug ("WARNING: None cipher enabled"); + char *old_ciphers = options.ciphers; + xasprintf(&options.ciphers, "%s,none", old_ciphers); + free(old_ciphers); + } +#endif if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, options.rekey_interval); +@@ -813,7 +821,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + free(hkalgs); + + if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, +- options.version_addendum)) != 0) { ++ options.version_addendum, options.hpn_disabled)) != 0) { + BLACKLIST_NOTIFY(ssh, BLACKLIST_AUTH_FAIL, "Banner exchange"); + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange"); + } diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn-gss-glue b/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn-gss-glue index 3924a57f9d67..81ee7e0e4250 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn-gss-glue +++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/extra-patch-hpn-gss-glue @@ -1,57 +1,56 @@ --- sshconnect2.c.orig 2019-07-19 11:53:14.918867000 -0700 +++ sshconnect2.c 2019-07-19 11:53:16.911086000 -0700 @@ -159,11 +159,6 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr char *s, *all_key; int r; -#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) - char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; - char *gss_host = NULL; -#endif - xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; @@ -197,6 +192,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr } #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; + char *gss_host = NULL; + if (options.gss_keyex) { /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ---- readconf.c.orig 2025-10-08 15:36:47.220504000 -0700 -+++ readconf.c 2025-10-08 15:38:09.729314000 -0700 -@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ +--- readconf.c.orig 2026-04-25 17:03:05.811011000 -0700 ++++ readconf.c 2026-04-25 17:03:28.148581000 -0700 +@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" #include "mac.h" - #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" -#include "ssh-gss.h" #include "version.h" /* Format of the configuration file: --- servconf.c.orig 2025-10-08 15:36:47.223017000 -0700 +++ servconf.c 2025-10-08 15:38:32.182178000 -0700 @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" @@ -66,7 +67,6 @@ #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" -#include "ssh-gss.h" #include "version.h" #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-servconf.c b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-servconf.c index 8061e4c76386..cba3768c1507 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-servconf.c +++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-servconf.c @@ -1,52 +1,44 @@ r99048 | des | 2002-06-29 05:51:56 -0500 (Sat, 29 Jun 2002) | 4 lines Changed paths: M /head/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h M /head/crypto/openssh/readconf.c M /head/crypto/openssh/servconf.c Apply FreeBSD's configuration defaults. --- servconf.c.orig 2026-04-25 16:05:26.936844000 -0700 +++ servconf.c 2026-04-25 16:18:06.486288000 -0700 -@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ - # include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" - #endif - -+#include "version.h" - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "ssh.h" @@ -298,7 +299,11 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) - options->use_pam = 0; +#ifdef USE_PAM + options->use_pam = 1; +#else + options->use_pam = 0; +#endif if (options->pam_service_name == NULL) options->pam_service_name = xstrdup(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE); @@ -328,7 +333,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) - options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD; + options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) @@ -380,7 +385,11 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) +#ifdef USE_PAM + options->password_authentication = 0; +#else options->password_authentication = 1; +#endif if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) diff --git a/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-session.c b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-session.c index da35125897b5..511b989893a4 100644 --- a/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-session.c +++ b/security/openssh-portable/files/patch-session.c @@ -1,109 +1,110 @@ bdrewery: - Refactor and simplify original commit. - Stop setting TERM=su without a term. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ r99055 | des | 2002-06-29 04:21:58 -0700 (Sat, 29 Jun 2002) | 6 lines Changed paths: M /head/crypto/openssh/session.c Make sure the environment variables set by setusercontext() are passed on to the child process. Reviewed by: ache Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs ---- session.c.orig 2021-04-15 20:55:25.000000000 -0700 -+++ session.c 2021-04-27 13:11:13.515917000 -0700 -@@ -939,6 +939,9 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * +--- session.c.orig 2026-04-02 01:09:03.000000000 -0700 ++++ session.c 2026-04-25 16:52:16.015940000 -0700 +@@ -940,6 +940,9 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * struct passwd *pw = s->pw; #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) char *path = NULL; +#else + extern char **environ; + char **senv, **var, *val; #endif /* Initialize the environment. */ -@@ -960,6 +963,9 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * +@@ -961,6 +964,9 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * } #endif + if (getenv("TZ")) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); + #ifdef GSSAPI /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter * the child's environment as they see fit -@@ -977,11 +983,30 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * +@@ -978,11 +984,30 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); #endif child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP - if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0) - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); - else - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", "su"); + /* + * Temporarily swap out our real environment with an empty one, + * let setusercontext() apply any environment variables defined + * for the user's login class, copy those variables to the child, + * free the temporary environment, and restore the original. + */ + senv = environ; + environ = xmalloc(sizeof(*environ)); + *environ = NULL; + (void)setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH); + for (var = environ; *var != NULL; ++var) { + if ((val = strchr(*var, '=')) != NULL) { + *val++ = '\0'; + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, *var, val); + } + free(*var); + } + free(environ); + environ = senv; #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* -@@ -1001,17 +1026,9 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * +@@ -1001,18 +1026,10 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char * + } # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ - +- - if (!options.use_pam) { - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", - _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); - } -- + /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); - if (getenv("TZ")) - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); - if (s->term) - child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); - if (s->display) -@@ -1225,7 +1242,8 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) + #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (getenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR")) { + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "XDG_RUNTIME_DIR", +@@ -1232,7 +1249,8 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f = NULL; - char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; + const char *nl; + char buf[1024], *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; struct stat sb; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP -@@ -1315,7 +1333,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) +@@ -1322,7 +1340,7 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, - (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { + (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); exit(1); }