diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/introduction/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/introduction/chapter.sgml index 5db0989bf6..975c08dd39 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/introduction/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/introduction/chapter.sgml @@ -1,943 +1,943 @@ Jim Mock Restructured, reorganized, and parts rewritten by Introduction Synopsis Thank you for your interest in FreeBSD! The following chapter covers various aspects of the FreeBSD Project, such as its history, goals, development model, and so on. After reading this chapter, you will know: How FreeBSD relates to other computer operating systems. The history of the FreeBSD Project. The goals of the FreeBSD Project. The basics of the FreeBSD open-source development model. And of course: where the name FreeBSD comes from. Welcome to FreeBSD! 4.4BSD-Lite FreeBSD is a 4.4BSD-Lite based operating system for Intel (x86 and &itanium;), AMD64, Alpha, Sun &ultrasparc; computers. Ports to other architectures are also underway. You can also read about the history of FreeBSD, or the current release. If you are interested in contributing something to the Project (code, hardware, unmarked bills), see the Contributing to FreeBSD article. What Can FreeBSD Do? FreeBSD has many noteworthy features. Some of these are: preemptive multitasking Preemptive multitasking with dynamic priority adjustment to ensure smooth and fair sharing of the computer between applications and users, even under the heaviest of loads. multi-user facilities Multi-user facilities which allow many people to use a FreeBSD system simultaneously for a variety of things. This means, for example, that system peripherals such as printers and tape drives are properly shared between all users on the system or the network and that individual resource limits can be placed on users or groups of users, protecting critical system resources from over-use. TCP/IP networking Strong TCP/IP networking with support for industry standards such as SLIP, PPP, NFS, DHCP, and NIS. This means that your FreeBSD machine can interoperate easily with other systems as well as act as an enterprise server, providing vital functions such as NFS (remote file access) and email services or putting your organization on the Internet with WWW, FTP, routing and firewall (security) services. memory protection Memory protection ensures that applications (or users) cannot interfere with each other. One application crashing will not affect others in any way. FreeBSD is a 32-bit operating system (64-bit on the Alpha, &itanium;, AMD64, and &ultrasparc;) and was designed as such from the ground up. X Window System XFree86 The industry standard X Window System (X11R6) provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for the cost of a common VGA card and monitor and comes with full sources. binary compatibility Linux binary compatibility SCO binary compatibility SVR4 binary compatibility BSD/OS binary compatibility NetBSD Binary compatibility with many programs built for Linux, SCO, SVR4, BSDI and NetBSD. Thousands of ready-to-run applications are available from the FreeBSD ports and packages collection. Why search the net when you can find it all right here? Thousands of additional and easy-to-port applications are available on the Internet. FreeBSD is source code compatible with most popular commercial &unix; systems and thus most applications require few, if any, changes to compile. virtual memory Demand paged virtual memory and merged VM/buffer cache design efficiently satisfies applications with large appetites for memory while still maintaining interactive response to other users. Symmetric Multi-Processing (SMP) SMP support for machines with multiple CPUs. compilers C compilers C++ compilers FORTRAN A full complement of C, C++, Fortran, and Perl development tools. Many additional languages for advanced research and development are also available in the ports and packages collection. source code Source code for the entire system means you have the greatest degree of control over your environment. Why be locked into a proprietary solution at the mercy of your vendor when you can have a truly open system? Extensive online documentation. And many more! 4.4BSD-Lite Computer Systems Research Group (CSRG) U.C. Berkeley FreeBSD is based on the 4.4BSD-Lite release from Computer Systems Research Group (CSRG) at the University of California at Berkeley, and carries on the distinguished tradition of BSD systems development. In addition to the fine work provided by CSRG, the FreeBSD Project has put in many thousands of hours in fine tuning the system for maximum performance and reliability in real-life load situations. As many of the commercial giants struggle to field PC operating systems with such features, performance and reliability, FreeBSD can offer them now! The applications to which FreeBSD can be put are truly limited only by your own imagination. From software development to factory automation, inventory control to azimuth correction of remote satellite antennae; if it can be done with a commercial &unix; product then it is more than likely that you can do it with FreeBSD too! FreeBSD also benefits significantly from literally thousands of high quality applications developed by research centers and universities around the world, often available at little to no cost. Commercial applications are also available and appearing in greater numbers every day. Because the source code for FreeBSD itself is generally available, the system can also be customized to an almost unheard of degree for special applications or projects, and in ways not generally possible with operating systems from most major commercial vendors. Here is just a sampling of some of the applications in which people are currently using FreeBSD: Internet Services: The robust TCP/IP networking built into FreeBSD makes it an ideal platform for a variety of Internet services such as: FTP servers FTP servers web servers World Wide Web servers (standard or secure [SSL]) firewall IP masquerading Firewalls and NAT (IP masquerading) gateways electronic mail Electronic Mail servers USENET USENET News or Bulletin Board Systems And more... With FreeBSD, you can easily start out small with an inexpensive 386 class PC and upgrade all the way up to a quad-processor Xeon with RAID storage as your enterprise grows. Education: Are you a student of computer science or a related engineering field? There is no better way of learning about operating systems, computer architecture and networking than the hands on, under the hood experience that FreeBSD can provide. A number of freely available CAD, mathematical and graphic design packages also make it highly useful to those whose primary interest in a computer is to get other work done! Research: With source code for the entire system available, FreeBSD is an excellent platform for research in operating systems as well as other branches of computer science. FreeBSD's freely available nature also makes it possible for remote groups to collaborate on ideas or shared development without having to worry about special licensing agreements or limitations on what may be discussed in open forums. router DNS Server Networking: Need a new router? A name server (DNS)? A firewall to keep people out of your internal network? FreeBSD can easily turn that unused 386 or 486 PC sitting in the corner into an advanced router with sophisticated packet-filtering capabilities. X Window System XFree86 X Window System Accelerated-X X Window workstation: FreeBSD is a fine choice for an inexpensive X terminal solution, either - using the freely available &xfree86; server or one of the + using the freely available X11 server or one of the excellent commercial servers provided by Xi Graphics. Unlike an X terminal, FreeBSD allows many applications to be run locally if desired, thus relieving the burden on a central server. FreeBSD can even boot diskless, making individual workstations even cheaper and easier to administer. GNU Compiler Collection Software Development: The basic FreeBSD system comes with a full complement of development tools including the renowned GNU C/C++ compiler and debugger. FreeBSD is available in both source and binary form on CDROM, DVD, and via anonymous FTP. Please see for more information about obtaining FreeBSD. Who Uses FreeBSD? Users Large sites running FreeBSD FreeBSD is used to power some of the biggest sites on the Internet, including: Yahoo! Yahoo! Apache Apache Blue Mountain Arts Blue Mountain Arts Pair Networks Pair Networks Sony Japan Sony Japan Netcraft Netcraft Weathernews Weathernews Supervalu Supervalu TELEHOUSE America TELEHOUSE America Sophos Anti-Virus Sophos Anti-Virus JMA Wired JMA Wired and many more. About the FreeBSD Project The following section provides some background information on the project, including a brief history, project goals, and the development model of the project. Jordan Hubbard Contributed by A Brief History of FreeBSD 386BSD Patchkit Hubbard, Jordan Williams, Nate Grimes, Rod FreeBSD Project history The FreeBSD project had its genesis in the early part of 1993, partially as an outgrowth of the Unofficial 386BSD Patchkit by the patchkit's last 3 coordinators: Nate Williams, Rod Grimes and myself. 386BSD Our original goal was to produce an intermediate snapshot of 386BSD in order to fix a number of problems with it that the patchkit mechanism just was not capable of solving. Some of you may remember the early working title for the project being 386BSD 0.5 or 386BSD Interim in reference to that fact. Jolitz, Bill 386BSD was Bill Jolitz's operating system, which had been up to that point suffering rather severely from almost a year's worth of neglect. As the patchkit swelled ever more uncomfortably with each passing day, we were in unanimous agreement that something had to be done and decided to assist Bill by providing this interim cleanup snapshot. Those plans came to a rude halt when Bill Jolitz suddenly decided to withdraw his sanction from the project without any clear indication of what would be done instead. Greenman, David Walnut Creek CDROM It did not take us long to decide that the goal remained worthwhile, even without Bill's support, and so we adopted the name FreeBSD, coined by David Greenman. Our initial objectives were set after consulting with the system's current users and, once it became clear that the project was on the road to perhaps even becoming a reality, I contacted Walnut Creek CDROM with an eye toward improving FreeBSD's distribution channels for those many unfortunates without easy access to the Internet. Walnut Creek CDROM not only supported the idea of distributing FreeBSD on CD but also went so far as to provide the project with a machine to work on and a fast Internet connection. Without Walnut Creek CDROM's almost unprecedented degree of faith in what was, at the time, a completely unknown project, it is quite unlikely that FreeBSD would have gotten as far, as fast, as it has today. 4.3BSD-Lite Net/2 U.C. Berkeley 386BSD Free Software Foundation The first CDROM (and general net-wide) distribution was FreeBSD 1.0, released in December of 1993. This was based on the 4.3BSD-Lite (Net/2) tape from U.C. Berkeley, with many components also provided by 386BSD and the Free Software Foundation. It was a fairly reasonable success for a first offering, and we followed it with the highly successful FreeBSD 1.1 release in May of 1994. Novell U.C. Berkeley Net/2 AT&T Around this time, some rather unexpected storm clouds formed on the horizon as Novell and U.C. Berkeley settled their long-running lawsuit over the legal status of the Berkeley Net/2 tape. A condition of that settlement was U.C. Berkeley's concession that large parts of Net/2 were encumbered code and the property of Novell, who had in turn acquired it from AT&T some time previously. What Berkeley got in return was Novell's blessing that the 4.4BSD-Lite release, when it was finally released, would be declared unencumbered and all existing Net/2 users would be strongly encouraged to switch. This included FreeBSD, and the project was given until the end of July 1994 to stop shipping its own Net/2 based product. Under the terms of that agreement, the project was allowed one last release before the deadline, that release being FreeBSD 1.1.5.1. FreeBSD then set about the arduous task of literally re-inventing itself from a completely new and rather incomplete set of 4.4BSD-Lite bits. The Lite releases were light in part because Berkeley's CSRG had removed large chunks of code required for actually constructing a bootable running system (due to various legal requirements) and the fact that the Intel port of 4.4 was highly incomplete. It took the project until November of 1994 to make this transition, at which point it released FreeBSD 2.0 to the net and on CDROM (in late December). Despite being still more than a little rough around the edges, the release was a significant success and was followed by the more robust and easier to install FreeBSD 2.0.5 release in June of 1995. We released FreeBSD 2.1.5 in August of 1996, and it appeared to be popular enough among the ISP and commercial communities that another release along the 2.1-STABLE branch was merited. This was FreeBSD 2.1.7.1, released in February 1997 and capping the end of mainstream development on 2.1-STABLE. Now in maintenance mode, only security enhancements and other critical bug fixes will be done on this branch (RELENG_2_1_0). FreeBSD 2.2 was branched from the development mainline (-CURRENT) in November 1996 as the RELENG_2_2 branch, and the first full release (2.2.1) was released in April 1997. Further releases along the 2.2 branch were done in the summer and fall of '97, the last of which (2.2.8) appeared in November 1998. The first official 3.0 release appeared in October 1998 and spelled the beginning of the end for the 2.2 branch. The tree branched again on Jan 20, 1999, leading to the 4.0-CURRENT and 3.X-STABLE branches. From 3.X-STABLE, 3.1 was released on February 15, 1999, 3.2 on May 15, 1999, 3.3 on September 16, 1999, 3.4 on December 20, 1999, and 3.5 on June 24, 2000, which was followed a few days later by a minor point release update to 3.5.1, to incorporate some last-minute security fixes to Kerberos. This will be the final release in the 3.X branch. There was another branch on March 13, 2000, which saw the emergence of the 4.X-STABLE branch, now considered to be the current -stable branch. There have been several releases from it so far: 4.0-RELEASE was introduced in March 2000, and the most recent &rel2.current;-RELEASE came out in &rel2.current.date;. There will be additional releases along the 4.X-stable (RELENG_4) branch well into 2003. The long-awaited 5.0-RELEASE was announced on January 19, 2003. The culmination of nearly three years of work, this release started FreeBSD on the path of advanced multiprocessor and application thread support and introduced support for the &ultrasparc; and ia64 platforms. This release was followed by 5.1 in June of 2003. Besides a number of new features, the 5.X releases also contain a number of major developments in the underlying system architecture. Along with these advances, however, comes a system that incorporates a tremendous amount of new and not-widely-tested code. For this reason, the 5.X releases are considered New Technology releases, while the 4.X series function as Production releases. In time, 5.X will be declared stable and work will commence on the next development branch, 6.0-CURRENT. For now, long-term development projects continue to take place in the 5.X-CURRENT (trunk) branch, and SNAPshot releases of 5.X on CDROM (and, of course, on the net) are continually made available from the snapshot server as work progresses. Jordan Hubbard Contributed by FreeBSD Project Goals FreeBSD Project goals The goals of the FreeBSD Project are to provide software that may be used for any purpose and without strings attached. Many of us have a significant investment in the code (and project) and would certainly not mind a little financial compensation now and then, but we are definitely not prepared to insist on it. We believe that our first and foremost mission is to provide code to any and all comers, and for whatever purpose, so that the code gets the widest possible use and provides the widest possible benefit. This is, I believe, one of the most fundamental goals of Free Software and one that we enthusiastically support. GNU General Public License (GPL) GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) BSD Copyright That code in our source tree which falls under the GNU General Public License (GPL) or Library General Public License (LGPL) comes with slightly more strings attached, though at least on the side of enforced access rather than the usual opposite. Due to the additional complexities that can evolve in the commercial use of GPL software we do, however, prefer software submitted under the more relaxed BSD copyright when it is a reasonable option to do so. Satoshi Asami Contributed by The FreeBSD Development Model FreeBSD Project development model The development of FreeBSD is a very open and flexible process, being literally built from the contributions of hundreds of people around the world, as can be seen from our list of contributors. FreeBSD's development infrastructure allow these hundreds of developers to collaborate over the Internet. We are constantly on the lookout for new developers and ideas, and those interested in becoming more closely involved with the project need simply contact us at the &a.hackers;. The &a.announce; is also available to those wishing to make other FreeBSD users aware of major areas of work. Useful things to know about the FreeBSD project and its development process, whether working independently or in close cooperation: The CVS repository CVS repository Concurrent Versions System CVS The central source tree for FreeBSD is maintained by CVS (Concurrent Versions System), a freely available source code control tool that comes bundled with FreeBSD. The primary CVS repository resides on a machine in Santa Clara CA, USA from where it is replicated to numerous mirror machines throughout the world. The CVS tree, which contains the -CURRENT and -STABLE trees, can all be easily replicated to your own machine as well. Please refer to the Synchronizing your source tree section for more information on doing this. The committers list committers The committers are the people who have write access to the CVS tree, and are authorized to make modifications to the FreeBSD source (the term committer comes from the &man.cvs.1; commit command, which is used to bring new changes into the CVS repository). The best way of making submissions for review by the committers list is to use the &man.send-pr.1; command. If something appears to be jammed in the system, then you may also reach them by sending mail to the &a.committers;. The FreeBSD core team core team The FreeBSD core team would be equivalent to the board of directors if the FreeBSD Project were a company. The primary task of the core team is to make sure the project, as a whole, is in good shape and is heading in the right directions. Inviting dedicated and responsible developers to join our group of committers is one of the functions of the core team, as is the recruitment of new core team members as others move on. The current core team was elected from a pool of committer candidates in July 2004. Elections are held every 2 years. Some core team members also have specific areas of responsibility, meaning that they are committed to ensuring that some large portion of the system works as advertised. For a complete list of FreeBSD developers and their areas of responsibility, please see the Contributors List Most members of the core team are volunteers when it comes to FreeBSD development and do not benefit from the project financially, so commitment should also not be misconstrued as meaning guaranteed support. The board of directors analogy above is not very accurate, and it may be more suitable to say that these are the people who gave up their lives in favor of FreeBSD against their better judgment! Outside contributors contributors Last, but definitely not least, the largest group of developers are the users themselves who provide feedback and bug fixes to us on an almost constant basis. The primary way of keeping in touch with FreeBSD's more non-centralized development is to subscribe to the &a.hackers; where such things are discussed. See for more information about the various FreeBSD mailing lists. The FreeBSD Contributors List is a long and growing one, so why not join it by contributing something back to FreeBSD today? Providing code is not the only way of contributing to the project; for a more complete list of things that need doing, please refer to the FreeBSD Project web site. In summary, our development model is organized as a loose set of concentric circles. The centralized model is designed for the convenience of the users of FreeBSD, who are provided with an easy way of tracking one central code base, not to keep potential contributors out! Our desire is to present a stable operating system with a large set of coherent application programs that the users can easily install and use — this model works very well in accomplishing that. All we ask of those who would join us as FreeBSD developers is some of the same dedication its current people have to its continued success! The Current FreeBSD Release NetBSD OpenBSD 386BSD Free Software Foundation U.C. Berkeley Computer Systems Research Group (CSRG) FreeBSD is a freely available, full source 4.4BSD-Lite based release for Intel &i386;, &i486;, &pentium;, &pentium; Pro, &celeron;, &pentium; II, &pentium; III, &pentium; 4 (or compatible), &xeon;, DEC Alpha and Sun &ultrasparc; based computer systems. It is based primarily on software from U.C. Berkeley's CSRG group, with some enhancements from NetBSD, OpenBSD, 386BSD, and the Free Software Foundation. Since our release of FreeBSD 2.0 in late 94, the performance, feature set, and stability of FreeBSD has improved dramatically. The largest change is a revamped virtual memory system with a merged VM/file buffer cache that not only increases performance, but also reduces FreeBSD's memory footprint, making a 5 MB configuration a more acceptable minimum. Other enhancements include full NIS client and server support, transaction TCP support, dial-on-demand PPP, integrated DHCP support, an improved SCSI subsystem, ISDN support, support for ATM, FDDI, Fast and Gigabit Ethernet (1000 Mbit) adapters, improved support for the latest Adaptec controllers, and many thousands of bug fixes. In addition to the base distributions, FreeBSD offers a ported software collection with thousands of commonly sought-after programs. At the time of this printing, there were over &os.numports; ports! The list of ports ranges from http (WWW) servers, to games, languages, editors, and almost everything in between. The entire ports collection requires approximately &ports.size; of storage, all ports being expressed as deltas to their original sources. This makes it much easier for us to update ports, and greatly reduces the disk space demands made by the older 1.0 ports collection. To compile a port, you simply change to the directory of the program you wish to install, type make install, and let the system do the rest. The full original distribution for each port you build is retrieved dynamically off the CDROM or a local FTP site, so you need only enough disk space to build the ports you want. Almost every port is also provided as a pre-compiled package, which can be installed with a simple command (pkg_add) by those who do not wish to compile their own ports from source. More information on packages and ports can be found in . A number of additional documents which you may find very helpful in the process of installing and using FreeBSD may now also be found in the /usr/share/doc directory on any recent FreeBSD machine. You may view the locally installed manuals with any HTML capable browser using the following URLs: The FreeBSD Handbook /usr/share/doc/handbook/index.html The FreeBSD FAQ /usr/share/doc/faq/index.html You can also view the master (and most frequently updated) copies at . diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml index e902dad898..9ed07a885d 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml @@ -1,2290 +1,2290 @@ Tom Rhodes Written by Mandatory Access Control Synopsis MAC Mandatory Access Control &os; 5.X introduced new security extensions from the TrustedBSD project based on the &posix;.1e draft. Two of the most significant new security mechanisms are file system Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) facilities. Mandatory Access Control allows new access control modules to be loaded, implementing new security policies. Some provide protections of a narrow subset of the system, hardening a particular service, while others provide comprehensive labeled security across all subjects and objects. The mandatory part of the definition comes from the fact that the enforcement of the controls is done by administrators and the system, and is not left up to the discretion of users as is done with discretionary access control (DAC, the standard file and System V IPC permissions on &os;). This chapter will focus on the Mandatory Access Control Framework (MAC Framework), and a set of pluggable policy modules implementing various security policies. After reading this chapter, you will know: What MAC modules are currently included in &os; and their associated policies. What MAC policies are capable of implementing, the difference between a label and non-labeled policy. How to efficiently configure a system to use the MAC framework. How to configure the different policies used by the MAC modules. How to implement a more secure environment using the MAC framework and the examples shown. How to test the MAC configuration to ensure the framework has been properly implemented. Before reading this chapter, you should: Understand &unix; and &os; basics (). Be familiar with the basics of kernel configuration/compilation (). Have some familiarity with security and how it pertains to &os; (). The improper use of the information in this chapter may cause loss of access to the system, aggravation of users, or inability to access the features - provided by &xfree86;. More importantly, MAC should not + provided by X11. More importantly, MAC should not be relied upon to completely secure a system. The MAC framework only augments existing security policy; without sound security practices and regular security checks, the system will never be completely secure. It should also be noted that the examples contained within this chapter are just that, examples. It is not recommended that these particular settings be rolled out on a production system. Implementing these policies takes a good deal of thought. One who does not fully understand exactly how everything works may find him or herself going back through the entire system and reconfiguring many files or directories. What Will Not Be Covered This chapter covers a broad range of security issues relating to the MAC framework; however, the development of new MAC policies will not be covered. A number of modules included with the MAC framework have specific characteristics which are provided for both testing and new module development. These include the &man.mac.test.4;, &man.mac.stub.4; and &man.mac.none.4; modules/policies. For more information on these modules and the various mechanisms they provide, please review the manual pages. Key Terms in this Chapter Before reading this chapter, a few key terms must be explained. This will hopefully clear up any confusion that may occur and avoid the abrupt introduction of new terms and information. compartment: A compartment is a a set of programs and data to be partitioned or separated, where users are given explicit access to specific components of a system. Also, a compartment represents a grouping, such as a work group, department, project, or topic. Using compartments, it is possible to implement a need-to-know policy. integrity: Integrity, as a key concept, is the level of trust which can be placed on data. As the integrity of the data is elevated, so does the ability to trust that data. label: A label is a security attribute which can be applied to files, directories, or other items in the system. It could be considered to be a confidentiality stamp; when a label is placed on a file it describes the security properties for that specific file and will only permit access by files, users, resources, etc. with a similar security setting. The meaning and interpretation of label values depends on the policy: while some policies might treat a label as representing the integrity or secrecy of an object, other policies might use labels to hold rules for access. level: The increased or decreased setting of a security attribute. As the level increases, its security is considered to elevate as well. multilabel: The property is a file system option which can be set in single user mode using the &man.tunefs.8; utility; set during the boot operation using the &man.fstab.5; file; or during the creation of a new file system. This option will permit an administrator to apply different MAC labels on different objects. This option only applies to labeled policies. object: An object or system object is an entity through which information flows under the direction of a subject. This includes directories, files, fields, screens, keyboards, memory, magnetic storage, printers or any other data storage/moving device. Basically, an object is a data container or a system resource; access to an object effectively means access to the data. policy: A collection of rules which defines how objectives are to be achieved. A policy usually documents how certain items are to be handled. This chapter will consider the term policy in this context as a security policy; i.e. a collection of rules which will control the flow of data and information and define whom will have access to that data and information. sensitivity: Usually used when discussing MLS. A sensitivity level is a term used to describe how important or secret the data should be. As the sensitivity level increases, so does the importance of the secrecy, or confidentiality of the data. single label: A single label is when the entire file system uses one label to enforce access control over the flow of data. When a file system has this set, which is any time when the option is not set, all files will conform to the same label setting. subject: a subject is any active entity that causes information to flow between objects; e.g. a user, user processor, system process, etc. On &os;, this is almost always a thread acting in a process on behalf of a user. Explanation of MAC With all of these new terms in mind, consider how the MAC framework augments the security of the system as a whole. The various security policies provided by the MAC framework could be used to protect the network and file systems, block users from accessing certain ports and sockets, and more. Perhaps the best use of the policies is to blend them together, by loading several security policy modules at a time, for a multi-layered security environment. In a multi-layered security environment, multiple policies are in effect to keep security in check. This is different then a hardening policy, which typically hardens elements of a system that is used only for specific purposes. The only downside is administrative overhead in cases of multiple file system labels, setting network access control user by user, etc. These downsides are minimal when compared to the lasting effect of the framework; for instance, the ability to pick choose which policies are required for a specific configuration keeps performance overhead down. The reduction of support for unneeded policies can increase the overall performance of the system as well as offer flexibility of choice. A good implementation would consider the overall security requirements and effectively implement the various policies offered by the framework. Thus a system utilizing MAC features should at least guarantee that a user will not be permitted to change security attributes at will; all user utilities, programs and scripts must work within the constraints of the access rules provided by the selected policies; and that total control of the MAC access rules are in the hands of the system administrator. It is the sole duty of the system administrator to carefully select the correct policies. Some environments may need to limit access control over the network; in these cases, the &man.mac.portacl.4;, &man.mac.ifoff.4; and even &man.mac.biba.4; policies might make good starting points. In other cases, strict confidentiality of file system objects might be required. Policies such as &man.mac.bsdextended.4; and &man.mac.mls.4; exist for this purpose. Policy decisions could be made based on network configuration. Perhaps only certain users should be permitted access to facilities provided by &man.ssh.1; to access the network or the Internet. The &man.mac.portacl.4; would be the policy of choice for these situations. But what should be done in the case of file systems? Should all access to certain directories be severed from other groups or specific users? Or should we limit user or utility access to specific files by setting certain objects as classified? In the file system case, access to objects might be considered confidential to some users but not to others. For an example, a large development team might be broken off into smaller groups of individuals. Developers in project A might not be permitted to access objects written by developers in project B. Yet they might need to access objects created by developers in project C; that is quite a situation indeed. Using the different policies provided by the MAC framework; users could be divided into these groups and then given access to the appropriate areas without the fear of information leakage. Thus, each policy has a unique way of dealing with the overall security of a system. Policy selection should be based on a well thought out security policy. In many cases, the overall policy may need to be revised and reimplemented on the system. Understanding the different policies offered by the MAC framework will help administrators choose the best policies for their situations. The default &os; kernel does not include the option for the MAC framework; thus the following kernel option must be added before trying any of the examples or information in this chapter: options MAC And the kernel will require a rebuild and a reinstall. While the various manual pages for MAC modules state that they may be built into the kernel, it is possible to lock the system out of the network and more. Implementing MAC is much like implementing a firewall, but care must be taken to prevent being completely locked out of the system. The ability to revert back to a previous configuration should be considered while the implementation of MAC remotely should be done with extreme caution. Understanding MAC Labels A MAC label is a security attribute which may be applied to subjects and objects throughout the system. When setting a label, the user must be able to comprehend what it is, exactly, that is being done. The attributes available on an object depend on the policy loaded, and that policies interpret their attributes in pretty different ways. If improperly configured due to lack of comprehension, or the inability to understand the implications, the result will be the unexpected and perhaps, undesired, behavior of the system. The security label on an object is used as a part of a security access control decision by a policy. With some policies, the label by itself contains all information necessary to make a decision; in other models, the labels may be processed as part of a larger rule set, etc. For instance, setting the label of biba/low on a file will represent a label maintained by the Biba policy, with a value of low. A few policies which support the labeling feature in &os; offers three specific predefined labels. These are the low, high, and equal labels. Although they enforce access control in a different manner with each policy, you can be sure that the low label will be the lowest setting, the equal label will set the subject or object to be disabled or unaffected, and the high label will enforce the highest setting available in the Biba and MLS policies. Within single label file system environments, only one label may be used on objects. This will enforce one set of access permissions across the entire system and in many environments may be all that is required. There are a few cases; however, where multiple labels may be set on objects or subjects in the file system. For those cases, the option may be passed to &man.tunefs.8;. In the case of Biba and MLS, a numeric label may be set to indicate the precise level of hierarchical control. This numeric level is used to partition or sort information into different groups of say, classification only permitting access to that group or a higher group level. In most cases the administrator will only be setting up a single label to use throughout the file system. Hey wait, this is similar to DAC! I thought MAC gave control strictly to the administrator. That statement still holds true, to some extent root is the one in control and who configures the policy so that users are placed in the appropriate categories/access levels. Alas, many policies can restrict the root user as well. Basic control over objects will then be released to the group but root may revoke or modify the settings at any time. This is the hierarchal/clearance model covered by policies such as Biba and MLS. Label Configuration Virtually all aspects of label policy configuration will be performed using the base system utilities. These commands provide a simple interface for object or subject configuration or the manipulation and verification of the configuration. All configuration may be done by use of the &man.setfmac.8; and &man.setpmac.8; utilities. The setfmac command is used to set MAC labels on system objects while the setpmac command is used to set the labels on system subjects. Observe: &prompt.root; setfmac biba/high test If no errors occurred with the command above, a prompt will be returned. The only time these commands are not quiescent is when an error occurred; similarly to the &man.chmod.1; and &man.chown.8; commands. In some cases this error may be a Permission denied and is usually obtained when the label is being set or modified on an object which is restricted.Other conditions may produce different failures. For instance, the file may not be owned by the user attempting to relabel the object, the object may not exist or may be read only. A mandatory policy will not allow the process to relabel the file, maybe because of a property of the file, a property of the process, or a property of the proposed new label value. For example: a user running at low integrity tries to change the label of a high integrity file. Or perhaps a user running at low integrity tries to change the label of a low integrity file to a high integrity label. The system administrator may use the following commands to overcome this: &prompt.root; setfmac biba/high test Permission denied &prompt.root; setpmac biba/low setfmac biba/high test &prompt.root; getfmac test test: biba/high As we see above, setpmac can be used to override the policy's settings by assigning a different label to the invoked process. The getpmac utility is usually used with currently running processes, such as sendmail: although it takes a process ID in place of a command the logic is extremely similar. If users attempt to manipulate a file not in their access, subject to the rules of the loaded policies, the Operation not permitted error will be displayed by the mac_set_link function. Common Label Types For the &man.mac.biba.4;, &man.mac.mls.4; and &man.mac.lomac.4; policy modules, the ability to assign simple labels is provided. These take the form of high, equal and low, what follows is a brief description of what these labels provide: The low label is considered the lowest label setting an object or subject may have. Setting this on objects or subjects will block their access to objects or subjects marked high. The equal label should only be placed on objects considered to be exempt from the policy. The high label grants an object or subject the highest possible setting. With respect to each policy module, each of those settings will instate a different information flow directive. Reading the proper manual pages will further explain the traits of these generic label configurations. Advanced Label Configuration Numeric grade numbers used for comparison:compartment+compartment; thus the following: biba/10:2+3+6(5:2+3-20:2+3+4+5+6) May be interpreted as: Biba Policy Label/Grade 10 :Compartments 2, 3 and 6: (grade 5 ...) In this example, the first grade would be considered the effective grade with effective compartments, the second grade is the low grade and the last one is the high grade. In most configurations these settings will not be used; indeed, they offered for more advanced configurations. When applied to system objects, they will only have a current grade/compartments as opposed to system subjects as they reflect the range of available rights in the system, and network interfaces, where they are used for access control. The grade and compartments in a subject and object pair are used to construct a relationship referred to as dominance, in which a subject dominates an object, the object dominates the subject, neither dominates the other, or both dominate each other. The both dominate case occurs when the two labels are equal. Due to the information flow nature of Biba, you have rights to a set of compartments, need to know, that might correspond to projects, but objects also have a set of compartments. Users may have to subset their rights using su or setpmac in order to access objects in a compartment from which they are not restricted. Users and Label Settings Users themselves are required to have labels so that their files and processes may properly interact with the security policy defined on the system. This is configured through the login.conf file by use of login classes. Every policy that uses labels will implement the user class setting. An example entry containing every policy is listed below: default:\ :copyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT:\ :welcome=/etc/motd:\ :setenv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K:\ :path=~/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:\ :manpath=/usr/share/man /usr/local/man:\ :nologin=/usr/sbin/nologin:\ :cputime=1h30m:\ :datasize=8M:\ :vmemoryuse=100M:\ :stacksize=2M:\ :memorylocked=4M:\ :memoryuse=8M:\ :filesize=8M:\ :coredumpsize=8M:\ :openfiles=24:\ :maxproc=32:\ :priority=0:\ :requirehome:\ :passwordtime=91d:\ :umask=022:\ :ignoretime@:\ :label=partition/13,mls/5,biba/10(5-15),lomac10[2]: The label option is used to set the user class default label which will be enforced by MAC. Users will never be permitted to modify this value, thus it can be considered not optional in the user case. In a real configuration, however, the administrator will never wish to enable every policy. It is recommended that the rest of this chapter be reviewed before any of this configuration is implemented. Users may change their label after the initial login; however, this change is subject constraints of the policy. The example above tells the Biba policy that a process's minimum integrity is 5, its maximum is 15, but the default effective label is 10. The process will run at 10 until it chooses to change label, perhaps due to the user using the setpmac command, which will be constrained by Biba to the range set at login. In all cases, after a change to login.conf, the login class capability database must be rebuilt using cap_mkdb and this will be reflected throughout every forthcoming example or discussion. It is useful to note that many sites may have a particularly large number of users requiring several different user classes. In depth planning is required as this may get extremely difficult to manage. Future versions of &os; will include a new way to deal with mapping users to labels; however, this will not be available until some time after &os; 5.3. Network Interfaces and Label Settings Labels may also be set on network interfaces to help control the flow of data across the network. In all cases they function in the same way the policies function with respect to objects. Users at high settings in biba, for example, will not be permitted to access network interfaces with a label of low. The may be passed to ifconfig when setting the MAC label on network interfaces. For example: &prompt.root; ifconfig bge0 maclabel biba/equal will set the MAC label of biba/equal on the &man.bge.4; interface. When using a setting similar to biba/high(low-high) the entire label should be quoted; otherwise an error will be returned. Each policy which supports labeling has some tunable which may be used to disable the MAC label on network interfaces. Setting the label to will have a similar effect. Review the output from sysctl, the policy manual pages, or even the information found later in this chapter for those tunables. Singlelabel or Multilabel? By default the system will use the option. But what does this mean to the administrator? There are several differences which, in their own right, offer pros and cons to the flexibility in the systems security model. The only permits for one label, for instance biba/high to be used for each subject or object. It provides for lower administration overhead but decreases the flexibility of policies which support labeling. Many administrators may want to use the option in their security policy. The option will permit each subject or object to have its own independent MAC label in place of the standard option which will allow only one label throughout the partition. The and label options are only required for the policies which implement the labeling feature, including the Biba, Lomac, MLS and SEBSD policies. In many cases, the may not need to be set at all. Consider the following situation and security model: &os; web-server using the MAC framework and a mix of the various policies. This machine only requires one label, biba/high, for everything in the system. Here the file system would not require the option as a single label will always be in effect. But, this machine will be a web server and should have the web server run at biba/low to prevent write up capabilities. The Biba policy and how it works will be discussed later, so if the previous comment was difficult to interpret just continue reading and return. The server could use a separate partition set at biba/low for most if not all of its runtime state. Much is lacking from this example, for instance the restrictions on data, configuration and user settings; however, this is just a quick example to prove the aforementioned point. If any of the non-labeling policies are to be used, then the option would never be required. These include the seeotheruids, portacl and partition policies. It should also be noted that using with a partition and establishing a security model based on functionality could open the doors for higher administrative overhead as everything in the file system would have a label. This includes directories, files, and even device nodes. The following command will set on the file systems to have multiple labels. This may only be done in single user mode: &prompt.root; tunefs -l enable / This is not a requirement for the swap file system. Some users have experienced problems with setting the flag on the root partition. If this is the case, please review the of this chapter. Controlling MAC with Tunables Without any modules loaded, there are still some parts of MAC which may be configured using the sysctl interface. These tunables are described below and in all cases the number one (1) means enabled while the number zero (0) means disabled: security.mac.enforce_fs defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC file system policies on the file systems. security.mac.enforce_kld defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC kernel linking policies on the dynamic kernel linker (see &man.kld.4;). security.mac.enforce_network defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC network policies. security.mac.enforce_pipe defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC policies on pipes. security.mac.enforce_process defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC policies on processes which utilize inter-process communication. security.mac.enforce_socket defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC policies on sockets (see the &man.socket.2; manual page). security.mac.enforce_system defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC policies on system activities such as accounting and rebooting. security.mac.enforce_vm defaults to one (1) and enforces MAC policies on the virtual memory system. Every policy or MAC option supports tunables. These usually hang off of the security.mac.<policyname> tree. To view all of the tunables from MAC use the following command: &prompt.root; sysctl -da | grep mac This should be interpreted as all of the basic MAC policies are enforced by default. If the modules were built into the kernel the system would be extremely locked down and most likely unable to communicate with the local network or connect to the Internet, etc. This is why building the modules into the kernel is not completely recommended. Not because it limits the ability to disable features on the fly with sysctl, but it permits the administrator to instantly switch the policies of a system without the requirement of rebuilding and reinstalling a new system. Module Configuration Every module included with the MAC framework may be either compiled into the kernel as noted above or loaded as a run-time kernel module. The recommended method is to add the module name to the /boot/loader.conf file so that it will load during the initial boot operation. The following sections will discuss the various MAC modules and cover their features. Implementing them into a specific environment will also be a consideration of this chapter. Some modules support the use of labeling, which is controlling access by enforcing a label such as this is allowed and this is not. A label configuration file may control how files may be accessed, network communication can be exchanged, and more. The previous section showed how the flag could be set on file systems to enable per-file or per-partition access control. A single label configuration would enforce only one label across the system, that is why the tunefs option is called . The MAC seeotheruids Module MAC See Other UIDs Policy Module name: mac_seeotheruids.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS Boot option: mac_seeotheruids_load="YES" The &man.mac.seeotheruids.4; module mimics and extends the security.bsd.see_other_uids and security.bsd.see_other_gids sysctl tunables. This option does not require any labels to be set before configuration and can operate transparently with the other modules. After loading the module, the following sysctl tunables may be used to control the features: security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled will enable the module's features and use the default settings. These default settings will deny users the ability to view processes and sockets owned by other users. security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled will allow a certain group to be exempt from this policy. To exempt specific groups from this policy, use the security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid=XXX sysctl tunable. In the above example, the XXX should be replaced with the numeric group ID to be exempted. security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled is used to exempt specific primary groups from this policy. When using this tunable, the security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled may not be set. It should be noted that the root user is not exempt from this policy. This is one of the large differences between the MAC version and the standard tunable version included by default: security.bsd.seeotheruids. The MAC bsdextended Module MAC File System Firewall Policy Module name: mac_bsdextended.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_BSDEXTENDED Boot option: mac_bsdextended_load="YES" The &man.mac.bsdextended.4; module enforces the file system firewall. This module's policy provides an extension to the standard file system permissions model, permitting an administrator to create a firewall-like ruleset to protect files, utilities, and directories in the file system hierarchy. The policy may be created using a utility, &man.ugidfw.8;, that has a syntax similar to that of &man.ipfw.8;. More tools can be written by using the functions in the &man.libugidfw.3; library. Extreme caution should be taken when working with this module; incorrect use could block access to certain parts of the file system. Examples After the &man.mac.bsdextended.4; module has been loaded, the following command may be used to list the current rule configuration: &prompt.root; ugidfw list 0 slots, 0 rules As expected, there are no rules defined. This means that everything is still completely accessible. To create a rule which will block all access by users but leave root unaffected, simply run the following command: &prompt.root; ugidfw add subject not uid root new object not uid root mode n In releases prior to &os; 5.3, the add parameter did not exist. In those cases the set should be used instead. See below for a command example. This is a very bad idea as it will block all users from issuing even the most simple commands, such as ls. A more patriotic list of rules might be: &prompt.root; ugidfw set 2 subject uid user1 object uid user2 mode n &prompt.root; ugidfw set 3 subject uid user1 object gid user2 mode n This will block any and all access, including directory listings, to user2's home directory from the username user1. In place of user1, the could be passed. This will enforce the same access restrictions above for all users in place of just one user. The root user will be unaffected by these changes. This should give a general idea of how the &man.mac.bsdextended.4; module may be used to help fortify a file system. For more information, see the &man.mac.bsdextended.4; and the &man.ugidfw.8; manual pages. The MAC ifoff Module MAC Interface Silencing Policy Module name: mac_ifoff.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_IFOFF Boot option: mac_ifoff_load="YES" The &man.mac.ifoff.4; module exists solely to disable network interfaces on the fly and keep network interfaces from being brought up during the initial system boot. It does not require any labels to be set up on the system, nor does it have a dependency on other MAC modules. Most of the control is done through the sysctl tunables listed below. security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled will enable/disable all traffic on the loopback (&man.lo.4;) interface. security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled will enable/disable all traffic on the Berkeley Packet Filter interface (&man.bpf.4;) security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled will enable/disable traffic on all other interfaces. One of the most common uses of &man.mac.ifoff.4; is network monitoring in an environment where network traffic should not be permitted during the boot sequence. Another suggested use would be to write a script which uses security/aide to automatically block network traffic if it finds new or altered files in protected directories. The MAC portacl Module MAC Port Access Control List Policy Module name: mac_portacl.ko Kernel configuration line: MAC_PORTACL Boot option: mac_portacl_load="YES" The &man.mac.portacl.4; module is used to limit binding to local TCP and UDP ports using a variety of sysctl variables. In essence &man.mac.portacl.4; makes it possible to allow non-root users to bind to specified privileged ports, i.e. ports fewer than 1024. Once loaded, this module will enable the MAC policy on all sockets. The following tunables are available: security.mac.portacl.enabled will enable/disable the policy completely.Due to a bug the security.mac.portacl.enabled sysctl variable will not work on &os; 5.2.1 or previous releases. security.mac.portacl.port_high will set the highest port number that &man.mac.portacl.4; will enable protection for. security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt will, when set to a non-zero value, exempt the root user from this policy. security.mac.portacl.rules will specify the actual mac_portacl policy; see below. The actual mac_portacl policy, as specified in the security.mac.portacl.rules sysctl, is a text string of the form: rule[,rule,...] with as many rules as needed. Each rule is of the form: idtype:id:protocol:port. The idtype parameter can be uid or gid and used to interpret the id parameter as either a user id or group id, respectively. The protocol parameter is used to determine if the rule should apply to TCP or UDP by setting the parameter to tcp or udp. The final port parameter is the port number to allow the specified user or group to bind to. Since the ruleset is interpreted directly by the kernel only numeric values can be used for the user ID, group ID, and port parameters. I.e. user, group, and port service names cannot be used. By default, on &unix;-like systems, ports fewer than 1024 can only be used by/bound to privileged processes, i.e. those run as root. For &man.mac.portacl.4; to allow non-privileged processes to bind to ports below 1024 this standard &unix; restriction has to be disabled. This can be accomplished by setting the &man.sysctl.8; variables net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedlow and net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh to zero. See the examples below or review the &man.mac.portacl.4; manual page for further information. Examples The following examples should illuminate the above discussion a little better: &prompt.root; sysctl security.mac.portacl.port_high=1023 &prompt.root; sysctl net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedlow=0 net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh=0 First we set &man.mac.portacl.4; to cover the standard privileged ports and disable the normal &unix; bind restrictions. &prompt.root; sysctl security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt=1 The root user should not be crippled by this policy, thus set the security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt to a non-zero value. The &man.mac.portacl.4; module has now been set up to behave the same way &unix;-like systems behave by default. &prompt.root; sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules=uid:80:tcp:80 Allow the user with UID 80 (normally the www user) to bind to port 80. This can be used to allow the www user to run a web server without ever having root privilege. &prompt.root; sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules=uid:1001:tcp:110,uid:1001:tcp:995 Permit the user with the UID of 1001 to bind to the TCP ports 110 (pop3) and 995 (pop3s). This will permit this user to start a server that accepts connections on ports 110 and 995. MAC Policies with Labeling Features The next few sections will discuss MAC policies which use labels. From here on this chapter will focus on the features of &man.mac.biba.4;, &man.mac.lomac.4;, &man.mac.partition.4;, and &man.mac.mls.4;. This is an example configuration only and should not be considered for a production implementation. The goal is to document and show the syntax as well as examples for implementation and testing. For these policies to work correctly several preparations must be made. Preparation for Labeling Policies The following changes are required in the login.conf file: An insecure class, or another class of similar type, must be added. The login class of insecure is not required and just used as an example here; different configurations may use another class name. The insecure class should have the following settings and definitions. Several of these can be altered but the line which defines the default label is a requirement and must remain. insecure:\ :copyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT:\ :welcome=/etc/motd:\ :setenv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K:\ :path=~/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:\ :manpath=/usr/share/man /usr/local/man:\ :nologin=/usr/sbin/nologin:\ :cputime=1h30m:\ :datasize=8M:\ :vmemoryuse=100M:\ :stacksize=2M:\ :memorylocked=4M:\ :memoryuse=8M:\ :filesize=8M:\ :coredumpsize=8M:\ :openfiles=24:\ :maxproc=32:\ :priority=0:\ :requirehome:\ :passwordtime=91d:\ :umask=022:\ :ignoretime@:\ :label=partition/13,mls/5,biba/low: The &man.cap.mkdb.1; command needs to be ran on &man.login.conf.5; before any of the users can be switched over to the new class. The root should also be placed into a login class; otherwise, almost every command executed by root will require the use of setpmac. Rebuilding the login.conf database may cause some errors later with the daemon class. Simply uncommenting the daemon account and rebuilding the database should alleviate these issues. Ensure that all partitions on which MAC labeling will be implemented support the . We must do this because many of the examples here contain different labels for testing purposes. Review the output from the mount command as a precautionary measure. Switch any users who will have the higher security mechanisms enforced over to the new user class. A quick run of &man.pw.8; or &man.vipw.8; should do the trick. The MAC partition Module MAC Process Partition Policy Module name: mac_partition.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_PARTITION Boot option: mac_partition_load="YES" The &man.mac.partition.4; policy will drop processes into specific partitions based on their MAC label. Think of it as a special type of &man.jail.8;, though that is hardly a worthy comparison. This is one module that should be added to the &man.loader.conf.5; file so that it loads and enables the policy during the boot process. Most configuration for this policy is done using the &man.setpmac.8; utility which will be explained below. The following sysctl tunable is available for this policy: security.mac.partition.enabled will enable the enforcement of MAC process partitions. When this policy is enabled, users will only be permitted to see their processes but will not be permitted to work with certain utilities. For instance, a user in the insecure class above will not be permitted to access the top command as well as many other commands that must spawn a process. To set or drop utilities into a partition label, use the setpmac utility: &prompt.root; setpmac partition/13 top This will add the top command to the label set on users in the insecure class. Note that all processes spawned by users in the insecure class will stay in the partition/13 label. Examples The following command will show you the partition label and the process list: &prompt.root; ps Zax This next command will allow the viewing of another user's process partition label and that user's currently running processes: &prompt.root; ps -ZU trhodes Users can see processes in root's label unless the &man.mac.seeotheruids.4; policy is loaded. A really crafty implementation could have all of the services disabled in /etc/rc.conf and started by a script that starts them with the proper labeling set. The following policies support integer settings in place of the three default labels offered. These options, including their limitations, are further explained in the module manual pages. The MAC Multi-Level Security Module MAC Multi-Level Security Policy Module name: mac_mls.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_MLS Boot option: mac_mls_load="YES" The &man.mac.mls.4; policy controls access between subjects and objects in the system by enforcing a strict information flow policy. In MLS environments, a clearance level is set in each subject or objects label, along with compartments. Since these clearance or sensibility levels can reach numbers greater than six thousand; it would be a daunting task for any system administrator to thoroughly configure each subject or object. Thankfully, three instant labels are already included in this policy. These labels are mls/low, mls/equal and mls/high. Since these labels are described in depth in the manual page, they will only get a brief description here: The mls/low label contains a low configuration which permits it to be dominated by all other objects. Anything labeled with mls/low will have a low clearance level and not be permitted to access information of a higher level. In addition, this label will prevent objects of a higher clearance level from writing or passing information on to them. The mls/equal label should be placed on objects considered to be exempt from the policy. The mls/high label is the highest level of clearance possible. Objects assigned this label will hold dominance over all other objects in the system; however, they will not permit the leaking of information to objects of a lower class. MLS provides for: A hierarchical security level with a set of non hierarchical categories; Fixed rules: no read up, no write down (a subject can have read access to objects on its own level or below, but not above. Similarly, a subject can have write access to objects on its own level or above but not beneath.); Secrecy (preventing inappropriate disclosure of data); Basis for the design of systems that concurrently handle data at multiple sensitivity levels (without leaking information between secret and confidential). The following sysctl tunables are available for the configuration of special services and interfaces: security.mac.mls.enabled is used to enable/disable the MLS policy. security.mac.mls.ptys_equal will label all &man.pty.4; devices as mls/equal during creation. security.mac.mls.revocation_enabled is used to revoke access to objects after their label changes to a label of a lower grade. security.mac.mls.max_compartments is used to set the maximum number of compartment levels with objects; basically the maximum compartment number allowed on a system. To manipulate the MLS labels, the &man.setfmac.8; command has been provided. To assign a label to an object, issue the following command: &prompt.root; setfmac mls/5 test To get the MLS label for the file test issue the following command: &prompt.root; getfmac test This is a summary of the MLS policy's features. Another approach is to create a master policy file in /etc which specifies the MLS policy information and to feed that file into the setfmac command. This method will be explained after all policies are covered. Observations: an object with lower clearance is unable to observe higher clearance processes. A basic policy would be to enforce mls/high on everything not to be read, even if it needs to be written. Enforce mls/low on everything not to be written, even if it needs to be read. And finally enforce mls/equal on the rest. All users marked insecure should be set at mls/low. The MAC Biba Module MAC Biba Integrity Policy Module name: mac_biba.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_BIBA Boot option: mac_biba_load="YES" The &man.mac.biba.4; module loads the MAC Biba policy. This policy works much like that of the MLS policy with the exception that the rules for information flow are slightly reversed. This is said to prevent the downward flow of sensitive information whereas the MLS policy prevents the upward flow of sensitive information; thus, much of this section can apply to both policies. In Biba environments, an integrity label is set on each subject or object. These labels are made up of hierarchal grades, and non-hierarchal components. As an object's or subject's grade ascends, so does its integrity. Supported labels are biba/low, biba/equal, and biba/high; as explained below: The biba/low label is considered the lowest integrity an object or subject may have. Setting this on objects or subjects will block their write access to objects or subjects marked high. They still have read access though. The biba/equal label should only be placed on objects considered to be exempt from the policy. The biba/high label will permit writing to objects set at a lower label but not permit reading that object. It is recommended that this label be placed on objects that affect the integrity of the entire system. Biba provides for: Hierarchical integrity level with a set of non hierarchical integrity categories; Fixed rules: no write up, no read down (opposite of MLS). A subject can have write access to objects on its own level or below, but not above. Similarly, a subject can have read access to objects on its own level or above, but not below; Integrity (preventing inappropriate modification of data); Integrity levels (instead of MLS sensitivity levels). The following sysctl tunables can be used to manipulate the Biba policy. security.mac.biba.enabled may be used to enable/disable enforcement of the Biba policy on the target machine. security.mac.biba.ptys_equal may be used to disable the Biba policy on &man.pty.4; devices. security.mac.biba.revocation_enabled will force the revocation of access to objects if the label is changed to dominate the subject. To access the Biba policy setting on system objects, use the setfmac and getfmac commands: &prompt.root; setfmac biba/low test &prompt.root; getfmac test test: biba/low Observations: a lower integrity subject is unable to write to a higher integrity subject; a higher integrity subject cannot observe or read a lower integrity object. The MAC LOMAC Module MAC LOMAC Module name: mac_lomac.ko Kernel configuration line: options MAC_LOMAC Boot option: mac_lomac_load="YES" Unlike the MAC Biba policy, the &man.mac.lomac.4; policy permits access to lower integrity objects only after decreasing the integrity level to not disrupt any integrity rules. The MAC version of the Low-watermark integrity policy, not to be confused with the older &man.lomac.4; implementation, works almost identically to Biba but with the exception of using floating labels to support subject demotion via an auxiliary grade compartment. This secondary compartment takes the form of [auxgrade]. When assigning a lomac policy with an auxiliary grade, it should look a little bit like: lomac/10[2] where the number two (2) is the auxiliary grade. The MAC LOMAC policy relies on the ubiquitous labeling of all system objects with integrity labels, permitting subjects to read from low integrity objects and then downgrading the label on the subject to prevent future writes to high integrity objects. This is the [auxgrade] option discussed above, thus the policy may provide for greater compatibility and require less initial configuration than Biba. Examples Like the Biba and MLS policies; the setfmac and setpmac utilities may be used to place labels on system objects: &prompt.root; setfmac /usr/home/trhodes lomac/high[low] &prompt.root; getfmac /usr/home/trhodes lomac/high[low] Notice the auxiliary grade here is low, this is a feature provided only by the MAC LOMAC policy. Implementing a Secure Environment with MAC MAC Example Implementation The following demonstration will implement a secure environment using various MAC modules with properly configured policies. This is only a test and should not be considered the complete answer to everyone's security woes. Just implementing a policy and ignoring it never works and could be disastrous in a production environment. Before beginning this process, the multilabel option must be set on each file system as stated at the beginning of this chapter. Not doing so will result in errors. Create an insecure User Class Begin the procedure by adding the following user class to the /etc/login.conf file: insecure:\ :copyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT:\ :welcome=/etc/motd:\ :setenv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K:\ :path=~/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin :manpath=/usr/share/man /usr/local/man:\ :nologin=/usr/sbin/nologin:\ :cputime=1h30m:\ :datasize=8M:\ :vmemoryuse=100M:\ :stacksize=2M:\ :memorylocked=4M:\ :memoryuse=8M:\ :filesize=8M:\ :coredumpsize=8M:\ :openfiles=24:\ :maxproc=32:\ :priority=0:\ :requirehome:\ :passwordtime=91d:\ :umask=022:\ :ignoretime@:\ :label=partition/13,mls/5: And adding the following line to the default user class: :label=mls/equal,biba/equal,partition/equal: Once this is completed, the following command must be issued to rebuild the database: &prompt.root; cap_mkdb /etc/login.conf Boot with the Correct Modules Add the following lines to /boot/loader.conf so the required modules will load during system initialization: mac_biba_load="YES" mac_mls_load="YES" mac_seeotheruids_load="YES" mac_partition_load="YES" Set All Users to Insecure All user accounts that are not root or system users will now require a login class. The login class is required otherwise users will be refused access to common commands such as &man.vi.1;. The following sh script should do the trick: &prompt.root; for x in `awk -F: '($3 >= 1001) && ($3 != 65534) { print $1 }' \ /etc/passwd`; do pw usermod $x -L insecure; done; The cap_mkdb command will need to be run on /etc/master.passwd after this change. Complete the Configuration A contexts file should now be created; the following example was taken from Robert Watson's example policy and should be placed in /etc/policy.contexts. # This is the default BIBA/MLS policy for this system. .* biba/high,mls/high /sbin/dhclient biba/high(low),mls/high(low) /dev(/.*)? biba/equal,mls/equal # This is not an exhaustive list of all "privileged" devices. /dev/mdctl biba/high,mls/high /dev/pci biba/high,mls/high /dev/k?mem biba/high,mls/high /dev/io biba/high,mls/high /dev/agp.* biba/high,mls/high (/var)?/tmp(/.*)? biba/equal,mls/equal /tmp/\.X11-unix biba/high(equal),mls/high(equal) /tmp/\.X11-unix/.* biba/equal,mls/equal /proc(/.*)? biba/equal,mls/equal /mnt.* biba/low,mls/low (/usr)?/home biba/high(low),mls/high(low) (/usr)?/home/.* biba/low,mls/low /var/mail(/.*)? biba/low,mls/low /var/spool/mqueue(/.*)? biba/low,mls/low (/mnt)?/cdrom(/.*)? biba/high,mls/high (/usr)?/home/(ftp|samba)(/.*)? biba/high,mls/high /var/log/sendmail\.st biba/low,mls/low /var/run/utmp biba/equal,mls/equal /var/log/(lastlog|wtmp) biba/equal,mls/equal This policy will enforce security by setting restrictions on both the downward and upward flow of information with regards to the directories and utilities listed on the left. This can now be read into our system by issuing the following command: &prompt.root; setfsmac -ef /etc/policy.contexts / &prompt.root; setfsmac -ef /etc/policy.contexts /usr The above file system layout may be different depending on environment. The /etc/mac.conf file requires the following modifications in the main section: default_labels file ?biba,?mls default_labels ifnet ?biba,?mls default_labels process ?biba,?mls,?partition default_labels socket ?biba,?mls Testing the Configuration MAC Configuration Testing Add a user with the adduser command and place that user in the insecure class for these tests. The examples below will show a mix of root and regular user tests; use the prompt to distinguish between the two. Basic Labeling Tests &prompt.user; getpmac biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 &prompt.root; setpmac partition/15,mls/equal top The top process will be killed before we start another top process. MAC Seeotheruids Tests &prompt.user; ps Zax biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1096 #C: S 0:00.03 -su (bash) biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1101 #C: R+ 0:00.01 ps Zax We should not be permitted to see any processes owned by other users. MAC Partition Test Disable the MAC seeotheruids policy for the rest of these tests: &prompt.root; sysctl security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled=0 &prompt.user; ps Zax LABEL PID TT STAT TIME COMMAND biba/equal(low-high),mls/equal(low-high),partition/15 1122 #C: S+ 0:00.02 top biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1096 #C: S 0:00.05 -su (bash) biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1123 #C: R+ 0:00.01 ps Zax All users should be permitted to see every process in their partition. Testing Biba and MLS Labels &prompt.root; setpmac partition/15,mls/equal,biba/high\(high-high\) top &prompt.user; ps Zax LABEL PID TT STAT TIME COMMAND biba/high(high-high),mls/equal(low-high),partition/15 1251 #C: S+ 0:00.02 top biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1096 #C: S 0:00.06 -su (bash) biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1157 #C: R+ 0:00.00 ps Zax The Biba policy allows us to read higher-labeled objects. &prompt.root; setpmac partition/15,mls/equal,biba/low top &prompt.user; ps Zax LABEL PID TT STAT TIME COMMAND biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1096 #C: S 0:00.07 -su (bash) biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15 1226 #C: R+ 0:00.01 ps Zax The Biba policy does not allow lower-labeled objects to be read; however, MLS does. &prompt.user; ifconfig bge0 | grep maclabel maclabel biba/low(low-low),mls/low(low-low) &prompt.user; ping -c 1 192.0.34.166 PING 192.0.34.166 (192.0.34.166): 56 data bytes ping: sendto: Permission denied Users are unable to ping example.com, or any domain for that matter. To prevent this error from occurring, run the following command: &prompt.root; sysctl security.mac.biba.trust_all_interfaces=1 This sets the default interface label to insecure mode, so the default Biba policy label will not be enforced. &prompt.root; ifconfig bge0 maclabel biba/equal\(low-high\),mls/equal\(low-high\) &prompt.user; ping -c 1 192.0.34.166 PING 192.0.34.166 (192.0.34.166): 56 data bytes 64 bytes from 192.0.34.166: icmp_seq=0 ttl=50 time=204.455 ms --- 192.0.34.166 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 204.455/204.455/204.455/0.000 ms By setting a more correct label, we can issue ping requests. Now to create a few files for some read and write testing procedures: &prompt.root; touch test1 test2 test3 test4 test5 &prompt.root; getfmac test1 test1: biba/equal,mls/equal &prompt.root; setfmac biba/low test1 test2; setfmac biba/high test4 test5; \ setfmac mls/low test1 test3; setfmac mls/high test2 test4 &prompt.root; setfmac mls/equal,biba/equal test3 && getfmac test? test1: biba/low,mls/low test2: biba/low,mls/high test3: biba/equal,mls/equal test4: biba/high,mls/high test5: biba/high,mls/equal &prompt.root; chown testuser:testuser test? All of these files should now be owned by our testuser user. And now for some read tests: &prompt.user; ls test1 test2 test3 test4 test5 &prompt.user; ls test? ls: test1: Permission denied ls: test2: Permission denied ls: test4: Permission denied test3 test5 We should not be permitted to observe pairs; e.g.: (biba/low,mls/low), (biba/low,mls/high) and (biba/high,mls/high). And of course, read access should be denied. Now for some write tests: &prompt.user; for i in `echo test*`; do echo 1 > $i; done -su: test1: Permission denied -su: test4: Permission denied -su: test5: Permission denied Like with the read tests, write access should not be permitted to write pairs; e.g.: (biba/low,mls/high) and (biba/equal,mls/equal). &prompt.user; cat test? cat: test1: Permission denied cat: test2: Permission denied 1 cat: test4: Permission denied And now as root: &prompt.root; cat test2 1 Another Example: Using MAC to Constrain a Web Server A separate location for the web data which users must be capable of accessing will be appointed. This will permit biba/high processes access rights to the web data. Begin by creating a directory to store the web data in: &prompt.root; mkdir /usr/home/cvs Now initialize it with cvs: &prompt.root; cvs -d /usr/home/cvs init The first goal is to enable the biba policy, thus the mac_biba_enable="YES" should be placed in /boot/loader.conf. This assumes that support for MAC has been enabled in the kernel. From this point on everything in the system should be set at biba/high by default. The following modification must be made to the login.conf file, under the default user class: :ignoretime@:\ :umask=022:\ :label=biba/high: Every user should now be placed in the default class; a command such as: &prompt.root; for x in `awk -F: '($3 >= 1001) && ($3 != 65534) { print $1 }' \ /etc/passwd`; do pw usermod $x -L default; done; will accomplish this task in a few moments. Now create another class, web, a copy of default, with the label setting of biba/low. Create a user who will be used to work with the main web data stored in a cvs repository. This user must be placed in our new login class, web. Since the default is biba/high everywhere, the repository will be the same. The web data must also be the same for users to have read/write access to it; however, since our web server will be serving data that biba/high users must access, we will need to downgrade the data as a whole. The perfect tools for this are &man.sh.1; and &man.cron.8; and are already provided in &os;. The following script should do everything we want: PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin; export PATH; CVSROOT=/home/repo; export CVSROOT; cd /home/web; cvs -qR checkout -P htdocs; exit; In many cases the cvs Id tags must be placed into the web site data files. This script may now be placed into web's home directory and the following &man.crontab.1; entry added: # Check out the web data as biba/low every twelve hours: 0 */12 * * * web /home/web/checkout.sh This will check out the HTML sources every twelve hours on the machine. The default startup method for the web server must also be modified to start the process as biba/low. This can be done by making the following modification to the /usr/local/etc/rc.d/apache.sh script: command="setpmac biba/low /usr/local/sbin/httpd" The Apache configuration must be altered to work with the biba/low policy. In this case the software must be configured to append to the log files in a directory set at biba/low or else access denied errors will be returned. Following this example requires that the docroot directive be set to /home/web/htdocs; otherwise, Apache will fail when trying to locate the directory to serve documents from. Other configuration variables must be altered as well, including the PID file, Scoreboardfile, DocumentRoot, log file locations, or any other variable which requires write access. When using biba, all write access will be denied to the server in areas not set at biba/low. Troubleshooting the MAC Framework MAC Troubleshooting During the development stage, a few users reported problems with normal configuration. Some of these problems are listed below: The <option>multilabel</option> option cannot be enabled on <filename>/</filename> The flag does not stay enabled on my root (/) partition! It seems that one out of every fifty users has this problem, indeed, we had this problem during our initial configuration. Further observation of this so called bug has lead me to believe that it is a result of either incorrect documentation or misinterpretation of the documentation. Regardless of why it happened, the following steps may be taken to resolve it: Edit /etc/fstab and set the root partition at for read-only. Reboot into single user mode. Run tunefs on /. Reboot the system into normal mode. Run mount / and change the back to in /etc/fstab and reboot the system again. Double-check the output from the mount to ensure that has been properly set on the root file system. Cannot start &xfree86; after <acronym>MAC</acronym> After establishing a secure environment with MAC, I am no longer able to start &xfree86;! This could be caused by the MAC partition policy or by a mislabeling in one of the MAC labeling policies. To debug, try the following: Check the error message; if the user is in the insecure class, the partition policy may be the culprit. Try setting the user's class back to the default class and rebuild the database with the cap_mkdb command. If this does not alleviate the problem, go to step two. Double-check the label policies. Ensure that the policies are set correctly for the user in question, the &xfree86; application, and the /dev entries. If neither of these resolve the problem, send the error message and a description of your environment to the TrustedBSD discussion lists located at the TrustedBSD website or to the &a.questions; mailing list. Error: &man..secure.path.3; cannot stat <filename>.login_conf</filename> When I attempt to switch from the root to another user in the system, the error message _secure_path: unable to state .login_conf. This message is usually shown when the user has a higher label setting then that of the user whom they are attempting to become. For instance a user on the system, joe, has a default label of . The root user, who has a label of , cannot view joe's home directory. This will happen regardless if root has used the su command to become joe, or not. In this scenario, the Biba integrity model will not permit root to view objects set at a lower integrity level. The <username>root</username> username is broken! In normal or even single user mode, the root is not recognized. The whoami command returns 0 (zero) and su returns who are you?. What could be going on? This can happen if a labeling policy has been disabled, either by a &man.sysctl.8; or the policy module was unloaded. If the policy is being disabled or has been temporarily disabled, then the login capabilities database needs to be reconfigured with the option being removed. Double check the login.conf file to ensure that all options have been removed and rebuild the database with the cap_mkdb command. diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/multimedia/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/multimedia/chapter.sgml index 1eb1ffd1f8..dc43516e89 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/multimedia/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/multimedia/chapter.sgml @@ -1,1858 +1,1858 @@ Ross Lippert Edited by Multimedia Synopsis FreeBSD supports a wide variety of sound cards, allowing you to enjoy high fidelity output from your computer. This includes the ability to record and playback audio in the MPEG Audio Layer 3 (MP3), WAV, and Ogg Vorbis formats as well as many other formats. The FreeBSD Ports Collection also contains applications allowing you to edit your recorded audio, add sound effects, and control attached MIDI devices. With some willingness to experiment, FreeBSD can support playback of video files and DVD's. The number of applications to encode, convert, and playback various video media is more limited than the number of sound applications. For example as of this writing, there is no good re-encoding application in the FreeBSD Ports Collection, which could be use to convert between formats, as there is with audio/sox. However, the software landscape in this area is changing rapidly. This chapter will describe the necessary steps to configure your sound card. The configuration and installation of X11 () has already taken care of the hardware issues for your video card, though there may be some tweaks to apply for better playback. After reading this chapter, you will know: How to configure your system so that your sound card is recognized. Methods to test that your card is working using sample applications. How to troubleshoot your sound setup. How to playback and encode MP3s and other audio. How video is supported by the X server. Some video player/encoder ports which give good results. How to playback DVD's, .mpg and .avi files. How to rip CD and DVD information into files. How to configure a TV card. How to configure an image scanner. Before reading this chapter, you should: Know how to configure and install a new kernel (). Trying to mount audio CDs with the &man.mount.8; command will result in an error, at least, and a kernel panic, at worst. These media have specialized encodings which differ from the usual ISO-filesystem. Moses Moore Contributed by Marc Fonvieille Enhanced for &os; 5.X by Setting Up the Sound Card Configuring the System PCI ISA sound cards Before you begin, you should know the model of the card you have, the chip it uses, and whether it is a PCI or ISA card. FreeBSD supports a wide variety of both PCI and ISA cards. Check the supported audio devices list of the Hardware Notes to see if your card is supported. This document will also mention which driver supports your card. kernel configuration To use your sound device, you will need to load the proper device driver. This may be accomplished in one of two ways. The easiest way is to simply load a kernel module for your sound card with &man.kldload.8; which can either be done from the command line: &prompt.root; kldload snd_emu10k1 or by adding the appropriate line to the file /boot/loader.conf like this: snd_emu10k1_load="YES" These examples are for a Creative &soundblaster; Live! sound card. Other available loadable sound modules are listed in /boot/defaults/loader.conf. If you are not sure which driver to use, you may try to load the snd_driver module: &prompt.root; kldload snd_driver This is a metadriver loading the most common device drivers at once. This speeds up the search for the correct driver. It is also possible to load all sound drivers via the /boot/loader.conf facility. Under &os; 4.X, to load all sound drivers, you have to load the snd module instead of snd_driver. A second method is to statically compile in support for your sound card in your kernel. The section below provides the information you need to add support for your hardware in this manner. For more information about recompiling your kernel, please see . Configuring a Custom Kernel with Sound Support The first thing to do is adding the generic audio driver &man.sound.4; to the kernel, for that you will need to add the following line to the kernel configuration file: device sound Under &os; 4.X, you would use the following line: device pcm Then we have to add the support for our sound card. Therefore, we need to know which driver supports the card. Check the supported audio devices list of the Hardware Notes, to determine the correct driver for your sound card. For example, a Creative &soundblaster; Live! sound card is supported by the &man.snd.emu10k1.4; driver. To add the support for this card, use the following: device "snd_emu10k1" Be sure to read the manual page of the driver for the syntax to use. Information regarding the syntax of sound drivers in the kernel configuration can also be found in the /usr/src/sys/conf/NOTES file (/usr/src/sys/i386/conf/LINT for &os; 4.X). Non-PnP ISA cards may require you to provide the kernel with information on the sound card settings (IRQ, I/O port, etc). This is done via the /boot/device.hints file. At system boot, the &man.loader.8; will read this file and pass the settings to the kernel. For example, an old Creative &soundblaster; 16 ISA non-PnP card will use the &man.snd.sbc.4; driver, with the following line added to the kernel configuration file: device snd_sbc as well as the following in /boot/device.hints: hint.sbc.0.at="isa" hint.sbc.0.port="0x220" hint.sbc.0.irq="5" hint.sbc.0.drq="1" hint.sbc.0.flags="0x15" In this case, the card uses the 0x220 I/O port and the IRQ 5. The syntax used in the /boot/device.hints file is covered in the sound driver manual page. On &os; 4.X, these settings are directly written in the kernel configuration file. In the case of our ISA card, we would only use this line: device sbc0 at isa? port 0x220 irq 5 drq 1 flags 0x15 The settings shown above are the defaults. In some cases, you may need to change the IRQ or the other settings to match your card. See the &man.snd.sbc.4; manual page for more information. Under &os; 4.X, some systems with built-in motherboard sound devices may require the following option in the kernel configuration: options PNPBIOS Testing the Sound Card After rebooting with the modified kernel, or after loading the required module, the sound card should appear in your system message buffer (&man.dmesg.8;) as something like: pcm0: <Intel ICH3 (82801CA)> port 0xdc80-0xdcbf,0xd800-0xd8ff irq 5 at device 31.5 on pci0 pcm0: [GIANT-LOCKED] pcm0: <Cirrus Logic CS4205 AC97 Codec> The status of the sound card may be checked via the /dev/sndstat file: &prompt.root; cat /dev/sndstat FreeBSD Audio Driver (newpcm) Installed devices: pcm0: <Intel ICH3 (82801CA)> at io 0xd800, 0xdc80 irq 5 bufsz 16384 kld snd_ich (1p/2r/0v channels duplex default) The output from your system may vary. If no pcm devices show up, go back and review what was done earlier. Go through your kernel configuration file again and make sure the correct device is chosen. Common problems are listed in . If all goes well, you should now have a functioning sound card. If your CD-ROM or DVD-ROM drive is properly coupled to your sound card, you can put a CD in the drive and play it with &man.cdcontrol.1;: &prompt.user; cdcontrol -f /dev/acd0 play 1 Various applications, such as audio/workman can provide a friendlier interface. You may want to install an application such as audio/mpg123 to listen to MP3 audio files. A quick way to test the card is sending data to the /dev/dsp, like this: &prompt.user; cat filename > /dev/dsp where filename can be any file. This command line should produce some noise, confirming the sound card is actually working. &os; 4.X users need to create the sound card device nodes before being able to use it. If the card showed up in message buffer as pcm0, you will have to run the following as root: &prompt.root; cd /dev &prompt.root; sh MAKEDEV snd0 If the card detection returned pcm1, follow the same steps as shown above, replacing snd0 with snd1. MAKEDEV will create a group of device nodes that will be used by the different sound related applications. Sound card mixer levels can be changed via the &man.mixer.8; command. More details can be found in the &man.mixer.8; manual page. Common Problems device nodes I/O port IRQ DSP Error Solution unsupported subdevice XX One or more of the device nodes was not created correctly. Repeat the steps above. sb_dspwr(XX) timed out The I/O port is not set correctly. bad irq XX The IRQ is set incorrectly. Make sure that the set IRQ and the sound IRQ are the same. xxx: gus pcm not attached, out of memory There is not enough available memory to use the device. xxx: can't open /dev/dsp! Check with fstat | grep dsp if another application is holding the device open. Noteworthy troublemakers are esound and KDE's sound support. Munish Chopra Contributed by Utilizing Multiple Sound Sources It is often desirable to have multiple sources of sound that are able to play simultaneously, such as when esound or artsd do not support sharing of the sound device with a certain application. FreeBSD lets you do this through Virtual Sound Channels, which can be set with the &man.sysctl.8; facility. Virtual channels allow you to multiplex your sound card's playback channels by mixing sound in the kernel. To set the number of virtual channels, there are two sysctl knobs which, if you are the root user, can be set like this: &prompt.root; sysctl hw.snd.pcm0.vchans=4 &prompt.root; sysctl hw.snd.maxautovchans=4 The above example allocates four virtual channels, which is a practical number for everyday use. hw.snd.pcm0.vchans is the number of virtual channels pcm0 has, and is configurable once a device has been attached. hw.snd.maxautovchans is the number of virtual channels a new audio device is given when it is attached using &man.kldload.8;. Since the pcm module can be loaded independently of the hardware drivers, hw.snd.maxautovchans can store how many virtual channels any devices which are attached later will be given. If you are not using &man.devfs.5;, you will have to point your applications at /dev/dsp0.x, where x is 0 to 3 if hw.snd.pcm.0.vchans is set to 4 as in the above example. On a system using &man.devfs.5;, the above will automatically be allocated transparently to the user. Josef El-Rayes Contributed by Setting Default Values for Mixer Channels The default values for the different mixer channels are hardcoded in the sourcecode of the &man.pcm.4; driver. There are a lot of different applications and daemons that allow you to set values for the mixer they remember and set each time they are started, but this is not a clean solution, we want to have default values at the driver level. This is accomplished by defining the appropriate values in /boot/device.hints. E.g.: hint.pcm.0.vol="100" This will set the volume channel to a default value of 100, as soon as the &man.pcm.4; module gets loaded. Only &os; 5.3 and above support this. Chern Lee Contributed by MP3 Audio MP3 (MPEG Layer 3 Audio) accomplishes near CD-quality sound, leaving no reason to let your FreeBSD workstation fall short of its offerings. MP3 Players - By far, the most popular &xfree86; MP3 player is + By far, the most popular X11 MP3 player is XMMS (X Multimedia System). Winamp skins can be used with XMMS since the GUI is almost identical to that of Nullsoft's Winamp. XMMS also has native plug-in support. XMMS can be installed from the multimedia/xmms port or package. XMMS' interface is intuitive, with a playlist, graphic equalizer, and more. Those familiar with Winamp will find XMMS simple to use. The audio/mpg123 port is an alternative, command-line MP3 player. mpg123 can be run by specifying the sound device and the MP3 file on the command line, as shown below: &prompt.root; mpg123 -a /dev/dsp1.0 Foobar-GreatestHits.mp3 High Performance MPEG 1.0/2.0/2.5 Audio Player for Layer 1, 2 and 3. Version 0.59r (1999/Jun/15). Written and copyrights by Michael Hipp. Uses code from various people. See 'README' for more! THIS SOFTWARE COMES WITH ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY! USE AT YOUR OWN RISK! Playing MPEG stream from Foobar-GreatestHits.mp3 ... MPEG 1.0 layer III, 128 kbit/s, 44100 Hz joint-stereo /dev/dsp1.0 should be replaced with the dsp device entry on your system. Ripping CD Audio Tracks Before encoding a CD or CD track to MP3, the audio data on the CD must be ripped onto the hard drive. This is done by copying the raw CDDA (CD Digital Audio) data to WAV files. The cdda2wav tool, which is a part of the sysutils/cdrtools suite, is used for ripping audio information from CDs and the information associated with them. With the audio CD in the drive, the following command can be issued (as root) to rip an entire CD into individual (per track) WAV files: &prompt.root; cdda2wav -D 0,1,0 -B cdda2wav will support ATAPI (IDE) CDROM drives. To rip from an IDE drive, specify the device name in place of the SCSI unit numbers. For example, to rip track 7 from an IDE drive: &prompt.root; cdda2wav -D /dev/acd0a -t 7 The indicates the SCSI device 0,1,0, which corresponds to the output of cdrecord -scanbus. To rip individual tracks, make use of the option as shown: &prompt.root; cdda2wav -D 0,1,0 -t 7 This example rips track seven of the audio CDROM. To rip a range of tracks, for example, track one to seven, specify a range: &prompt.root; cdda2wav -D 0,1,0 -t 1+7 The utility &man.dd.1; can also be used to extract audio tracks on ATAPI drives, read for more information on that possibility. Encoding MP3s Nowadays, the mp3 encoder of choice is lame. Lame can be found at audio/lame in the ports tree. Using the ripped WAV files, the following command will convert audio01.wav to audio01.mp3: &prompt.root; lame -h -b 128 \ --tt "Foo Song Title" \ --ta "FooBar Artist" \ --tl "FooBar Album" \ --ty "2001" \ --tc "Ripped and encoded by Foo" \ --tg "Genre" \ audio01.wav audio01.mp3 128 kbits seems to be the standard MP3 bitrate in use. Many enjoy the higher quality 160, or 192. The higher the bitrate, the more disk space the resulting MP3 will consume--but the quality will be higher. The option turns on the higher quality but a little slower mode. The options beginning with indicate ID3 tags, which usually contain song information, to be embedded within the MP3 file. Additional encoding options can be found by consulting the lame man page. Decoding MP3s In order to burn an audio CD from MP3s, they must be converted to a non-compressed WAV format. Both XMMS and mpg123 support the output of MP3 to an uncompressed file format. Writing to Disk in XMMS: Launch XMMS. Right-click on the window to bring up the XMMS menu. Select Preference under Options. Change the Output Plugin to Disk Writer Plugin. Press Configure. Enter (or choose browse) a directory to write the uncompressed files to. Load the MP3 file into XMMS as usual, with volume at 100% and EQ settings turned off. Press Play — XMMS will appear as if it is playing the MP3, but no music will be heard. It is actually playing the MP3 to a file. Be sure to set the default Output Plugin back to what it was before in order to listen to MP3s again. Writing to stdout in mpg123: Run mpg123 -s audio01.mp3 > audio01.pcm XMMS writes a file in the WAV format, while mpg123 converts the MP3 into raw PCM audio data. Both of these formats can be used with cdrecord to create audio CDs. You have to use raw PCM with &man.burncd.8;. If you use WAV files, you will notice a small tick sound at the beginning of each track, this sound is the header of the WAV file. You can simply remove the header of a WAV file with the utility SoX (it can be installed from the audio/sox port or package): &prompt.user; sox -t wav -r 44100 -s -w -c 2 track.wav track.raw Read for more information on using a CD burner in FreeBSD. Ross Lippert Contributed by Video Playback Video playback is a very new and rapidly developing application area. Be patient. Not everything is going to work as smoothly as it did with sound. Before you begin, you should know the model of the video card you have and the chip it uses. While &xorg; and &xfree86; support a wide variety of video cards, fewer give good playback performance. To obtain a list of extensions supported by the X server using your card use the command &man.xdpyinfo.1; while X11 is running. It is a good idea to have a short MPEG file which can be treated as a test file for evaluating various players and options. Since some DVD players will look for DVD media in /dev/dvd by default, or have this device name hardcoded in them, you might find it useful to make symbolic links to the proper devices: &prompt.root; ln -sf /dev/acd0c /dev/dvd &prompt.root; ln -sf /dev/racd0c /dev/rdvd On FreeBSD 5.X, which uses &man.devfs.5; there is a slightly different set of recommended links: &prompt.root; ln -sf /dev/acd0 /dev/dvd &prompt.root; ln -sf /dev/acd0 /dev/rdvd Note that due to the nature of &man.devfs.5;, manually created links like these will not persist if you reboot your system. In order to create the symbolic links automatically whenever you boot your system, add the following lines to /etc/devfs.conf: link acd0 dvd link acd0 rdvd Additionally, DVD decryption, which requires invoking special DVD-ROM functions, requires write permission on the DVD devices. kernel options options CPU_ENABLE_SSE kernel options options USER_LDT Some of the ports discussed rely on the following kernel options to build correctly. Before attempting to build, add these options to the kernel configuration file, build a new kernel, and reboot: option CPU_ENABLE_SSE option USER_LDT option USER_LDT does not exist on &os; 5.X. To enhance the shared memory X11 interface, it is recommended that the values of some &man.sysctl.8; variables should be increased: kern.ipc.shmmax=67108864 kern.ipc.shmall=32768 Determining Video Capabilities XVideo SDL DGA There are several possible ways to display video under X11. What will really work is largely hardware dependent. Each method described below will have varying quality across different hardware. Secondly, the rendering of video in X11 is a topic receiving a lot of attention lately, and with each version of &xorg;, or of &xfree86;, there may be significant improvement. A list of common video interfaces: X11: normal X11 output using shared memory. XVideo: an extension to the X11 interface which supports video in any X11 drawable. SDL: the Simple Directmedia Layer. DGA: the Direct Graphics Access. SVGAlib: low level console graphics layer. XVideo &xorg; and &xfree86; 4.X have an extension called XVideo (aka Xvideo, aka Xv, aka xv) which allows video to be directly displayed in drawable objects through a special acceleration. This extension provides very good quality playback even on low-end machines. To check whether the extension is running, use xvinfo: &prompt.user; xvinfo XVideo is supported for your card if the result looks like: X-Video Extension version 2.2 screen #0 Adaptor #0: "Savage Streams Engine" number of ports: 1 port base: 43 operations supported: PutImage supported visuals: depth 16, visualID 0x22 depth 16, visualID 0x23 number of attributes: 5 "XV_COLORKEY" (range 0 to 16777215) client settable attribute client gettable attribute (current value is 2110) "XV_BRIGHTNESS" (range -128 to 127) client settable attribute client gettable attribute (current value is 0) "XV_CONTRAST" (range 0 to 255) client settable attribute client gettable attribute (current value is 128) "XV_SATURATION" (range 0 to 255) client settable attribute client gettable attribute (current value is 128) "XV_HUE" (range -180 to 180) client settable attribute client gettable attribute (current value is 0) maximum XvImage size: 1024 x 1024 Number of image formats: 7 id: 0x32595559 (YUY2) guid: 59555932-0000-0010-8000-00aa00389b71 bits per pixel: 16 number of planes: 1 type: YUV (packed) id: 0x32315659 (YV12) guid: 59563132-0000-0010-8000-00aa00389b71 bits per pixel: 12 number of planes: 3 type: YUV (planar) id: 0x30323449 (I420) guid: 49343230-0000-0010-8000-00aa00389b71 bits per pixel: 12 number of planes: 3 type: YUV (planar) id: 0x36315652 (RV16) guid: 52563135-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 bits per pixel: 16 number of planes: 1 type: RGB (packed) depth: 0 red, green, blue masks: 0x1f, 0x3e0, 0x7c00 id: 0x35315652 (RV15) guid: 52563136-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 bits per pixel: 16 number of planes: 1 type: RGB (packed) depth: 0 red, green, blue masks: 0x1f, 0x7e0, 0xf800 id: 0x31313259 (Y211) guid: 59323131-0000-0010-8000-00aa00389b71 bits per pixel: 6 number of planes: 3 type: YUV (packed) id: 0x0 guid: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 bits per pixel: 0 number of planes: 0 type: RGB (packed) depth: 1 red, green, blue masks: 0x0, 0x0, 0x0 Also note that the formats listed (YUV2, YUV12, etc) are not present with every implementation of XVideo and their absence may hinder some players. If the result looks like: X-Video Extension version 2.2 screen #0 no adaptors present Then XVideo is probably not supported for your card. If XVideo is not supported for your card, this only means that it will be more difficult for your display to meet the computational demands of rendering video. Depending on your video card and processor, though, you might still be able to have a satisfying experience. You should probably read about ways of improving performance in the advanced reading . Simple Directmedia Layer The Simple Directmedia Layer, SDL, was intended to be a porting layer between µsoft.windows;, BeOS, and &unix;, allowing cross-platform applications to be developed which made efficient use of sound and graphics. The SDL layer provides a low-level abstraction to the hardware which can sometimes be more efficient than the X11 interface. The SDL can be found at devel/sdl12. Direct Graphics Access - Direct Graphics Access is an &xfree86; extension which allows + Direct Graphics Access is an X11 extension which allows a program to bypass the X server and directly alter the framebuffer. Because it relies on a low level memory mapping to effect this sharing, programs using it must be run as root. The DGA extension can be tested and benchmarked by &man.dga.1;. When dga is running, it changes the colors of the display whenever a key is pressed. To quit, use q. Ports and Packages Dealing with Video video ports video packages This section discusses the software available from the FreeBSD Ports Collection which can be used for video playback. Video playback is a very active area of software development, and the capabilities of various applications are bound to diverge somewhat from the descriptions given here. Firstly, it is important to know that many of the video applications which run on FreeBSD were developed as Linux applications. Many of these applications are still beta-quality. Some of the problems that you may encounter with video packages on FreeBSD include: An application cannot playback a file which another application produced. An application cannot playback a file which the application itself produced. The same application on two different machines, rebuilt on each machine for that machine, plays back the same file differently. A seemingly trivial filter like rescaling of the image size results in very bad artifacts from a buggy rescaling routine. An application frequently dumps core. Documentation is not installed with the port and can be found either on the web or under the port's work directory. Many of these applications may also exhibit Linux-isms. That is, there may be issues resulting from the way some standard libraries are implemented in the Linux distributions, or some features of the Linux kernel which have been assumed by the authors of the applications. These issues are not always noticed and worked around by the port maintainers, which can lead to problems like these: The use of /proc/cpuinfo to detect processor characteristics. A misuse of threads which causes a program to hang upon completion instead of truly terminating. Software not yet in the FreeBSD Ports Collection which is commonly used in conjunction with the application. So far, these application developers have been cooperative with port maintainers to minimize the work-arounds needed for port-ing. MPlayer MPlayer is a recently developed and rapidly developing video player. The goals of the MPlayer team are speed and flexibility on Linux and other Unices. The project was started when the team founder got fed up with bad playback performance on then available players. Some would say that the graphical interface has been sacrificed for a streamlined design. However, once you get used to the command line options and the key-stroke controls, it works very well. Building MPlayer MPlayer making MPlayer resides in multimedia/mplayer. MPlayer performs a variety of hardware checks during the build process, resulting in a binary which will not be portable from one system to another. Therefore, it is important to build it from ports and not to use a binary package. Additionally, a number of options can be specified in the make command line, as described in the Makefile and at the start of the build: &prompt.root; cd /usr/ports/multimedia/mplayer &prompt.root; make N - O - T - E Take a careful look into the Makefile in order to learn how to tune mplayer towards you personal preferences! For example, make WITH_GTK1 builds MPlayer with GTK1-GUI support. If you want to use the GUI, you can either install /usr/ports/multimedia/mplayer-skins or download official skin collections from http://www.mplayerhq.hu/homepage/dload.html The default port options should be sufficient for most users. However, if you need the XviD codec, you have to specify the WITH_XVID option in the command line. The default DVD device can also be defined with the WITH_DVD_DEVICE option, by default /dev/acd0 will be used. As of this writing, the MPlayer port will build its HTML documentation and two executables, mplayer, and mencoder, which is a tool for re-encoding video. The HTML documentation for MPlayer is very informative. If the reader finds the information on video hardware and interfaces in this chapter lacking, the MPlayer documentation is a very thorough supplement. You should definitely take the time to read the MPlayer documentation if you are looking for information about video support in &unix;. Using MPlayer MPlayer use Any user of MPlayer must set up a .mplayer subdirectory of her home directory. To create this necessary subdirectory, you can type the following: &prompt.user; cd /usr/ports/multimedia/mplayer &prompt.user; make install-user The command options for mplayer are listed in the manual page. For even more detail there is HTML documentation. In this section, we will describe only a few common uses. To play a file, such as testfile.avi, through one of the various video interfaces set the option: &prompt.user; mplayer -vo xv testfile.avi &prompt.user; mplayer -vo sdl testfile.avi &prompt.user; mplayer -vo x11 testfile.avi &prompt.root; mplayer -vo dga testfile.avi &prompt.root; mplayer -vo 'sdl:dga' testfile.avi It is worth trying all of these options, as their relative performance depends on many factors and will vary significantly with hardware. To play from a DVD, replace the testfile.avi with where N is the title number to play and DEVICE is the device node for the DVD-ROM. For example, to play title 3 from /dev/dvd: &prompt.root; mplayer -vo xv dvd://3 -dvd-device /dev/dvd The default DVD device can be defined during the build of the MPlayer port via the WITH_DVD_DEVICE option. By default, this device is /dev/acd0. More details can be found in the port Makefile. To stop, pause, advance and so on, consult the keybindings, which are output by running mplayer -h or read the manual page. Additional important options for playback are: which engages the fullscreen mode and which helps performance. In order for the mplayer command line to not become too large, the user can create a file .mplayer/config and set default options there: vo=xv fs=yes zoom=yes Finally, mplayer can be used to rip a DVD title into a .vob file. To dump out the second title from a DVD, type this: &prompt.root; mplayer -dumpstream -dumpfile out.vob dvd://2 -dvd-device /dev/dvd The output file, out.vob, will be MPEG and can be manipulated by the other packages described in this section. mencoder mencoder Before using mencoder it is a good idea to familiarize yourself with the options from the HTML documentation. There is a manual page, but it is not very useful without the HTML documentation. There are innumerable ways to improve quality, lower bitrate, and change formats, and some of these tricks may make the difference between good or bad performance. Here are a couple of examples to get you going. First a simple copy: &prompt.user; mencoder input.avi -oac copy -ovc copy -o output.avi Improper combinations of command line options can yield output files that are unplayable even by mplayer. Thus, if you just want to rip to a file, stick to the in mplayer. To convert input.avi to the MPEG4 codec with MPEG3 audio encoding (audio/lame is required): &prompt.user; mencoder input.avi -oac mp3lame -lameopts br=192 \ -ovc lavc -lavcopts vcodec=mpeg4:vhq -o output.avi This has produced output playable by mplayer and xine. input.avi can be replaced with and run as root to re-encode a DVD title directly. Since you are likely to be dissatisfied with your results the first time around, it is recommended you dump the title to a file and work on the file. The xine Video Player The xine video player is a project of wide scope aiming not only at being an all in one video solution, but also in producing a reusable base library and a modular executable which can be extended with plugins. It comes both as a package and as a port, multimedia/xine. The xine player is still very rough around the edges, but it is clearly off to a good start. In practice, xine requires either a fast CPU with a fast video card, or support for the XVideo extension. The GUI is usable, but a bit clumsy. As of this writing, there is no input module shipped with xine which will play CSS encoded DVD's. There are third party builds which do have modules for this built in them, but none of these are in the FreeBSD Ports Collection. Compared to MPlayer, xine does more for the user, but at the same time, takes some of the more fine-grained control away from the user. The xine video player performs best on XVideo interfaces. By default, xine player will start up in a graphical user interface. The menus can then be used to open a specific file: &prompt.user; xine Alternatively, it may be invoked to play a file immediately without the GUI with the command: &prompt.user; xine -g -p mymovie.avi The transcode Utilities The software transcode is not a player, but a suite of tools for re-encoding .avi and .mpg files. With transcode, one has the ability to merge video files, repair broken files, using command line tools with stdin/stdout stream interfaces. Like MPlayer, transcode is very experimental software which must be build from the port multimedia/transcode. Using a great many options to the make command. We recommend: &prompt.root; make WITH_LIBMPEG2=yes If you plan to install multimedia/avifile, then add the WITH_AVIFILE option to your make command line, as shown here: &prompt.root; make WITH_AVIFILE=yes WITH_LIBMPEG2=yes Here are two examples of using transcode for video conversion which produce rescaled output. The first encodes the output to an openDIVX AVI file, while the second encodes to the much more portable MPEG format. &prompt.user; transcode -i input.vob -x vob -V -Z 320x240 \ -y opendivx -N 0x55 -o output.avi &prompt.user; transcode -i input.vob -x vob -V -Z 320x240 \ -y mpeg -N 0x55 -o output.tmp &prompt.user; tcmplex -o output.mpg -i output.tmp.m1v -p output.tmp.mpa -m 1 There is a manual page for transcode, but there is little documentation for the various tc* utilities (such as tcmplex) which are also installed. However, the command line option can always be given to get curt usage instructions for a command. In comparison, transcode runs significantly slower than mencoder, but it has a better chance of producing a more widely playable file. MPEGs created by transcode have been known to play on &windows.media; Player and Apple's &quicktime;, for example. Further Reading The various video software packages for FreeBSD are developing rapidly. It is quite possible that in the near future many of the problems discussed here will have been resolved. In the mean time, those who want to get the very most out of FreeBSD's A/V capabilities will have to cobble together knowledge from several FAQs and tutorials and use a few different applications. This section exists to give the reader pointers to such additional information. The MPlayer documentation is very technically informative. These documents should probably be consulted by anyone wishing to obtain a high level of expertise with &unix; video. The MPlayer mailing list is hostile to anyone who has not bothered to read the documentation, so if you plan on making bug reports to them, RTFM. The xine HOWTO contains a chapter on performance improvement which is general to all players. Finally, there are some other promising applications which the reader may try: Avifile which is also a port multimedia/avifile. Ogle which is also a port multimedia/ogle. Xtheater multimedia/dvdauthor, an open source package for authoring DVD content. Josef El-Rayes Original contribution by Marc Fonvieille Enhanced and adapted by Setting Up TV Cards TV cards Introduction TV cards allow you to watch broadcast or cable TV on your computer. Most of them accept composite video via an RCA or S-video input and some of these cards come with a FM radio tuner. &os; provides support for PCI-based TV cards using a Brooktree Bt848/849/878/879 or a Conexant CN-878/Fusion 878a Video Capture Chip with the &man.bktr.4; driver. You must also ensure the board comes with a supported tuner, consult the &man.bktr.4; manual page for a list of supported tuners. Adding the Driver To use your card, you will need to load the &man.bktr.4; driver, this can be done by adding the following line to the /boot/loader.conf file like this: bktr_load="YES" Alternatively, you may statically compile the support for the TV card in your kernel, in that case add the following lines to your kernel configuration: device bktr device iicbus device iicbb device smbus These additional device drivers are necessary because of the card components being interconnected via an I2C bus. Then build and install a new kernel. Once the support was added to your system, you have to reboot your machine. During the boot process, your TV card should show up, like this: bktr0: <BrookTree 848A> mem 0xd7000000-0xd7000fff irq 10 at device 10.0 on pci0 iicbb0: <I2C bit-banging driver> on bti2c0 iicbus0: <Philips I2C bus> on iicbb0 master-only iicbus1: <Philips I2C bus> on iicbb0 master-only smbus0: <System Management Bus> on bti2c0 bktr0: Pinnacle/Miro TV, Philips SECAM tuner. Of course these messages can differ according to your hardware. However you should check if the tuner is correctly detected; it is still possible to override some of the detected parameters with &man.sysctl.8; MIBs and kernel configuration file options. For example, if you want to force the tuner to a Philips SECAM tuner, you should add the following line to your kernel configuration file: options OVERRIDE_TUNER=6 or you can directly use &man.sysctl.8;: &prompt.root; sysctl hw.bt848.tuner=6 See the &man.bktr.4; manual page and the /usr/src/sys/conf/NOTES file for more details on the available options. (If you are under &os; 4.X, /usr/src/sys/conf/NOTES is replaced with /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/LINT.) Useful Applications To use your TV card you need to install one of the following applications: multimedia/fxtv provides TV-in-a-window and image/audio/video capture capabilities. multimedia/xawtv is also a TV application, with the same features as fxtv. misc/alevt decodes and displays Videotext/Teletext. audio/xmradio, an application to use the FM radio tuner coming with some TV cards. audio/wmtune, a handy desktop application for radio tuners. More applications are available in the &os; Ports Collection. Troubleshooting If you encounter any problem with your TV card, you should check at first if the video capture chip and the tuner are really supported by the &man.bktr.4; driver and if you used the right configuration options. For more support and various questions about your TV card you may want to contact and use the archives of the &a.multimedia.name; mailing list. Marc Fonvieille Written by Image Scanners image scanners Introduction &os;, like any modern operating system, allows the use of image scanners. Standardized access to scanners is provided by the SANE (Scanner Access Now Easy) API available through the &os; Ports Collection. SANE will also use some &os; devices drivers to access to the scanner hardware. &os; supports both SCSI and USB scanners. Be sure your scanner is supported by SANE prior to performing any configuration. SANE has a supported devices list that can provide you with information about the support for a scanner and its status. The &man.uscanner.4; manual page also provides a list of supported USB scanners. Kernel Configuration As mentioned above both SCSI and USB interfaces are supported. According to your scanner interface, different device drivers are required. USB Interface The GENERIC kernel by default includes the device drivers needed to support USB scanners. Should you decide to use a custom kernel, be sure that the following lines are present in your kernel configuration file: device usb device uhci device ohci device uscanner Depending upon the USB chipset on your motherboard, you will only need either device uhci or device ohci, however having both in the kernel configuration file is harmless. If you do not want to rebuild your kernel and your kernel is not the GENERIC one, you can directly load the &man.uscanner.4; device driver module with the &man.kldload.8; command: &prompt.root; kldload uscanner To load this module at each system startup, add the following line to /boot/loader.conf: uscanner_load="YES" After rebooting with the correct kernel, or after loading the required module, plug in your USB scanner. The scanner should appear in your system message buffer (&man.dmesg.8;) as something like: uscanner0: EPSON EPSON Scanner, rev 1.10/3.02, addr 2 This shows that our scanner is using the /dev/uscanner0 device node. On &os; 4.X, the USB daemon (&man.usbd.8;) must be running to be able to see some USB devices. To enable this, add usbd_enable="YES" to your /etc/rc.conf file and reboot the machine. SCSI Interface If your scanner comes with a SCSI interface, it is important to know which SCSI controller board you will use. According to the SCSI chipset used, you will have to tune your kernel configuration file. The GENERIC kernel supports the most common SCSI controllers. Be sure to read the NOTES file (LINT under &os; 4.X) and add the correct line to your kernel configuration file. In addition to the SCSI adapter driver, you need to have the following lines in your kernel configuration file: device scbus device pass Once your kernel has been properly compiled, you should be able to see the devices in your system message buffer, when booting: pass2 at aic0 bus 0 target 2 lun 0 pass2: <AGFA SNAPSCAN 600 1.10> Fixed Scanner SCSI-2 device pass2: 3.300MB/s transfers If your scanner was not powered-on at system boot, it is still possible to manually force the detection by performing a SCSI bus scan with the &man.camcontrol.8; command: &prompt.root; camcontrol rescan all Re-scan of bus 0 was successful Re-scan of bus 1 was successful Re-scan of bus 2 was successful Re-scan of bus 3 was successful Then the scanner will appear in the SCSI devices list: &prompt.root; camcontrol devlist <IBM DDRS-34560 S97B> at scbus0 target 5 lun 0 (pass0,da0) <IBM DDRS-34560 S97B> at scbus0 target 6 lun 0 (pass1,da1) <AGFA SNAPSCAN 600 1.10> at scbus1 target 2 lun 0 (pass3) <PHILIPS CDD3610 CD-R/RW 1.00> at scbus2 target 0 lun 0 (pass2,cd0) More details about SCSI devices, are available in the &man.scsi.4; and &man.camcontrol.8; manual pages. SANE Configuration The SANE system has been splitted in two parts: the backends (graphics/sane-backends) and the frontends (graphics/sane-frontends). The backends part provides access to the scanner itself. The SANE's supported devices list specifies which backend will support your image scanner. It is mandatory to determine the correct backend for your scanner if you want to be able to use your device. The frontends part provides the graphical scanning interface (xscanimage). The first thing to do is install the graphics/sane-backends port or package. Then, use the sane-find-scanner command to check the scanner detection by the SANE system: &prompt.root; sane-find-scanner -q found SCSI scanner "AGFA SNAPSCAN 600 1.10" at /dev/pass3 The output will show the interface type of the scanner and the device node used to attach the scanner to the system. The vendor and the product model may not appear, it is not important. Some USB scanners require you to load a firmware, this is explained in the backend manual page. You should also read &man.sane-find-scanner.1; and &man.sane.7; manual pages. Now we have to check if the scanner will be identified by a scanning frontend. By default, the SANE backends comes with a command line tool called &man.scanimage.1;. This command allows you to list the devices and to perform an image acquisition from the command line. The option is used to list the scanner device: &prompt.root; scanimage -L device `snapscan:/dev/pass3' is a AGFA SNAPSCAN 600 flatbed scanner No output or a message saying that no scanners were identified indicates that &man.scanimage.1; is unable to identify the scanner. If this happens, you will need to edit the backend configuration file and define the scanner device used. The /usr/local/etc/sane.d/ directory contains all backends configuration files. This identification problem does appear with certain USB scanners. For example, with the USB scanner used in the , sane-find-scanner gives us the following information: &prompt.root; sane-find-scanner -q found USB scanner (UNKNOWN vendor and product) at device /dev/uscanner0 The scanner is correctly detected, it uses the USB interface and is attached to the /dev/uscanner0 device node. We can now check if the scanner is correctly identified: &prompt.root; scanimage -L No scanners were identified. If you were expecting something different, check that the scanner is plugged in, turned on and detected by the sane-find-scanner tool (if appropriate). Please read the documentation which came with this software (README, FAQ, manpages). Since the scanner is not identified, we will need to edit the /usr/local/etc/sane.d/epson.conf file. The scanner model used was the &epson.perfection; 1650, so we know the scanner will use the epson backend. Be sure to read the help comments in the backends configuration files. Line changes are quite simple: comment out all lines that have the wrong interface for your scanner (in our case, we will comment out all lines starting with the word scsi as our scanner uses the USB interface), then add at the end of the file a line specifying the interface and the device node used. In this case, we add the following line: usb /dev/uscanner0 Please be sure to read the comments provided in the backend configuration file as well as the backend manual page for more details and correct syntax to use. We can now verify if the scanner is identified: &prompt.root; scanimage -L device `epson:/dev/uscanner0' is a Epson GT-8200 flatbed scanner Our USB scanner has been identified. It is not important if the brand and the model do not match. The key item to be concerned with is the `epson:/dev/uscanner0' field, which give us the right backend name and the right device node. Once the scanimage -L command is able to see the scanner, the configuration is complete. The device is now ready to scan. While &man.scanimage.1; does allow us to perform an image acquisition from the command line, it is preferable to use a graphical user interface to perform image scanning. SANE offers a simple but efficient graphical interface: xscanimage (graphics/sane-frontends). Xsane (graphics/xsane) is another popular graphical scanning frontend. This frontend offers advanced features such as various scanning mode (photocopy, fax, etc.), color correction, batch scans, etc. Both of these applications are useable as a GIMP plugin. Allowing Scanner Access to Other Users All previous operations have been done with root privileges. You may however, need other users to have access to the scanner. The user will need read and write permissions to the device node used by the scanner. As an example, our USB scanner uses the device node /dev/uscanner0 which is owned by the operator group. Adding the user joe to the operator group will allow him to use the scanner: &prompt.root; pw groupmod operator -m joe For more details read the &man.pw.8; manual page. You also have to set the correct write permissions (0660 or 0664) on the /dev/uscanner0 device node, by default the operator group can only read the device node. This is done by adding the following lines to the /etc/devfs.rules file: [system=5] add path uscanner0 mode 660 Then add the following to /etc/rc.conf and reboot the machine: devfs_system_ruleset="system" More information regarding these lines can be found in the &man.devfs.8; manual page. Under &os; 4.X, the operator group has, by default, read and write permissions to /dev/uscanner0. Of course, for security reasons, you should think twice before adding a user to any group, especially the operator group. diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/preface/preface.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/preface/preface.sgml index 7136a57134..fe685de2b8 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/preface/preface.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/preface/preface.sgml @@ -1,618 +1,618 @@ Preface Intended Audience The FreeBSD newcomer will find that the first section of this book guides the user through the FreeBSD installation process and gently introduces the concepts and conventions that underpin &unix;. Working through this section requires little more than the desire to explore, and the ability to take on board new concepts as they are introduced. Once you have traveled this far, the second, far larger, section of the Handbook is a comprehensive reference to all manner of topics of interest to FreeBSD system administrators. Some of these chapters may recommend that you do some prior reading, and this is noted in the synopsis at the beginning of each chapter. For a list of additional sources of information, please see . Changes from the Second Edition This third edition is the culmination of over two years of work by the dedicated members of the FreeBSD Documentation Project. The following are the major changes in this new edition: , Configuration and Tuning, has been expanded with new information about the ACPI power and resource management, the cron system utility, and more kernel tuning options. , Security, has been expanded with new information about virtual private networks (VPNs), file system access control lists (ACLs), and security advisories. , Mandatory Access Control (MAC), is a new chapter with this edition. It explains what MAC is and how this mechanism can be used to secure a FreeBSD system. , Storage, has been expanded with new information about USB storage devices, file system snapshots, file system quotas, file and network backed filesystems, and encrypted disk partitions. , Vinum, is a new chapter with this edition. It describes how to use Vinum, a logical volume manager which provides device-independent logical disks, and software RAID-0, RAID-1 and RAID-5. A troubleshooting section has been added to , PPP and SLIP. , Electronic Mail, has been expanded with new information about using alternative transport agents, SMTP authentication, UUCP, fetchmail, procmail, and other advanced topics. , Network Servers, is all new with this edition. This chapter includes information about setting up the Apache HTTP Server, FTPd, and setting up a server for Microsoft Windows clients with Samba. Some sections from , Advanced Networking, were moved here to improve the presentation. , Advanced Networking, has been expanded with new information about using Bluetooth devices with FreeBSD, setting up wireless networks, and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networking. A glossary has been added to provide a central location for the definitions of technical terms used throughout the book. A number of aesthetic improvements have been made to the tables and figures throughout the book. Changes from the First Edition The second edition was the culmination of over two years of work by the dedicated members of the FreeBSD Documentation Project. The following were the major changes in this edition: A complete Index has been added. All ASCII figures have been replaced by graphical diagrams. A standard synopsis has been added to each chapter to give a quick summary of what information the chapter contains, and what the reader is expected to know. The content has been logically reorganized into three parts: Getting Started, System Administration, and Appendices. (Installing FreeBSD) was completely rewritten with many screenshots to make it much easier for new users to grasp the text. (&unix; Basics) has been expanded to contain additional information about processes, daemons, and signals. (Installing Applications) has been expanded to contain additional information about binary package management. (The X Window System) has been completely rewritten with an emphasis on using modern desktop technologies such as KDE and GNOME on &xfree86; 4.X. (The FreeBSD Booting Process) has been expanded. (Storage) has been written from what used to be two separate chapters on Disks and Backups. We feel that the topics are easier to comprehend when presented as a single chapter. A section on RAID (both hardware and software) has also been added. (Serial Communications) has been completely reorganized and updated for FreeBSD 4.X/5.X. (PPP and SLIP) has been substantially updated. Many new sections have been added to (Advanced Networking). (Electronic Mail) has been expanded to include more information about configuring sendmail. (&linux; Compatibility) has been expanded to include information about installing &oracle; and &sap.r3;. The following new topics are covered in this second edition: Configuration and Tuning (). Multimedia () Organization of This Book This book is split into five logically distinct sections. The first section, Getting Started, covers the installation and basic usage of FreeBSD. It is expected that the reader will follow these chapters in sequence, possibly skipping chapters covering familiar topics. The second section, Common Tasks, covers some frequently used features of FreeBSD. This section, and all subsequent sections, can be read out of order. Each chapter begins with a succinct synopsis that describes what the chapter covers and what the reader is expected to already know. This is meant to allow the casual reader to skip around to find chapters of interest. The third section, System Administration, covers administration topics. The fourth section, Network Communication, covers networking and server topics. The fifth section contains appendices of reference information. , Introduction Introduces FreeBSD to a new user. It describes the history of the FreeBSD Project, its goals and development model. , Installation Walks a user through the entire installation process. Some advanced installation topics, such as installing through a serial console, are also covered. , &unix; Basics Covers the basic commands and functionality of the FreeBSD operating system. If you are familiar with &linux; or another flavor of &unix; then you can probably skip this chapter. , Installing Applications Covers the installation of third-party software with both FreeBSD's innovative Ports Collection and standard binary packages. , The X Window System Describes the X Window System in general and using - &xfree86; on FreeBSD in particular. Also describes common + X11 on FreeBSD in particular. Also describes common desktop environments such as KDE and GNOME. , Desktop Applications Lists some common desktop applications, such as web browsers and productivity suites, and describes how to install them on FreeBSD. , Multimedia Shows how to set up sound and video playback support for your system. Also describes some sample audio and video applications. , Configuring the FreeBSD Kernel Explains why you might need to configure a new kernel and provides detailed instructions for configuring, building, and installing a custom kernel. , Printing Describes managing printers on FreeBSD, including information about banner pages, printer accounting, and initial setup. , &linux; Binary Compatibility Describes the &linux; compatibility features of FreeBSD. Also provides detailed installation instructions for many popular &linux; applications such as &oracle;, &sap.r3;, and &mathematica;. , Configuration and Tuning Describes the parameters available for system administrators to tune a FreeBSD system for optimum performance. Also describes the various configuration files used in FreeBSD and where to find them. , Booting Process Describes the FreeBSD boot process and explains how to control this process with configuration options. , Users and Basic Account Management Describes the creation and manipulation of user accounts. Also discusses resource limitations that can be set on users and other account management tasks. , Security Describes many different tools available to help keep your FreeBSD system secure, including Kerberos, IPsec and OpenSSH. , Mandatory Access Control Explains what Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is and how this mechanism can be used to secure a FreeBSD system. , Storage Describes how to manage storage media and filesystems with FreeBSD. This includes physical disks, RAID arrays, optical and tape media, memory-backed disks, and network filesystems. , Vinum Describes how to use Vinum, a logical volume manager which provides device-independent logical disks, and software RAID-0, RAID-1 and RAID-5. , Localization Describes how to use FreeBSD in languages other than English. Covers both system and application level localization. , The Cutting Edge Explains the differences between FreeBSD-STABLE, FreeBSD-CURRENT, and FreeBSD releases. Describes which users would benefit from tracking a development system and outlines that process. , Serial Communications Explains how to connect terminals and modems to your FreeBSD system for both dial in and dial out connections. , PPP and SLIP Describes how to use PPP, SLIP, or PPP over Ethernet to connect to remote systems with FreeBSD. , Electronic Mail Explains the different components of an email server and dives into simple configuration topics for the most popular mail server software: sendmail. , Network Servers Provides detailed instructions and example configuration files to set up your FreeBSD machine as a network filesystem server, domain name server, network information system server, or time synchronization server. , Firewalls Explains the philosophy behind software-based firewalls and provides detailed information about the configuration of the different firewalls available for FreeBSD. , Advanced Networking Describes many networking topics, including sharing an Internet connection with other computers on your LAN, advanced routing topics, wireless networking, bluetooth, ATM, IPv6, and much more. , Obtaining FreeBSD Lists different sources for obtaining FreeBSD media on CDROM or DVD as well as different sites on the Internet that allow you to download and install FreeBSD. , Bibliography This book touches on many different subjects that may leave you hungry for a more detailed explanation. The bibliography lists many excellent books that are referenced in the text. , Resources on the Internet Describes the many forums available for FreeBSD users to post questions and engage in technical conversations about FreeBSD. , PGP Keys Lists the PGP fingerprints of several FreeBSD Developers. Conventions used in this book To provide a consistent and easy to read text, several conventions are followed throughout the book. Typographic Conventions Italic An italic font is used for filenames, URLs, emphasized text, and the first usage of technical terms. Monospace A monospaced font is used for error messages, commands, environment variables, names of ports, hostnames, user names, group names, device names, variables, and code fragments. Bold A bold font is used for applications, commands, and keys. User Input Keys are shown in bold to stand out from other text. Key combinations that are meant to be typed simultaneously are shown with `+' between the keys, such as: Ctrl Alt Del Meaning the user should type the Ctrl, Alt, and Del keys at the same time. Keys that are meant to be typed in sequence will be separated with commas, for example: Ctrl X , Ctrl S Would mean that the user is expected to type the Ctrl and X keys simultaneously and then to type the Ctrl and S keys simultaneously. Examples Examples starting with E:\> indicate a &ms-dos; command. Unless otherwise noted, these commands may be executed from a Command Prompt window in a modern µsoft.windows; environment. E:\> tools\fdimage floppies\kern.flp A: Examples starting with &prompt.root; indicate a command that must be invoked as the superuser in FreeBSD. You can login as root to type the command, or login as your normal account and use &man.su.1; to gain superuser privileges. &prompt.root; dd if=kern.flp of=/dev/fd0 Examples starting with &prompt.user; indicate a command that should be invoked from a normal user account. Unless otherwise noted, C-shell syntax is used for setting environment variables and other shell commands. &prompt.user; top Acknowledgments The book you are holding represents the efforts of many hundreds of people around the world. Whether they sent in fixes for typos, or submitted complete chapters, all the contributions have been useful. Several companies have supported the development of this document by paying authors to work on it full-time, paying for publication, etc. In particular, BSDi (subsequently acquired by Wind River Systems) paid members of the FreeBSD Documentation Project to work on improving this book full time leading up to the publication of the first printed edition in March 2000 (ISBN 1-57176-241-8). Wind River Systems then paid several additional authors to make a number of improvements to the print-output infrastructure and to add additional chapters to the text. This work culminated in the publication of the second printed edition in November 2001 (ISBN 1-57176-303-1). In 2003-2004, FreeBSD Mall, Inc, paid several contributors to improve the Handbook in preparation for the third printed edition.