diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/fdp-primer/sgml-markup/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/fdp-primer/sgml-markup/chapter.sgml index 2c79f02b93..772477ac93 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/fdp-primer/sgml-markup/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/fdp-primer/sgml-markup/chapter.sgml @@ -1,2563 +1,2563 @@ SGML Markup This chapter describes the three markup languages you will encounter when you contribute to the FreeBSD documentation project. Each section describes the markup language, and details the markup that you are likely to want to use, or that is already in use. These markup languages contain a large number of elements, and it can be confusing sometimes to know which element to use for a particular situation. This section goes through the elements you are most likely to need, and gives examples of how you would use them. This is not an exhaustive list of elements, since that would just reiterate the documentation for each language. The aim of this section is to list those elements more likely to be useful to you. If you have a question about how best to markup a particular piece of content, please post it to the FreeBSD Documentation Project mailing list freebsd-doc@FreeBSD.org. Inline vs. block In the remainder of this document, when describing elements, inline means that the element can occur within a block element, and does not cause a line break. A block element, by comparison, will cause a line break (and other processing) when it is encountered. HTML HTML, the HyperText Markup Language, is the markup language of choice on the World Wide Web. More information can be found at <URL:http://www.w3.org/>. HTML is used to markup pages on the FreeBSD web site. It should not (generally) be used to mark up other documention, since DocBook offers a far richer set of elements to choose from. Consequently, you will normally only encounter HTML pages if you are writing for the web site. HTML has gone through a number of versions, 1, 2, 3.0, 3.2, and the latest, 4.0 (available in both strict and loose variants). The HTML DTDs are available from the ports collection in the textproc/html port. They are automatically installed as part of the textproc/docproj port. Formal Public Identifier (FPI) There are a number of HTML FPIs, depending upon the version (also known as the level) of HTML that you want to declare your document to be compliant with. The majority of HTML documents on the FreeBSD web site comply with the loose version of HTML 4.0. PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" Sectional elements An HTML document is normally split in to two sections. The first section, called the head, contains meta-information about the document, such as its title, the name of the author, the parent document, and so on. The second section, the body, contains the content that will be displayed to the user. These sections are indicated with head and body elements respectively. These elements are contained within the top-level html element. Normal HTML document structure <html> <head> <title>The document's title</title> </head> <body> … </body> </html> Block elements Headings HTML allows you to denote headings in your document, at up to six different levels. The largest and most prominent heading is h1, then h2, continuing down to h6. The element's content is the text of the heading. <sgmltag>h1</sgmltag>, <sgmltag>h2</sgmltag>, etc. Use: First section

This is the heading for the first section

This is the heading for the first sub-section

This is the heading for the second section

]]> Generally, an HTML page should have one first level heading (h1). This can contain many second level headings (h2), which can in turn contain many third level headings. Each hn element should have the same element, but one further up the hierarchy, preceeding it. Leaving gaps in the numbering is to be avoided. Bad ordering of <sgmltag>h<replaceable>n</replaceable></sgmltag> elements Use: First section

Sub-section

]]> Paragraphs HTML supports a single paragraph element, p. <sgmltag>p</sgmltag> Use: This is a paragraph. It can contain just about any other element.

]]> Block quotations A block quotation is an extended quotation from another document that should not appear within the current paragraph. <sgmltag>blockquote</sgmltag> Use: A small excerpt from the US Constitution:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
]]> Lists You can present the user with three types of lists, ordered, unordered, and definition. Typically, each entry in an ordered list will be numbered, while each entry in an unordered list will be preceded by a bullet point. Definition lists are composed of two sections for each entry. The first section is the term being defined, and the second section is the definition of the term. Ordered lists are indicated by the ol element, unordered lists by the ul element, and definition lists by the dl element. Ordered and unordered lists contain listitems, indicated by the li element. A listitem can contain textual content, or it may be further wrapped in one or more p elements. Definition lists contain definition terms (dt) and definition descriptions (dd). A definition term can only contain inline elements. A definition description can contain other block elements. <sgmltag>ul</sgmltag> and <sgmltag>ol</sgmltag> Use: An unordered list. Listitems will probably be preceeded by bullets.

  • First item
  • Second item
  • Third item

An ordered list, with list items consisting of multiple paragraphs. Each item (note: not each paragraph) will be numbered.

  1. This is the first item. It only has one paragraph.

  2. This is the first paragraph of the second item.

    This is the second paragraph of the second item.

  3. This is the first and only paragraph of the third item.

]]> Definition lists with <sgmltag>dl</sgmltag> Use:
Term 1

Paragraph 1 of definition 1.

Paragraph 2 of definition 1.

Term 2

Paragraph 1 of definition 2.

Term 3
Paragraph 1 of definition 3. Note that the <p> element is not required in the single paragraph case.
]]> Pre-formatted text You can indicate that text should be shown to the user exactly as it is in the file. Typically, this means that the text is shown in a fixed font, multiple spaces are not merged in to one, and line breaks in the text are significant. In order to do this, wrap the content in the pre element. <sgmltag>pre</sgmltag> You could use pre to mark up an e-mail message; From: nik@FreeBSD.org To: freebsd-doc@FreeBSD.org Subject: New documentation available There's a new copy of my primer for contributers to the FreeBSD Documentation Project available at Comments appreciated. N]]> Tables Most text-mode browsers (such as Lynx) do not render tables particularly effectively. If you are relying on the tabular display of your content, you should consider using alternative markup to prevent confusion. Mark up tabular information using the table element. A table consists of one or more table rows (tr), each containing one or more cells of table data (td). Each cell can contain other block elements, such as paragraphs or lists. It can also contain another table (this nesting can repeat indefinitely). If the cell only contains one paragraph then you do not need to include the p element. Simple use of <sgmltag>table</sgmltag> Use: This is a simple 2x2 table.

Top left cell Top right cell
Bottom left cell Bottom right cell
]]> A cell can span multiple rows and columns. To indicate this, add the rowspan and/or colspan attributes, with values indicating the number of rows of columns that should be spanned. Using <literal>rowspan</literal> Use: One tall thin cell on the left, two short cells next to it on the right.

Long and thin
Top cell Bottom cell
]]> Using <literal>colspan</literal> Use: One long cell on top, two short cells below it.

Top cell
Bottom left cell Bottom right cell
]]> Using <literal>rowspan</literal> and <literal>colspan</literal> together Use: On a 3x3 grid, the top left block is a 2x2 set of cells merged in to one. The other cells are normal.

Top left large cell Top right cell
Middle right cell
Bottom left cell Bottom middle cell Bottom right cell
]]> In-line elements Emphasising information You have two levels of emphasis available in HTML, em and strong. em is for a normal level of emphasis and strong indicates stronger emphasis. Typically, em is rendered in italic and strong is rendered in bold. This is not always the case, however, and you should not rely on it. <sgmltag>em</sgmltag> and <sgmltag>strong</sgmltag> Use: This has been emphasised, while this has been strongly emphasised.

]]> Bold and italics Because HTML includes presentational markup, you can also indicate that particular content should be rendered in bold or italic. The elements are b and i respectively. <sgmltag>b</sgmltag> and <sgmltag>i</sgmltag> This is in bold, while this is in italics.

]]> Indicating fixed pitch text If you have content that should be rendered in a fixed pitch (typewriter) typeface, use tt (for “teletype”). <sgmltag>tt</sgmltag> Use: This document was originally written by Nik Clayton, who can be reached by e-mail as nik@FreeBSD.org.

]]> Content size You can indicate that content should be shown in a larger or smaller font. There are three ways of doing this. Use big and small around the content you wish to change size. These tags can be nested, so <big><big>This is much bigger</big></big> is possible. Use font with the size attribute set to +1 or -1 respectively. This has the same effect as using big or small. However, the use of this approach is deprecated. Use font with the size attribute set to a number between 1 and 7. The default font size is 3. This approach is deprecated. <sgmltag>big</sgmltag>, <sgmltag>small</sgmltag>, and <sgmltag>font</sgmltag> The following fragments all do the same thing. This text is slightly smaller. But this text is slightly bigger.

This text is slightly smaller. But this text is slightly bigger

This text is slightly smaller. But this text is slightly bigger.

]]> Links Links are also in-line elements. Linking to other documents on the WWW In order to include a link to another document on the WWW you must know the URL of the document you want to link to. The link is indicated with a, and the href attribute contains the URL of the target document. The content of the element becomes the link, and is normally indicated to the user in some way (underlining, change of colour, different mouse cursor when over the link, and so on). Using <literal><a href="..."></literal> Use: More information is available at the FreeBSD web site.

]]> These links will take the user to the top of the chosen document. Linking to other parts of documents Linking to a point within another document (or within the same document) requires that the document author include anchors that you can link to. Anchors are indicated with a and the name attribute instead of href. Using <literal><a name="..."></literal> Use: This paragraph can be referenced in other links with the name para1.

]]> To link to a named part of a document, write a normal link to that document, but include the name of the anchor after a # symbol. Linking to a named part of another document Assume that the para1 example resides in a document called foo.html. More information can be found in the first paragraph of foo.html.

]]> If you are linking to a named anchor within the same document then you can omit the document's URL, and just include the name of the anchor (with the preceeding #). Linking to a named part of the same document Assume that the para1 example resides in this document More information can be found in the first paragraph of this document.

]]> DocBook DocBook was designed by the Davenport Group to be a DTD for writing technical documentation. As such, and unlike LinuxDoc and HTML, DocBook is very heavily oriented towards markup that describes what something is, rather than describing how it should be presented. <literal>formal</literal> vs. <literal>informal</literal> Some elements may exist in two forms, formal and informal. Typically, the formal version of the element will consist of a title followed by the information version of the element. The informal version will not have a title. The DocBook DTD is available from the ports collection in the textproc/docbook port. It is automatically installed as part of the textproc/docproj port. FreeBSD extensions The FreeBSD Documentation Project has extended the DocBook DTD by adding some new elements. These elements serve to make some of the markup more precise. Where a FreeBSD specific element is listed below it is clearly marked. Throughout the rest of this document, the term “DocBook” is used to mean the FreeBSD extended DocBook DTD. There is nothing about these extensions that is FreeBSD specific, it was just felt that they were useful enhancements for this particular project. Should anyone from any of the other *nix camps (NetBSD, OpenBSD, Linux, …) be interested in collaborating on a standard DocBook extension set, please get in touch with Nik Clayton nik@FreeBSD.org. The FreeBSD extensions are not (currently) in the ports collection. They are stored in the FreeBSD CVS tree, as doc/share/sgml/freebsd.dtd. Formal Public Identifier (FPI) In compliance with the DocBook guidelines for writing FPIs for DocBook customisations, the FPI for the FreeBSD extended DocBook DTD is; PUBLIC "-//FreeBSD//DTD DocBook V4.1-Based Extension//EN" Document structure DocBook allows you to structure your documentation in several ways. In the FreeBSD Documentation Project we are using two primary types of DocBook document: the book and the article. A book is organised into chapters. This is a mandatory requirement. There may be parts between the book and the chapter to provide another layer of organisation. The Handbook is arranged in this way. A chapter may (or may not) contain one or more sections. These are indicated with the sect1 element. If a section contains another section then use the sect2 element, and so on, up to sect5. Chapters and sections contain the remainder of the content. An article is simpler than a book, and does not use chapters. Instead, the content of an article is organised into one or more sections, using the same sect1 (and sect2 and so on) elements that are used in books. Obviously, you should consider the nature of the documentation you are writing in order to decide whether it is best marked up as a book or an article. Articles are well suited to information that does not need to be broken down into several chapters, and that is, relatively speaking, quite short, at up to 20-25 pages of content. Books are best suited to information that can be broken up into several chapters, possibly with appendices and similar content as well. The FreeBSD tutorials are all marked up as articles, while this document, the FreeBSD FAQ, and the FreeBSD Handbook are all marked up as books. Starting a book The content of the book is contained within the book element. As well as containing structural markup, this element can contain elements that include additional information about the book. This is either meta-information, used for reference purposes, or additional content used to produce a title page. This additional information should be contained within bookinfo. Boilerplate <sgmltag>book</sgmltag> with <sgmltag>bookinfo</sgmltag> <book> <bookinfo> <title>Your title here</title> <author> <firstname>Your first name</firstname> <surname>Your surname</surname> <affiliation> <address><email>Your e-mail address</email></address> </affiliation> </author> <copyright> <year>1998</year> <holder role="mailto:your e-mail address">Your name</holder> </copyright> <pubdate role="rcs">$Date$</pubdate> <releaseinfo>$Id$</releaseinfo> <abstract> <para>Include an abstract of the book's contents here.</para> </abstract> </bookinfo> … </book> Starting an article The content of the article is contained within the article element. As well as containing structural markup, this element can contain elements that include additional information about the article. This is either meta-information, used for reference purposes, or additional content used to produce a title page. This additional information should be contained within articleinfo. Boilerplate <sgmltag>article</sgmltag> with <sgmltag>articleinfo</sgmltag> <article> <articleinfo> <title>Your title here</title> <author> <firstname>Your first name</firstname> <surname>Your surname</surname> <affiliation> <address><email>Your e-mail address</email></address> </affiliation> </author> <copyright> <year>1998</year> <holder role="mailto:your e-mail address">Your name</holder> </copyright> <pubdate role="rcs">$Date$</pubdate> <releaseinfo>$Id$</releaseinfo> <abstract> <para>Include an abstract of the article's contents here.</para> </abstract> </articleinfo> … </article> Indicating chapters Use chapter to mark up your chapters. Each chapter has a mandatory title. Articles do not contain chapters, they are reserved for books. A simple chapter The chapter's title ... ]]> A chapter cannot be empty; it must contain elements in addition to title. If you need to include an empty chapter then just use an empty paragraph. Empty chapters This is an empty chapter ]]> Sections below chapters In books, chapters may (but do not need to) be broken up into sections, subsections, and so on. In articles, sections are the main structural element, and each article must contain at least one section. Use the sectn element. The n indicates the section number, which identifies the section level. The first sectn is sect1. You can have one or more of these in a chapter. They can contain one or more sect2 elements, and so on, down to sect5. Sections in chapters A sample chapter Some text in the chapter. First section (1.1) … Second section (1.2) First sub-section (1.2.1) First sub-sub-section (1.2.1.1) … Second sub-section (1.2.2) … ]]> This example includes section numbers in the section titles. You should not do this in your documents. Adding the section numbers is carried out the by the stylesheets (of which more later), and you do not need to manage them yourself. Subdividing using <sgmltag>part</sgmltag>s You can introduce another layer of organisation between book and chapter with one or more parts. This cannot be done in an article. Introduction Overview ... What is FreeBSD? ... History ... ]]> Block elements Paragraphs DocBook supports three types of paragraphs: formalpara, para, and simpara. Most of the time you will only need to use para. formalpara includes a title element, and simpara disallows some elements from within para. Stick with para. <sgmltag>para</sgmltag> Use: This is a paragraph. It can contain just about any other element. ]]> Appearance: This is a paragraph. It can contain just about any other element. Block quotations A block quotation is an extended quotation from another document that should not appear within the current paragraph. You will probably only need it infrequently. Blockquotes can optionally contain a title and an attribution (or they can be left untitled and unattributed). <sgmltag>blockquote</sgmltag> Use: A small excerpt from the US Constitution;
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States Copied from a web site somewhere We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
]]> Appearance:
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States Copied from a web site somewhere We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Tips, notes, warnings, cautions, important information and sidebars. You may need to include extra information separate from the main body of the text. Typically this is “meta” information that the user should be aware of. Depending on the nature of the information, one of tip, note, warning, caution, and important should be used. Alternatively, if the information is related to the main text but is not one of the above, use sidebar. The circumstances in which to choose one of these elements over another is unclear. The DocBook documentation suggests; A Note is for information that should be heeded by all readers. An Important element is a variation on Note. A Caution is for information regarding possible data loss or software damage. A Warning is for information regarding possible hardware damage or injury to life or limb. <sgmltag>warning</sgmltag> Use: Installing FreeBSD may make you want to delete Windows from your harddisk. ]]> Installing FreeBSD may make you want to delete Windows from your harddisk. Lists and procedures You will often need to list pieces of information to the user, or present them with a number of steps that must be carried out in order to accomplish a particular goal. In order to do this, use itemizedlist, orderedlist, or procedureThere are other types of list element in DocBook, but we're not concerned with those at the moment. itemizedlist and orderedlist are similar to their counterparts in HTML, ul and ol. Each one consists of one or more listitem elements, and each listitem contains one or more block elements. The listitem elements are analagous to HTML's li tags. However, unlike HTML, they are required. procedure is slightly different. It consists of steps, which may in turn consists of more steps or substeps. Each step contains block elements. <sgmltag>itemizedlist</sgmltag>, <sgmltag>orderedlist</sgmltag>, and <sgmltag>procedure</sgmltag> Use: This is the first itemized item. This is the second itemized item. This is the first ordered item. This is the second ordered item. Do this. Then do this. And now do this. ]]> Appearance: This is the first itemized item. This is the second itemized item. This is the first ordered item. This is the second ordered item. Do this. Then do this. And now do this. Showing file samples If you want to show a fragment of a file (or perhaps a complete file) to the user, wrap it in the programlisting element. White space and line breaks within programlisting are significant. In particular, this means that the opening tag should appear on the same line as the first line of the output, and the closing tag should appear on the same line as the last line of the output, otherwise spurious blank lines may be included. <sgmltag>programlisting</sgmltag> Use: When you have finished, your program should look like this; #include <stdio.h> int main(void) { printf("hello, world\n"); }]]> Notice how the angle brackets in the #include line need to be referenced by their entities instead of being included literally. Appearance: When you have finished, your program should look like this; #include <stdio.h> int main(void) { printf("hello, world\n"); } Callouts A callout is a mechanism for referring back to an earlier piece of text or specific position within an earlier example without linking to it within the text. To do this, mark areas of interest in your example (programlisting, literallayout, or whatever) with the co element. Each element must have a unique id assigned to it. After the example include a calloutlist that refers back to the example and provides additional commentary. <sgmltag>co</sgmltag> and <sgmltag>calloutlist</sgmltag> When you have finished, your program should look like this; #include <stdio.h> int main(void) { printf("hello, world\n"); } Includes the standard IO header file. Specifies that main() returns an int. The printf() call that writes hello, world to standard output. ]]> Appearance: When you have finished, your program should look like this; #include <stdio.h> int main(void) { printf("hello, world\n"); } Includes the standard IO header file. Specifies that main() returns an int. The printf() call that writes hello, world to standard output. Tables Unlike HTML, you do not need to use tables for layout purposes, as the stylesheet handles those issues for you. Instead, just use tables for marking up tabular data. In general terms (and see the DocBook documentation for more detail) a table (which can be either formal or informal) consists of a table element. This contains at least one tgroup element, which specifies (as an attribute) the number of columns in this table group. Within the tablegroup you can then have one thead element, which contains elements for the table headings (column headings), and one tbody which contains the body of the table. Both tgroup and thead contain row elements, which in turn contain entry elements. Each entry element specifies one cell in the table. <sgmltag>informaltable</sgmltag> Use: This is column head 1 This is column head 2 Row 1, column 1 Row 1, column 2 Row 2, column 1 Row 2, column 2 ]]> Appearance: This is column head 1 This is column head 2 Row 1, column 1 Row 1, column 2 Row 2, column 1 Row 2, column 2 If you don't want a border around the table the frame attribute can be added to the informaltable element with a value of none (i.e., <informaltable frame="none">). Tables where <literal>frame="none"</literal> Appearance: This is column head 1 This is column head 2 Row 1, column 1 Row 1, column 2 Row 2, column 1 Row 2, column 2 Examples for the user to follow A lot of the time you need to show examples for the user to follow. Typically, these will consist of dialogs with the computer; the user types in a command, the user gets a response back, they type in another command, and so on. A number of distinct elements and entities come in to play here. screen Everything the user sees in this example will be on the computer screen, so the next element is screen. Within screen, white space is significant. prompt, &prompt.root; and &prompt.user; Some of the things the user will be seeing on the screen are prompts from the computer (either from the OS, command shell, or application. These should be marked up using prompt. As a special case, the two shell prompts for the normal user and the root user have been provided as entities. Every time you want to indicate the user is at a shell prompt, use one of &prompt.root; and &prompt.user; as necessary. They do not need to be inside prompt. &prompt.root; and &prompt.user; are FreeBSD extensions to DocBook, and are not part of the original DTD. userinput When displaying text that the user should type in, wrap it in userinput tags. It will probably be displayed differently to the user. <sgmltag>screen</sgmltag>, <sgmltag>prompt</sgmltag>, and <sgmltag>userinput</sgmltag> Use: &prompt.user; ls -1 foo1 foo2 foo3 &prompt.user; ls -1 | grep foo2 foo2 &prompt.user; su Password: &prompt.root; cat foo2 This is the file called 'foo2']]> Appearance: &prompt.user; ls -1 foo1 foo2 foo3 &prompt.user; ls -1 | grep foo2 foo2 &prompt.user; su Password: &prompt.root; cat foo2 This is the file called 'foo2' Even though we are displaying the contents of the file foo2, it is not marked up as programlisting. Reserve programlisting for showing fragments of files outside the context of user actions. In-line elements Emphasising information When you want to emphasise a particular word or phrase, use emphasis. This may be presented as italic, or bold, or might be spoken differently with a text-to-speech system. There is no way to change the presentation of the emphasis within your document, no equivalent of HTML's b and i. If the information you are presenting is important then consider presenting it in important rather than emphasis. <sgmltag>emphasis</sgmltag> Use: FreeBSD is without doubt the premiere Unix like operating system for the Intel architecture.]]> Appearance: FreeBSD is without doubt the premiere Unix like operating system for the Intel architecture. Applications, commands, options, and cites You will frequently want to refer to both applications and commands when writing for the Handbook. The distinction between them is simple: an application is the name for a suite (or possibly just 1) of programs that fulfil a particular task. A command is the name of a program that the user can run. In addition, you will occasionally need to list one or more of the options that a command might take. Finally, you will often want to list a command with its manual section number, in the “command(number)” format so common in Unix manuals. Mark up application names with application. When you want to list a command with its manual section number (which should be most of the time) the DocBook element is citerefentry. This will contain a further two elements, refentrytitle and manvolnum. The content of refentrytitle is the name of the command, and the content of manvolnum is the manual page section. This can be cumbersome to write, and so a series of general entities have been created to make this easier. Each entity takes the form &man.manual-page.manual-section;. The file that contains these entities is in doc/share/sgml/man-refs.ent, and can be referred to using this FPI: PUBLIC "-//FreeBSD//ENTITIES DocBook Manual Page Entities//EN" Therefore, the introduction to your documentation will probably look like this: <!DOCTYPE book PUBLIC "-//FreeBSD//DTD DocBook V4.1-Based Extension//EN" [ <!ENTITY % man PUBLIC "-//FreeBSD//ENTITIES DocBook Manual Page Entities//EN"> %man; … ]> Use command when you want to include a command name “in-line” but present it as something the user should type in. Use option to mark up a command's options. This can be confusing, and sometimes the choice is not always clear. Hopefully this example makes it clearer. Applications, commands, and options. Use: Sendmail is the most widely used Unix mail application. Sendmail includes the sendmail 8 , &man.mailq.8;, and &man.newaliases.8; programs. One of the command line parameters to sendmail 8 , , will display the current status of messages in the mail queue. Check this on the command line by running sendmail -bp.]]> Appearance: Sendmail is the most widely used Unix mail application. Sendmail includes the sendmail 8 , mailq 8 , and newaliases 8 programs. One of the command line parameters to sendmail 8 , , will display the current status of messages in the mail queue. Check this on the command line by running sendmail -bp. Notice how the &man.command.section; notation is easier to follow. Files, directories, extensions Whenever you wish to refer to the name of a file, a directory, or a file extension, use filename. <sgmltag>filename</sgmltag> Use: The SGML source for the Handbook in English can be found in /usr/doc/en/handbook/. The first file is called handbook.sgml in that directory. You should also see a Makefile and a number of files with a .ent extension.]]> Appearance: The SGML source for the Handbook in English can be found in /usr/doc/en/handbook/. The first file is called handbook.sgml in that directory. You should also see a Makefile and a number of files with a .ent extension. Devices FreeBSD extension These elements are part of the FreeBSD extension to DocBook, and do not exist in the original DocBook DTD. When referring to devices you have two choices. You can either refer to the device as it appears in /dev, or you can use the name of the device as it appears in the kernel. For this latter course, use devicename. Sometimes you will not have a choice. Some devices, such as networking cards, do not have entries in /dev, or the entries are markedly different from those entries. <sgmltag>devicename</sgmltag> Use: sio is used for serial communication in FreeBSD. sio manifests through a number of entries in /dev, including /dev/ttyd0 and /dev/cuaa0. By contrast, the networking devices, such as ed0 do not appear in /dev. In MS-DOS, the first floppy drive is referred to as a:. In FreeBSD it is /dev/fd0.]]> Appearance: sio is used for serial communication in FreeBSD. sio manifests through a number of entries in /dev, including /dev/ttyd0 and /dev/cuaa0. By contrast, the networking devices, such as ed0 do not appear in /dev. In MS-DOS, the first floppy drive is referred to as a:. In FreeBSD it is /dev/fd0. Hosts, domains, IP addresses, and so forth FreeBSD extension These elements are part of the FreeBSD extension to DocBook, and do not exist in the original DocBook DTD. You can markup identification information for networked computers (hosts) in several ways, depending on the nature of the information. All of them use hostid as the element, with the role attribute selecting the type of the marked up information. No role attribute, or role="hostname" With no role attribute (i.e., hostid...hostid the marked up information is the simple hostname, such as freefall or wcarchive. You can explicitly specify this with role="hostname". role="domainname" The text is a domain name, such as FreeBSD.org or ngo.org.uk. There is no hostname component. role="fqdn" The text is a Fully Qualified Domain Name, with both hostname and domain name parts. role="ipaddr" The text is an IP address, probably expressed as a dotted quad. role="ip6addr" The text is an IPv6 address. role="netmask" The text is a network mask, which might be expressed as a dotted quad, a hexadecimal string, or as a / followed by a number. role="mac" The text is an ethernet MAC address, expressed as a series of 2 digit hexadecimal numbers separated by colons. <sgmltag>hostid</sgmltag> and roles Use: The local machine can always be referred to by the name localhost, which will have the IP address 127.0.0.1. The FreeBSD.org domain contains a number of different hosts, including freefall.FreeBSD.org and bento.FreeBSD.org. When adding an IP alias to an interface (using ifconfig) always use a netmask of 255.255.255.255 (which can also be expressed as 0xffffffff. -The MAC address uniquely identifies every network card in +The MAC address uniquely identifies every network card in existence. A typical MAC address looks like 08:00:20:87:ef:d0.]]> Appearance: The local machine can always be referred to by the name localhost, which will have the IP address 127.0.0.1. The FreeBSD.org domain contains a number of different hosts, including freefall.FreeBSD.org and bento.FreeBSD.org. When adding an IP alias to an interface (using ifconfig) always use a netmask of 255.255.255.255 (which can also be expressed as 0xffffffff. The MAC address uniquely identifies every network card in existence. A typical MAC address looks like 08:00:20:87:ef:d0. Usernames FreeBSD extension These elements are part of the FreeBSD extension to DocBook, and do not exist in the original DocBook DTD. When you need to refer to a specific username, such as root or bin, use username. <sgmltag>username</sgmltag> Use: To carry out most system administration functions you will need to be root.]]> Appearance: To carry out most system administration functions you will need to be root. Describing <filename>Makefile</filename>s FreeBSD extension These elements are part of the FreeBSD extension to DocBook, and do not exist in the original DocBook DTD. Two elements exist to describe parts of Makefiles, maketarget and makevar. maketarget identifies a build target exported by a Makefile that can be given as a parameter to make. makevar identifies a variable that can be set (in the environment, on the make command line, or within the Makefile) to influence the process. <sgmltag>maketarget</sgmltag> and <sgmltag>makevar</sgmltag> Use: Two common targets in a Makefile are all and clean. Typically, invoking all will rebuild the application, and invoking clean will remove the temporary files (.o for example) created by the build process. clean may be controlled by a number of variables, including CLOBBER and RECURSE.]]> Appearance: Two common targets in a Makefile are all and clean. Typically, invoking all will rebuild the application, and invoking clean will remove the temporary files (.o for example) created by the build process. clean may be controlled by a number of variables, including CLOBBER and RECURSE. Literal text You will often need to include “literal” text in the Handbook. This is text that is excerpted from another file, or which should be copied from the Handbook into another file verbatim. Some of the time, programlisting will be sufficient to denote this text. programlisting is not always appropriate, particularly when you want to include a portion of a file “in-line” with the rest of the paragraph. On these occasions, use literal. <sgmltag>literal</sgmltag> Use: The maxusers 10 line in the kernel configuration file determines the size of many system tables, and is a rough guide to how many simultaneous logins the system will support.]]> Appearance: The maxusers 10 line in the kernel configuration file determines the size of many system tables, and is a rough guide to how many simultaneous logins the system will support. Showing items that the user <emphasis>must</emphasis> fill in There will often be times when you want to show the user what to do, or refer to a file, or command line, or similar, where the user can not simply copy the examples that you provide, but must instead include some information themselves. replaceable is designed for this eventuality. Use it inside other elements to indicate parts of that element's content that the user must replace. <sgmltag>replaceable</sgmltag> Use: &prompt.user; man command ]]> Appearance: &prompt.user; man command replaceable can be used in many different elements, including literal. This example also shows that replaceable should only be wrapped around the content that the user is meant to provide. The other content should be left alone. Use: The maxusers n line in the kernel configuration file determines the size of many system tables, and is a rough guide to how many simultaneous logins the system will support. For a desktop workstation, 32 is a good value for n.]]> Appearance: The maxusers n line in the kernel configuration file determines the size of many system tables, and is a rough guide to how many simultaneous logins the system will support. For a desktop workstation, 32 is a good value for n. Images Image support in the documentation is currently extremely experimental. I think the mechanisms described here are unlikely to change, but that's not guaranteed. You will also need to install the graphics/ImageMagick port, which is used to convert between the different image formats. This is a big port, and most of it is not required. However, while we're working on the Makefiles and other infrastructure it makes things easier. This port is not in the textproc/docproj meta port, you must install it by hand. The best example of what follows in practice is the en_US.ISO8859-1/articles/vm-design/ document. If you're unsure of the description that follows, take a look at the files in that directory to see how everything hangs togther. Experiment with creating different formatted versions of the document to see how the image markup appears in the formatted output. Image formats We currently support two formats for images. The format you should use will depend on the nature of your image. For images that are primarily vector based, such as network diagrams, timelines, and similar, use Encapsulated Postscript, and make sure that your images have the .eps extension. For bitmaps, such as screen captures, use the Portable Network Graphic format, and make sure that your images have the .png extension. These are the only formats in which images should be committed to the CVS repository. Use the right format for the right image. It is to be expected that your documentation will have a mix of EPS and PNG images. The Makefiles ensure that the correct format image is chosen depending on the output format that you use for your documentation. Do not commit the same image to the repository in two different formats. It is anticipated that the Documentation Project will switch to using the Scalable Vector Graphic (SVG) format for vector images. However, the current state of SVG capable editing tools makes this impractical. Markup The markup for an image is relatively simple. First, markup a mediaobject. The mediaobject can contain other, more specific objects. We are concerned with two, the imageobject and the textobject. You should include one imageobject, and two textobject elements. The imageobject will point to the name of the image file that will be used (without the extension). The textobject elements contain information that will be presented to the user as well as, or instead of, the image. There are two circumstances where this can happen. When the reader is viewing the documentation in HTML. In this case, each image will need to have associated alternate text to show the user, typically whilst the image is loading, or if they hover the mouse pointer over the image. When the reader is viewing the documentation in plain text. In this case, each image should have an ASCII art equivalent to show the user. An example will probably make things easier to understand. Suppose you have an image, called fig1, that you want to include in the document. This image is of a rectangle with an A inside it. The markup for this would be as follows. <mediaobject> <imageobject> <imagedata fileref="fig1"> </imageobject> <textobject> <literallayout class="monospaced">+---------------+ | A | +---------------+</literallayout> </textobject> <textobject> <phrase>A picture</phrase> </textobject> </mediaobject> Include an imagedata element inside the imageobject element. The fileref attribute should contain the filename of the image to include, without the extension. The stylesheets will work out which extension should be added to the filename automatically. The first textobject should contain a literallayout element, where the class attribute is set to monospaced. This is your opportunity to demonstrate your ASCII art skills. This content will be used if the document is converted to plain text. Notice how the first and last lines of the content of the literallayout element butt up next to the element's tags. This ensures no extraneous white space is included. The second textobject should contain a single phrase element. The contents of this will become the alt attribute for the image when this document is converted to HTML. <filename>Makefile</filename> entries Your images must be listed in the Makefile in the IMAGES variable. This variable should contain the name of all your source images. For example, if you have created three figures, fig1.eps, fig2.png, fig3.png, then your Makefile should have lines like this in it. … IMAGES= fig1.eps fig2.png fig3.png … or … IMAGES= fig1.eps IMAGES+= fig2.png IMAGES+= fig3.png … Again, the Makefile will work out the complete list of images it needs to build your source document, you only need to list the image files you provided. Images and chapters in subdirectories You must be careful when you separate your documentation in to smaller files (see ) in different directories. Suppose you have a book with three chapters, and the chapters are stored in their own directories, called chapter1/chapter.sgml, chapter2/chapter.sgml, and chapter3/chapter.sgml. If each chapter has images associated with it, I suggest you place those images in each chapter's subdirectory (chapter1/, chapter2/, and chapter3/). However, if you do this you must include the directory names in the IMAGES variable in the Makefile, and you must include the directory name in the imagedata element in your document. For example, if you have chapter1/fig1.png, then chapter1/chapter.sgml should contain <mediaobject> <imageobject> <imagedata fileref="chapter1/fig1"> </imageobject> … </mediaobject> The directory name must be included in the fileref attribute The Makefile must contain … IMAGES= chapter1/fig1.png … Then everything should just work. Links Links are also in-line elements. Linking to other parts of the same document Linking within the same document requires you to specify where you are linking from (i.e., the text the user will click, or otherwise indicate, as the source of the link) and where you are linking to (the link's destination). Each element within DocBook has an attribute called id. You can place text in this attribute to uniquely name the element it is attached to. This value will be used when you specify the link source. Normally, you will only be linking to chapters or sections, so you would add the id attribute to these elements. <literal>id on chapters and sections</literal> Introduction This is the introduction. It contains a subsection, which is identified as well. Sub-sect 1 This is the subsection. ]]> Obviously, you should use more descriptive values. The values must be unique within the document (i.e., not just the file, but the document the file might be included in as well). Notice how the id for the subsection is constructed by appending text to the id of the chapter. This helps to ensure that they are unique. If you want to allow the user to jump into a specific portion of the document (possibly in the middle of a paragraph or an example), use anchor. This element has no content, but takes an id attribute. <sgmltag>anchor</sgmltag> This paragraph has an embedded link target in it. It won't show up in the document.]]> When you want to provide the user with a link they can activate (probably by clicking) to go to a section of the document that has an id attribute, you can use either xref or link. Both of these elements have a linkend attribute. The value of this attribute should be the value that you have used in a id attribute (it does not matter if that value has not yet occurred in your document; this will work for forward links as well as backward links). If you use xref then you have no control over the text of the link. It will be generated for you. Using <sgmltag>xref</sgmltag> Assume that this fragment appears somewhere in a document that includes the id example; More information can be found in . More specific information can be found in .]]> The text of the link will be generated automatically, and will look like (emphasised text indicates the text that will be the link);
More information can be found in Chapter One. More specific information can be found in the section called Sub-sect 1.
Notice how the text from the link is derived from the section title or the chapter number. This means that you can not use xref to link to an id attribute on an anchor element. The anchor has no content, so the xref can not generate the text for the link. If you want to control the text of the link then use link. This element wraps content, and the content will be used for the link. Using <sgmltag>link</sgmltag> Assume that this fragment appears somewhere in a document that includes the id example. More information can be found in the first chapter. More specific information can be found in FreeBSD home page instead.]]> Appearance: Of course, you could stop reading this document and go to the FreeBSD home page instead. * LinuxDoc LinuxDoc is an adaptation of the QWERTZ DTD, first adopted by the Linux Documentation Project, and subsequently adopted by the FreeBSD Documentation Project. The LinuxDoc DTD contains primarily appearance related markup rather than content related markup (i.e., it describes what something looks like rather than what it is). Both the FreeBSD Documentation Project and the Linux Documentation Project are migrating from the LinuxDoc DTD to the DocBook DTD. The LinuxDoc DTD is available from the ports collection in the textproc/linuxdoc category. diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/kernelconfig/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/kernelconfig/chapter.sgml index 3543460804..0f3f450001 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/kernelconfig/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/kernelconfig/chapter.sgml @@ -1,1235 +1,1235 @@ Configuring the FreeBSD Kernel Synopsis Updated and restructured by &a.jim;, March 2000. Originally contributed by &a.jehamby;, 6 October 1995. kernel building a custom kernel The following chapter of the handbook covers everything you will need to know in order to build a custom kernel. If you are wondering what the benefits of a custom kernel are, or would like to know how to configure, compile, and install a custom kernel, this chapter is for you. Why Build a Custom Kernel? Building a custom kernel is one of the most important rites of passage nearly every UNIX user must endure. This process, while time consuming, will provide many benefits to your FreeBSD system. Unlike the GENERIC kernel, which must support a wide range of hardware, a custom kernel only contains support for your PC's hardware. This has a number of benefits, such as: Faster boot time. Since the kernel will only probe the hardware you have on your system, the time it takes your system to boot will decrease dramatically. Less memory use. A custom kernel often uses less memory than the GENERIC kernel, which is important because the kernel is one process that must always be present in memory. For this reason, a custom kernel is especially useful on a system with a small amount of RAM. Additional hardware support. A custom kernel allows you to add in support for devices such as sound cards, which are not present in the GENERIC kernel. Building and Installing a Custom Kernel kernel building / installing First, let us take a quick tour of the kernel build directory. All directories mentioned will be relative to the main /usr/src/sys directory, which is also accessible through /sys. There are a number of subdirectories here representing different parts of the kernel, but the most important, for our purposes, are arch/conf, where you will edit your custom kernel configuration, and compile, which is the staging area where your kernel will be built. arch represents either i386, alpha, or pc98 (an alternative development branch of PC hardware, popular in Japan). Everything inside a particular architecture's directory deals with that architecture only; the rest of the code is common to all platforms to which FreeBSD could potentially be ported. Notice the logical organization of the directory structure, with each supported device, filesystem, and option in its own subdirectory. If there is not a /usr/src/sys directory on your system, then the kernel source has not been installed. The easiest way to do this is by running /stand/sysinstall as root, choosing Configure, then Distributions, then src, then sys. Next, move to the arch/conf directory and copy the GENERIC configuration file to the name you want to give your kernel. For example: &prompt.root; cd /usr/src/sys/i386/conf &prompt.root; cp GENERIC MYKERNEL Traditionally, this name is in all capital letters and, if you are maintaining multiple FreeBSD machines with different hardware, it is a good idea to name it after your machine's hostname. We will call it MYKERNEL for the purpose of this example. Storing your kernel config file directly under /usr/src can be a bad idea. If you are experiencing problems it can be tempting to just delete /usr/src and start again. Five seconds after you do that you realise that you have deleted your custom kernel config file. You might want to keep your kernel config file elsewhere, and then create a symbolic link to the file in the i386 directory. For example: &prompt.root; cd /usr/src/sys/i386/conf &prompt.root; mkdir /root/kernels &prompt.root; cp GENERIC /root/kernels/MYKERNEL &prompt.root; ln -s /root/kernels/MYKERNEL You must execute these and all of the following commands under the root account or you will get permission denied errors. Now, edit MYKERNEL with your favorite text editor. If you are just starting out, the only editor available will probably be vi, which is too complex to explain here, but is covered well in many books in the bibliography. However, FreeBSD does offer an easier editor called ee which, if you are a beginner, should be your editor of choice. Feel free to change the comment lines at the top to reflect your configuration or the changes you have made to differentiate it from GENERIC. SunOS If you have built a kernel under SunOS or some other BSD operating system, much of this file will be very familiar to you. If you are coming from some other operating system such as DOS, on the other hand, the GENERIC configuration file might seem overwhelming to you, so follow the descriptions in the Configuration File section slowly and carefully. Be sure to always check the file /usr/src/UPDATING, before you perform any update steps, in the case you sync your source-tree with the latest sources of the FreeBSD project. In this file all important issues with updating FreeBSD are written down. /usr/src/UPDATING always fits to your version of the FreeBSD source, and is therefore more accurate for those information than the handbook. You must now compile the source code for the kernel. There are two procedures you can use to do this, and the one you will use depends on why you are rebuilding the kernel, and the version of FreeBSD you are running. If you have installed only the kernel source code, use procedure 1. If you are running a FreeBSD version prior to 4.0, and you are not upgrading to FreeBSD 4.0 or higher using the make world procedure, use procedure 1. If you are building a new kernel without updating the source code (perhaps just to add a new option, such as IPFIREWALL) you can use either procedure. If you are rebuilding the kernel as part of a make world process, use procedure 2. - Procedure 1. Building a kernel the the <quote>traditional</quote> way + Procedure 1. Building a kernel the <quote>traditional</quote> way Run &man.config.8; to generate the kernel source code. &prompt.root; /usr/sbin/config MYKERNEL Change in to the build directory. &prompt.root; cd ../../compile/MYKERNEL Compile the kernel. &prompt.root; make depend &prompt.root; make Install the new kernel. &prompt.root; make install Procedure 2. Building a kernel the <quote>new</quote> way Change to the /usr/src directory &prompt.root; cd /usr/src Compile the kernel. &prompt.root; make buildkernel KERNCONF=MYKERNEL Install the new kernel. &prompt.root; make installkernel KERNCONF=MYKERNEL In FreeBSD 4.2 and older you must replace KERNCONF= with KERNEL=. 4.2-STABLE that was fetched after Feb 2nd, 2001 does recognize KERNCONF= CVSup anoncvs CTM CVS anonymous If you have not upgraded your source tree in any way (you have not run CVSup, CTM, or used anoncvs), then you should use the config, make depend, make, make install sequence. kernel.old The new kernel will be copied to the root directory as /kernel and the old kernel will be moved to /kernel.old. Now, shutdown the system and reboot to use your kernel. In case something goes wrong, there are some troubleshooting instructions at the end of this document. Be sure to read the section which explains how to recover in case your new kernel does not boot. If you have added any new devices (such as sound cards) you may have to add some device nodes to your /dev directory before you can use them. The Configuration File kernelLINT LINT kernel config file The general format of a configuration file is quite simple. Each line contains a keyword and one or more arguments. For simplicity, most lines only contain one argument. Anything following a # is considered a comment and ignored. The following sections describe each keyword, generally in the order they are listed in GENERIC, although some related keywords have been grouped together in a single section (such as Networking) even though they are actually scattered throughout the GENERIC file. An exhaustive list of options and more detailed explanations of the device lines is present in the LINT configuration file, located in the same directory as GENERIC. If you are in doubt as to the purpose or necessity of a line, check first in LINT. Quoting numbers In all versions of FreeBSD up to and including 3.X, &man.config.8; required that any strings in the configuration file that contained numbers used as text had to be enclosed in double quotes. This requirement was removed in the 4.X branch, which this book covers, so if you are on a pre-4.X system, see the /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/LINT and /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC files on your system for examples. kernel example config The following is an example GENERIC kernel configuration file with various additional comments where needed for clarity. This example should match your copy in /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC fairly closely. For details of all the possible kernel options, see /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/LINT. # # GENERIC -- Generic kernel configuration file for FreeBSD/i386 # # For more information on this file, please read the handbook section on # Kernel Configuration Files: # # http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig-config.html # # The handbook is also available locally in /usr/share/doc/handbook # if you've installed the doc distribution, otherwise always see the # FreeBSD World Wide Web server (http://www.FreeBSD.ORG/) for the # latest information. # # An exhaustive list of options and more detailed explanations of the # device lines is also present in the ./LINT configuration file. If you are # in doubt as to the purpose or necessity of a line, check first in LINT. # # $FreeBSD: src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC,v 1.246 2000/03/09 16:32:55 jlemon Exp $ The following are the mandatory keywords required in every kernel you build: kernel options machine machine i386 This is the machine architecture. It must be either i386, alpha, or pc98. kernel options cpu cpu I386_CPU cpu I486_CPU cpu I586_CPU cpu I686_CPU The above specifies the type of CPU you have in your system. You may have multiple instances of the CPU line (i.e., you are not sure whether you should use I586_CPU or I686_CPU), however, for a custom kernel, it is best to specify only the CPU you have. If you are unsure which type your CPU use, you can use the dmesg command to view your boot up messages. kernel options cpu type The Alpha architecture has different values for cpu_type. They include: cpu EV4 cpu EV5 If you are using an Alpha machine, you should be using one of the above CPU types. kernel options ident ident GENERIC This is the identification of the kernel. You should change this to whatever you named your kernel, in our previous example, MYKERNEL. The value you put in the ident string will print when you boot up the kernel, so it is useful to give a kernel a different name if you want to keep it separate from your usual kernel (i.e., you want to build an experimental kernel). kernel options maxusers maxusers 32 The maxusers option sets the size of a number of important system tables. This number is supposed to be roughly equal to the number of simultaneous users you expect to have on your machine. However, under normal circumstances, you will want to set maxusers to at least 4, especially if you are using the X Window System or compiling software. The reason is that the most important table set by maxusers is the maximum number of processes, which is set to 20 + 16 * maxusers, so if you set maxusers to 1, then you can only have 36 simultaneous processes, including the 18 or so that the system starts up at boot time, and the 15 or so you will probably create when you start the X Window System. Even a simple task like reading a man page will start up nine processes to filter, decompress, and view it. Setting maxusers to 64 will allow you to have up to 1044 simultaneous processes, which should be enough for nearly all uses. If, however, you see the dreaded proc table full error when trying to start another program, or are running a server with a large number of simultaneous users (like ftp.FreeBSD.org), you can always increase the number and rebuild. maxusers does not limit the number of users which can log into your machine. It simply sets various table sizes to reasonable values considering the maximum number of users you will likely have on your system and how many processes each of them will be running. One keyword which does limit the number of simultaneous remote logins is pseudo-device pty 16. Everything that follows is more or less optional. See the notes underneath or next to each option for more information. #makeoptions DEBUG=-g #Build kernel with gdb(1) debug symbols options MATH_EMULATE #Support for x87 emulation This line allows the kernel to simulate a math co-processor if your computer does not have one (386 or 486SX). If you have a 486DX, or a 386 or 486SX (with a separate 387 or 487 chip), or higher (Pentium, Pentium II, etc.), you can comment this line out. The normal math co-processor emulation routines that come with FreeBSD are not very accurate. If you do not have a math co-processor, and you need the best accuracy, it is recommended that you change this option to GPL_MATH_EMULATION to use the GNU math support, which is not included by default for licensing reasons. options INET #InterNETworking Networking support. Leave this in, even if you do not plan to be connected to a network. Most programs require at least loopback networking (i.e., making network connections within your PC), so this is essentially mandatory. options INET6 #IPv6 communications protocols This enables the IPv6 communication protocols. options FFS #Berkeley Fast Filesystem options FFS_ROOT #FFS usable as root device [keep this!] This is the basic hard drive filesystem. Leave it in if you boot from the hard disk. options MFS #Memory Filesystem options MD_ROOT #MD is a potential root device This is the memory-mapped filesystem. This is basically a RAM disk for fast storage of temporary files, useful if you have a lot of swap space that you want to take advantage of. A perfect place to mount an MFS partition is on the /tmp directory, since many programs store temporary data here. To mount an MFS RAM disk on /tmp, add the following line to /etc/fstab: /dev/ad1s2b /tmp mfs rw 0 0 Now you simply need to either reboot, or run the command mount /tmp. kernel options NFS kernel options NFS_ROOT options NFS #Network Filesystem options NFS_ROOT #NFS usable as root device, NFS required The network filesystem. Unless you plan to mount partitions from a UNIX file server over TCP/IP, you can comment these out. kernel options MSDOSFS options MSDOSFS #MSDOS Filesystem The MS-DOS filesystem. Unless you plan to mount a DOS formatted hard drive partition at boot time, you can safely comment this out. It will be automatically loaded the first time you mount a DOS partition, as described above. Also, the excellent mtools software (in the ports collection) allows you to access DOS floppies without having to mount and unmount them (and does not require MSDOSFS at all). options CD9660 #ISO 9660 Filesystem options CD9660_ROOT #CD-ROM usable as root, CD9660 required The ISO 9660 filesystem for CDROMs. Comment it out if you do not have a CDROM drive or only mount data CDs occasionally (since it will be dynamically loaded the first time you mount a data CD). Audio CDs do not need this filesystem. options PROCFS #Process filesystem The process filesystem. This is a pretend filesystem mounted on /proc which allows programs like &man.ps.1; to give you more information on what processes are running. options COMPAT_43 #Compatible with BSD 4.3 [KEEP THIS!] Compatibility with 4.3BSD. Leave this in; some programs will act strangely if you comment this out. options SCSI_DELAY=15000 #Delay (in ms) before probing SCSI This causes the kernel to pause for 15 seconds before probing each SCSI device in your system. If you only have IDE hard drives, you can ignore this, otherwise you will probably want to lower this number, perhaps to 5 seconds, to speed up booting. Of course, if you do this, and FreeBSD has trouble recognizing your SCSI devices, you will have to raise it back up. options UCONSOLE #Allow users to grab the console Allow users to grab the console, which is useful for X users. For example, you can create a console xterm by typing xterm -C, which will display any write, talk, and any other messages you receive, as well as any console messages sent by the kernel. options USERCONFIG #boot -c editor This option allows you to boot the configuration editor from the boot menu. options VISUAL_USERCONFIG #visual boot -c editor This option allows you to boot the visual configuration editor from the boot menu. options KTRACE #ktrace(1) support This enables kernel process tracing, which is useful in debugging. options SYSVSHM #SYSV-style shared memory This option provides for System V shared memory. The most common use of this is the XSHM extension in X, which many graphics-intensive programs will automatically take advantage of for extra speed. If you use X, you'll definitely want to include this. options SYSVSEM #SYSV-style semaphores Support for System V semaphores. Less commonly used but only adds a few hundred bytes to the kernel. options SYSVMSG #SYSV-style message queues Support for System V messages. Again, only adds a few hundred bytes to the kernel. The &man.ipcs.1; command will list any processes using each of these System V facilities. options P1003_1B #Posix P1003_1B real-time extensions options _KPOSIX_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING Real-time extensions added in the 1993 POSIX. Certain applications in the ports collection use these (such as Star Office). kernel options ICMP_BANDLIM options ICMP_BANDLIM #Rate limit bad replies This option enables ICMP error response bandwidth limiting. You typically want this option as it will help protect the machine from denial of service packet attacks. kernel options SMP # To make an SMP kernel, the next two are needed #options SMP # Symmetric MultiProcessor Kernel #options APIC_IO # Symmetric (APIC) I/O The above are both required for SMP support. device isa All PCs supported by FreeBSD have one of these. If you have an IBM PS/2 (Micro Channel Architecture), you cannot run FreeBSD at this time (support is being worked on). device eisa Include this if you have an EISA motherboard. This enables auto-detection and configuration support for all devices on the EISA bus. device pci Include this if you have a PCI motherboard. This enables auto-detection of PCI cards and gatewaying from the PCI to ISA bus. # Floppy drives device fdc0 at isa? port IO_FD1 irq 6 drq 2 device fd0 at fdc0 drive 0 device fd1 at fdc0 drive 1 This is the floppy drive controller. fd0 is the A: floppy drive, and fd1 is the B: drive. device ata This driver supports all ATA and ATAPI devices. You only need one device ata line for the kernel to detect all PCI ATA/ATAPI devices on modern machines. device atadisk # ATA disk drives This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI disk drives. device atapicd # ATAPI CDROM drives This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI CDROM drives. device atapifd # ATAPI floppy drives This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI floppy drives. device atapist # ATAPI tape drives This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI tape drives. options ATA_STATIC_ID #Static device numbering This makes the controller number static (like the old driver) or else the device numbers are dynamically allocated. # ATA and ATAPI devices device ata0 at isa? port IO_WD1 irq 14 device ata1 at isa? port IO_WD2 irq 15 Use the above for older, non-PCI systems. # SCSI Controllers device ahb # EISA AHA1742 family device ahc # AHA2940 and onboard AIC7xxx devices device amd # AMD 53C974 (Teckram DC-390(T)) device dpt # DPT Smartcache - See LINT for options! device isp # Qlogic family device ncr # NCR/Symbios Logic device sym # NCR/Symbios Logic (newer chipsets) device adv0 at isa? device adw device bt0 at isa? device aha0 at isa? device aic0 at isa? SCSI controllers. Comment out any you do not have in your system. If you have an IDE only system, you can remove these altogether. # SCSI peripherals device scbus # SCSI bus (required) device da # Direct Access (disks) device sa # Sequential Access (tape etc) device cd # CD device pass # Passthrough device (direct SCSI access) SCSI peripherals. Again, comment out any you do not have, or if you have only IDE hardware, you can remove them completely. # RAID controllers device ida # Compaq Smart RAID device amr # AMI MegaRAID device mlx # Mylex DAC960 family Supported RAID controllers. If you do not have any of these, you can comment them out or remove them. # atkbdc0 controls both the keyboard and the PS/2 mouse device atkbdc0 at isa? port IO_KBD The keyboard controller (atkbdc) provides I/O services for the AT keyboard and PS/2 style pointing devices. This controller is required by the keyboard driver (atkbd) and the PS/2 pointing device driver (psm). device atkbd0 at atkbdc? irq 1 The atkbd driver, together with atkbdc controller, provides access to the AT 84 keyboard or the AT enhanced keyboard which is connected to the AT keyboard controller. device psm0 at atkbdc? irq 12 Use this device if your mouse plugs into the PS/2 mouse port. device vga0 at isa? The video card driver. # splash screen/screen saver pseudo-device splash Splash screen at start up! Screen savers require this too. # syscons is the default console driver, resembling an SCO console device sc0 at isa? sc0 is the default console driver, which resembles a SCO console. Since most full-screen programs access the console through a terminal database library like termcap, it should not matter whether you use this or vt0, the VT220 compatible console driver. When you log in, set your TERM variable to scoansi if full-screen programs have trouble running under this console. # Enable this and PCVT_FREEBSD for pcvt vt220 compatible console driver #device vt0 at isa? #options XSERVER # support for X server on a vt console #options FAT_CURSOR # start with block cursor # If you have a ThinkPAD, uncomment this along with the rest of the PCVT lines #options PCVT_SCANSET=2 # IBM keyboards are non-std This is a VT220-compatible console driver, backward compatible to VT100/102. It works well on some laptops which have hardware incompatibilities with sc0. Also set your TERM variable to vt100 or vt220 when you log in. This driver might also prove useful when connecting to a large number of different machines over the network, where termcap or terminfo entries for the sc0 device are often not available — vt100 should be available on virtually any platform. # Floating point support - do not disable. device npx0 at nexus? port IO_NPX irq 13 npx0 is the interface to the floating point math unit in FreeBSD, which is either the hardware co-processor or the software math emulator. This is not optional. # Power management support (see LINT for more options) device apm0 at nexus? disable flags 0x20 # Advanced Power Management Advanced Power Management support. Useful for laptops. # PCCARD (PCMCIA) support device card device pcic0 at isa? irq 10 port 0x3e0 iomem 0xd0000 device pcic1 at isa? irq 11 port 0x3e2 iomem 0xd4000 disable PCMCIA support. You need this if you are installing on a laptop. # Serial (COM) ports device sio0 at isa? port IO_COM1 flags 0x10 irq 4 device sio1 at isa? port IO_COM2 irq 3 device sio2 at isa? disable port IO_COM3 irq 5 device sio3 at isa? disable port IO_COM4 irq 9 These are the four serial ports referred to as COM1 through COM4 in the MS-DOS/Windows world. If you have an internal modem on COM4 and a serial port at COM2, you will have to change the IRQ of the modem to 2 (for obscure technical reasons, IRQ2 = IRQ 9) in order to access it from FreeBSD. If you have a multiport serial card, check the manual page for &man.sio.4; for more information on the proper values for these lines. Some video cards (notably those based on S3 chips) use IO addresses in the form of 0x*2e8, and since many cheap serial cards do not fully decode the 16-bit IO address space, they clash with these cards making the COM4 port practically unavailable. Each serial port is required to have a unique IRQ (unless you are using one of the multiport cards where shared interrupts are supported), so the default IRQs for COM3 and COM4 cannot be used. # Parallel port device ppc0 at isa? irq 7 This is the ISA-bus parallel port interface. device ppbus # Parallel port bus (required) Provides support for the parallel port bus. device lpt # Printer Support for parallel port printers. All three of the above are required to enable parallel printer support. device plip # TCP/IP over parallel This is the driver for the parallel network interface. device ppi # Parallel port interface device The general-purpose I/O (geek port) + IEEE1284 I/O. #device vpo # Requires scbus and da zip drive This is for an Iomega Zip drive. It requires scbus and da support. Best performance is achieved with ports in EPP 1.9 mode. # PCI Ethernet NICs. device de # DEC/Intel DC21x4x (Tulip) device fxp # Intel EtherExpress PRO/100B (82557, 82558) device tx # SMC 9432TX (83c170 EPIC) device vx # 3Com 3c590, 3c595 (Vortex) device wx # Intel Gigabit Ethernet Card (Wiseman) Various PCI network card drivers. Comment out or remove any of these not present in your system. # PCI Ethernet NICs that use the common MII bus controller code. device miibus # MII bus support MII bus support is required for some PCI 10/100 ethernet NICs, namely those which use MII-compliant transceivers or implement transceiver control interfaces that operate like an MII. Adding device miibus to the kernel config pulls in support for the generic miibus API and all of the PHY drivers, including a generic one for PHYs that are not specifically handled by an individual driver device dc # DEC/Intel 21143 and various workalikes device rl # RealTek 8129/8139 device sf # Adaptec AIC-6915 (Starfire) device sis # Silicon Integrated Systems SiS 900/SiS 7016 device ste # Sundance ST201 (D-Link DFE-550TX) device tl # Texas Instruments ThunderLAN device vr # VIA Rhine, Rhine II device wb # Winbond W89C840F device xl # 3Com 3c90x (Boomerang, Cyclone) Drivers that use the MII bus controller code. # ISA Ethernet NICs. device ed0 at isa? port 0x280 irq 10 iomem 0xd8000 device ex device ep # WaveLAN/IEEE 802.11 wireless NICs. Note: the WaveLAN/IEEE really # exists only as a PCMCIA device, so there is no ISA attachment needed # and resources will always be dynamically assigned by the pccard code. device wi # Aironet 4500/4800 802.11 wireless NICs. Note: the declaration below will # work for PCMCIA and PCI cards, as well as ISA cards set to ISA PnP # mode (the factory default). If you set the switches on your ISA # card for a manually chosen I/O address and IRQ, you must specify # those parameters here. device an # The probe order of these is presently determined by i386/isa/isa_compat.c. device ie0 at isa? port 0x300 irq 10 iomem 0xd0000 device fe0 at isa? port 0x300 device le0 at isa? port 0x300 irq 5 iomem 0xd0000 device lnc0 at isa? port 0x280 irq 10 drq 0 device cs0 at isa? port 0x300 device sn0 at isa? port 0x300 irq 10 # requires PCCARD (PCMCIA) support to be activated #device xe0 at isa? ISA ethernet drivers. See /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/LINT for which cards are supported by which driver. # Pseudo devices - the number indicates how many units to allocated. pseudo-device loop # Network loopback This is the generic loopback device for TCP/IP. If you telnet or FTP to localhost (a.k.a., 127.0.0.1) it will come back at you through this pseudo-device. This is mandatory. pseudo-device ether # Ethernet support ether is only needed if you have an Ethernet card. It includes generic Ethernet protocol code. pseudo-device sl 1 # Kernel SLIP sl is for SLIP support. This has been almost entirely supplanted by PPP, which is easier to set up, better suited for modem-to-modem connection, and more powerful. The number after sl specifies how many simultaneous SLIP sessions to support. pseudo-device ppp 1 # Kernel PPP This is for kernel PPP support for dial-up connections. There is also a version of PPP implemented as a userland application that uses tun and offers more flexibility and features such as demand dialing. The number after ppp specifies how many simultaneous PPP connections to support. pseudo-device tun # Packet tunnel. This is used by the userland PPP software. The number after tun specifies the number of simultaneous PPP sessions to support. See the PPP section of this book for more information. pseudo-device pty # Pseudo-ttys (telnet etc) This is a pseudo-terminal or simulated login port. It is used by incoming telnet and rlogin sessions, xterm, and some other applications such as emacs. The number indicates the number of ptys to create. If you need more than the default of 16 simultaneous xterm windows and/or remote logins, be sure to increase this number accordingly, up to a maximum of 256. pseudo-device md # Memory disks Memory disk pseudo-devices. pseudo-device gif 4 # IPv6 and IPv4 tunneling This implements IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling, IPv4 over IPv6 tunneling, IPv4 over IPv4 tunneling, and IPv6 over IPv6 tunneling. pseudo-device faith 1 # IPv6-to-IPv4 relaying (translation) This pseudo-device captures packets that are sent to it and diverts them to the IPv4/IPv6 translation daemon. # The `bpf' pseudo-device enables the Berkeley Packet Filter. # Be aware of the administrative consequences of enabling this! pseudo-device bpf # Berkeley packet filter This is the Berkeley Packet Filter. This pseudo-device allows network interfaces to be placed in promiscuous mode, capturing every packet on a broadcast network (e.g., an ethernet). These packets can be captured to disk and or examined with the &man.tcpdump.1; program. # USB support #device uhci # UHCI PCI->USB interface #device ohci # OHCI PCI->USB interface #device usb # USB Bus (required) #device ugen # Generic #device uhid # Human Interface Devices #device ukbd # Keyboard #device ulpt # Printer #device umass # Disks/Mass storage - Requires scbus and da #device ums # Mouse # USB Ethernet, requires mii #device aue # ADMtek USB ethernet #device cue # CATC USB ethernet #device kue # Kawasaki LSI USB ethernet Support for various USB devices. For more information and additional devices supported by FreeBSD, see /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/LINT. Making Device Nodes device nodes MAKEDEV Almost every device in the kernel has a corresponding node entry in the /dev directory. These nodes look like regular files, but are actually special entries into the kernel which programs use to access the device. The shell script /dev/MAKEDEV, which is executed when you first install the operating system, creates nearly all of the device nodes supported. However, it does not create all of them, so when you add support for a new device, it pays to make sure that the appropriate entries are in this directory, and if not, add them. Here is a simple example: Suppose you add the IDE CD-ROM support to the kernel. The line to add is: device acd0 This means that you should look for some entries that start with acd0 in the /dev directory, possibly followed by a letter, such as c, or preceded by the letter r, which means a raw device. It turns out that those files are not there, so you must change to the /dev directory and type: MAKEDEV &prompt.root; sh MAKEDEV acd0 When this script finishes, you will find that there are now acd0c and racd0c entries in /dev so you know that it executed correctly. For sound cards, the following command creates the appropriate entries: &prompt.root; sh MAKEDEV snd0 When creating device nodes for devices such as sound cards, if other people have access to your machine, it may be desirable to protect the devices from outside access by adding them to the /etc/fbtab file. See &man.fbtab.5; for more information. Follow this simple procedure for any other non-GENERIC devices which do not have entries. All SCSI controllers use the same set of /dev entries, so you do not need to create these. Also, network cards and SLIP/PPP pseudo-devices do not have entries in /dev at all, so you do not have to worry about these either. If Something Goes Wrong There are four categories of trouble that can occur when building a custom kernel. They are: config fails If the config command fails when you give it your kernel description, you have probably made a simple error somewhere. Fortunately, config will print the line number that it had trouble with, so you can quickly skip to it with vi. For example, if you see: config: line 17: syntax error You can skip to the problem in vi by typing 17G in command mode. Make sure the keyword is typed correctly, by comparing it to the GENERIC kernel or another reference. make fails If the make command fails, it usually signals an error in your kernel description, but not severe enough for config to catch it. Again, look over your configuration, and if you still cannot resolve the problem, send mail to the &a.questions; with your kernel configuration, and it should be diagnosed very quickly. The kernel will not boot If your new kernel does not boot, or fails to recognize your devices, do not panic! Fortunately, BSD has an excellent mechanism for recovering from incompatible kernels. Simply choose the kernel you want to boot from at the FreeBSD boot loader (i.e., boot kernel.old). When reconfiguring a kernel, it is always a good idea to keep a kernel that is known to work on hand. After booting with a good kernel you can check over your configuration file and try to build it again. One helpful resource is the /var/log/messages file which records, among other things, all of the kernel messages from every successful boot. Also, the &man.dmesg.8; command will print the kernel messages from the current boot. If you are having trouble building a kernel, make sure to keep a GENERIC, or some other kernel that is known to work on hand as a different name that will not get erased on the next build. You cannot rely on kernel.old because when installing a new kernel, kernel.old is overwritten with the last installed kernel which may be non-functional. Also, as soon as possible, move the working kernel to the proper kernel location or commands such as &man.ps.1; will not work properly. The proper command to unlock the kernel file that make installs (in order to move another kernel back permanently) is: &prompt.root; chflags noschg /kernel And, if you want to lock your new kernel into place, or any file for that matter, so that it cannot be moved or tampered with: &prompt.root; chflags schg /kernel The kernel works, but ps does not work any more! If you have installed a different version of the kernel from the one that the system utilities have been built with, for example, a 4.X kernel on a 3.X system, many system-status commands like &man.ps.1; and &man.vmstat.8; will not work any more. You must recompile the libkvm library as well as these utilities. This is one reason it is not normally a good idea to use a different version of the kernel from the rest of the operating system. diff --git a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/security/chapter.sgml b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/security/chapter.sgml index a207a7cbec..83894eefd6 100644 --- a/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/security/chapter.sgml +++ b/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/security/chapter.sgml @@ -1,3033 +1,3033 @@ Security security Much of this chapter has been taken from the &man.security.7; man page, originally written by &a.dillon;. Synopsis The following chapter will provide a basic introduction to system security concepts, some general good rules of thumb, and some advanced topics such as S/Key, OpenSSL, Kerberos, and others. Introduction Security is a function that begins and ends with the system administrator. While all BSD UNIX multi-user systems have some inherent security, the job of building and maintaining additional security mechanisms to keep those users honest is probably one of the single largest undertakings of the sysadmin. Machines are only as secure as you make them, and security concerns are ever competing with the human necessity for convenience. UNIX systems, in general, are capable of running a huge number of simultaneous processes and many of these processes operate as servers – meaning that external entities can connect and talk to them. As yesterday's mini-computers and mainframes become today's desktops, and as computers become networked and internetworked, security becomes an ever bigger issue. Security is best implemented through a layered onion approach. In a nutshell, what you want to do is to create as many layers of security as are convenient and then carefully monitor the system for intrusions. You do not want to overbuild your security or you will interfere with the detection side, and detection is one of the single most important aspects of any security mechanism. For example, it makes little sense to set the schg flags (see &man.chflags.1;) on every system binary because while this may temporarily protect the binaries, it prevents an attacker who has broken in from making an easily detectable change that may result in your security mechanisms not detecting the attacker at all. System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of attack, including attacks that attempt to crash or otherwise make a system unusable but do not attempt to break root. Security concerns can be split up into several categories: Denial of service attacks. User account compromises. Root compromise through accessible servers. Root compromise via user accounts. Backdoor creation. DOS attacks security DOS attacks Denial of Service A denial of service attack is an action that deprives the machine of needed resources. Typically, D.O.S. attacks are brute-force mechanisms that attempt to crash or otherwise make a machine unusable by overwhelming its servers or network stack. Some D.O.S. attacks try to take advantages of bugs in the networking stack to crash a machine with a single packet. The latter can only be fixed by applying a bug fix to the kernel. Attacks on servers can often be fixed by properly specifying options to limit the load the servers incur on the system under adverse conditions. Brute-force network attacks are harder to deal with. A spoofed-packet attack, for example, is nearly impossible to stop short of cutting your system off from the Internet. It may not be able to take your machine down, but it can saturate your Internet connection. security account compromises A user account compromise is even more common than a D.O.S. attack. Many sysadmins still run standard telnetd, rlogind, rshd, and ftpd servers on their machines. These servers, by default, do not operate over encrypted connections. The result is that if you have any moderate-sized user base, one or more of your users logging into your system from a remote location (which is the most common and convenient way to login to a system) will have his or her password sniffed. The attentive system admin will analyze his remote access logs looking for suspicious source addresses even for successful logins. One must always assume that once an attacker has access to a user account, the attacker can break root. However, the reality is that in a well secured and maintained system, access to a user account does not necessarily give the attacker access to root. The distinction is important because without access to root the attacker cannot generally hide his tracks and may, at best, be able to do nothing more than mess with the user's files or crash the machine. User account compromises are very common because users tend not to take the precautions that sysadmins take. security backdoors System administrators must keep in mind that there are potentially many ways to break root on a machine. The attacker may know the root password, the attacker may find a bug in a root-run server and be able to break root over a network connection to that server, or the attacker may know of a bug in an suid-root program that allows the attacker to break root once - he has broken into a user's account. If an attacker has found a + he has broken into a user's account. If an attacker has found a way to break root on a machine, the attacker may not have a need to install a backdoor. Many of the root holes found and closed to date involve a considerable amount of work by the attacker to cleanup after himself, so most attackers install backdoors. Backdoors provide the attacker with a way to easily regain root access to the system, but it also gives the smart system administrator a convenient way to detect the intrusion. Making it impossible for an attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental to your security because it will not close off the hole the attacker found to break in the first place. Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered onion peel approach and can be categorized as follows: Securing root and staff accounts. Securing root – root-run servers and suid/sgid binaries. Securing user accounts. Securing the password file. Securing the kernel core, raw devices, and filesystems. Quick detection of inappropriate changes made to the system. Paranoia. The next section of this chapter will cover the above bullet items in greater depth. security securing Securing FreeBSD The sections that follow will cover the methods of securing your FreeBSD system that were mentioned in the last section of this chapter. Securing the root account and staff accounts su First off, do not bother securing staff accounts if you have not secured the root account. Most systems have a password assigned to the root account. The first thing you do is assume that the password is always compromised. This does not mean that you should remove the password. The password is almost always necessary for console access to the machine. What it does mean is that you should not make it possible to use the password outside of the console or possibly even with the &man.su.1; command. For example, make sure that your pty's are specified as being unsecure in the /etc/ttys file so that direct root logins via telnet or rlogin are disallowed. If using other login services such as sshd, make sure that direct root logins are disabled there as well. Consider every access method – services such as FTP often fall through the cracks. Direct root logins should only be allowed via the system console. wheel Of course, as a sysadmin you have to be able to get to root, so we open up a few holes. But we make sure these holes require additional password verification to operate. One way to make root accessible is to add appropriate staff accounts to the wheel group (in /etc/group). The staff members placed in the wheel group are allowed to su to root. You should never give staff members native wheel access by putting them in the wheel group in their password entry. Staff accounts should be placed in a staff group, and then added to the wheel group via the /etc/group file. Only those staff members who actually need to have root access should be placed in the wheel group. It is also possible, when using an authentication method such as kerberos, to use kerberos' .k5login file in the root account to allow a &man.ksu.1; to root without having to place anyone at all in the wheel group. This may be the better solution since the wheel mechanism still allows an intruder to break root if the intruder has gotten hold of your password file and can break into a staff account. While having the wheel mechanism is better than having nothing at all, it is not necessarily the safest option. An indirect way to secure staff accounts, and ultimately root access is to use an alternative login access method and do what is known as *'ing out the crypted password for the staff accounts. Using the &man.vipw.8; command, one can replace each instance of a crypted password with a single * character. This command will update the /etc/master.passwd file and user/password database to disable password-authenticated logins. A staff account entry such as: foobar:R9DT/Fa1/LV9U:1000:1000::0:0:Foo Bar:/home/foobar:/usr/local/bin/tcsh Should be changed to this : foobar:*:1000:1000::0:0:Foo Bar:/home/foobar:/usr/local/bin/tcsh This change will prevent normal logins from occurring, since the encrypted password will never match *. With this done, staff members must use another mechanism to authenticate themselves such as &man.kerberos.1; or &man.ssh.1; using a public/private key pair. When using something like kerberos, one generally must secure the machines which run the kerberos servers and your desktop workstation. When using a public/private key pair with ssh, one must generally secure the machine used to login from (typically one's workstation). An additional layer of protection can be added to the key pair by password protecting the key pair when creating it with &man.ssh-keygen.1;. Being able to * out the passwords for staff accounts also guarantees that staff members can only login through secure access methods that you have setup. This forces all staff members to use secure, encrypted connections for all of their sessions which closes an important hole used by many intruders: That of sniffing the network from an unrelated, less secure machine. The more indirect security mechanisms also assume that you are logging in from a more restrictive server to a less restrictive server. For example, if your main box is running all sorts of servers, your workstation should not be running any. In order for your workstation to be reasonably secure you should run as few servers as possible, up to and including no servers at all, and you should run a password-protected screen blanker. Of course, given physical access to a workstation an attacker can break any sort of security you put on it. This is definitely a problem that you should consider but you should also consider the fact that the vast majority of break-ins occur remotely, over a network, from people who do not have physical access to your workstation or servers. Kerberos Using something like kerberos also gives you the ability to disable or change the password for a staff account in one place and have it immediately effect all the machine the staff member may have an account on. If a staff member's account gets compromised, the ability to instantly change his password on all machines should not be underrated. With discrete passwords, changing a password on N machines can be a mess. You can also impose re-passwording restrictions with kerberos: not only can a kerberos ticket be made to timeout after a while, but the kerberos system can require that the user choose a new password after a certain period of time (say, once a month). Securing Root-run Servers and SUID/SGID Binaries ntalk comsat finger sandboxes sshd telnetd rshd rlogind The prudent sysadmin only runs the servers he needs to, no more, no less. Be aware that third party servers are often the most bug-prone. For example, running an old version of imapd or popper is like giving a universal root ticket out to the entire world. Never run a server that you have not checked out carefully. Many servers do not need to be run as root. For example, the ntalk, comsat, and finger daemons can be run in special user sandboxes. A sandbox isn't perfect unless you go to a large amount of trouble, but the onion approach to security still stands: If someone is able to break in through a server running in a sandbox, they still have to break out of the sandbox. The more layers the attacker must break through, the lower the likelihood of his success. Root holes have historically been found in virtually every server ever run as root, including basic system servers. If you are running a machine through which people only login via sshd and never login via telnetd or rshd or rlogind, then turn off those services! FreeBSD now defaults to running ntalkd, comsat, and finger in a sandbox. Another program which may be a candidate for running in a sandbox is &man.named.8;. /etc/defaults/rc.conf includes the arguments necessary to run named in a sandbox in a commented-out form. Depending on whether you are installing a new system or upgrading an existing system, the special user accounts used by these sandboxes may not be installed. The prudent sysadmin would research and implement sandboxes for servers whenever possible. sendmail There are a number of other servers that typically do not run in sandboxes: sendmail, popper, imapd, ftpd, and others. There are alternatives to some of these, but installing them may require more work than you are willing to perform (the convenience factor strikes again). You may have to run these servers as root and rely on other mechanisms to detect break-ins that might occur through them. The other big potential root hole in a system are the suid-root and sgid binaries installed on the system. Most of these binaries, such as rlogin, reside in /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, or /usr/sbin. While nothing is 100% safe, the system-default suid and sgid binaries can be considered reasonably safe. Still, root holes are occasionally found in these binaries. A root hole was found in Xlib in 1998 that made xterm (which is typically suid) vulnerable. It is better to be safe than sorry and the prudent sysadmin will restrict suid binaries that only staff should run to a special group that only staff can access, and get rid of (chmod 000) any suid binaries that nobody uses. A server with no display generally does not need an xterm binary. Sgid binaries can be almost as dangerous. If an intruder can break an sgid-kmem binary the intruder might be able to read /dev/kmem and thus read the crypted password file, potentially compromising any passworded account. Alternatively an intruder who breaks group kmem can monitor keystrokes sent through pty's, including pty's used by users who login through secure methods. An intruder that breaks the tty group can write to almost any user's tty. If a user is running a terminal program or emulator with a keyboard-simulation feature, the intruder can potentially generate a data stream that causes the user's terminal to echo a command, which is then run as that user. Securing User Accounts User accounts are usually the most difficult to secure. While you can impose Draconian access restrictions on your staff and * out their passwords, you may not be able to do so with any general user accounts you might have. If you do have sufficient control then you may win out and be able to secure the user accounts properly. If not, you simply have to be more vigilant in your monitoring of those accounts. Use of ssh and kerberos for user accounts is more problematic due to the extra administration and technical support required, but still a very good solution compared to a crypted password file. Securing the Password File The only sure fire way is to * out as many passwords as you can and use ssh or kerberos for access to those accounts. Even though the crypted password file (/etc/spwd.db) can only be read by root, it may be possible for an intruder to obtain read access to that file even if the attacker cannot obtain root-write access. Your security scripts should always check for and report changes to the password file (see Checking file integrity below). Securing the Kernel Core, Raw Devices, and Filesystems If an attacker breaks root he can do just about anything, but there are certain conveniences. For example, most modern kernels have a packet sniffing device driver built in. Under FreeBSD it is called the bpf device. An intruder will commonly attempt to run a packet sniffer on a compromised machine. You do not need to give the intruder the capability and most systems should not have the bpf device compiled in. sysctl But even if you turn off the bpf device, you still have /dev/mem and /dev/kmem to worry about. For that matter, the intruder can still write to raw disk devices. Also, there is another kernel feature called the module loader, &man.kldload.8;. An enterprising intruder can use a KLD module to install his own bpf device or other sniffing device on a running kernel. To avoid these problems you have to run the kernel at a higher secure level, at least securelevel 1. The securelevel can be set with a sysctl on the kern.securelevel variable. Once you have set the securelevel to 1, write access to raw devices will be denied and special chflags flags, such as schg, will be enforced. You must also ensure that the schg flag is set on critical startup binaries, directories, and script files – everything that gets run up to the point where the securelevel is set. This might be overdoing it, and upgrading the system is much more difficult when you operate at a higher secure level. You may compromise and run the system at a higher secure level but not set the schg flag for every system file and directory under the sun. Another possibility is to simply mount / and /usr read-only. It should be noted that being too draconian in what you attempt to protect may prevent the all-important detection of an intrusion. Checking File Integrity: Binaries, Configuration Files, Etc. When it comes right down to it, you can only protect your core system configuration and control files so much before the convenience factor rears its ugly head. For example, using chflags to set the schg bit on most of the files in / and /usr is probably counterproductive because while it may protect the files, it also closes a detection window. The last layer of your security onion is perhaps the most important – detection. The rest of your security is pretty much useless (or, worse, presents you with a false sense of safety) if you cannot detect potential incursions. Half the job of the onion is to slow down the attacker rather than stop him in order to give the detection side of the equation a chance to catch him in the act. The best way to detect an incursion is to look for modified, missing, or unexpected files. The best way to look for modified files is from another (often centralized) limited-access system. Writing your security scripts on the extra-secure limited-access system makes them mostly invisible to potential attackers, and this is important. In order to take maximum advantage you generally have to give the limited-access box significant access to the other machines in the business, usually either by doing a read-only NFS export of the other machines to the limited-access box, or by setting up ssh key-pairs to allow the limit-access box to ssh to the other machines. Except for its network traffic, NFS is the least visible method – allowing you to monitor the filesystems on each client box virtually undetected. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a switch, the NFS method is often the better choice. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a hub or through several layers of routing, the NFS method may be too insecure (network-wise) and using ssh may be the better choice even with the audit-trail tracks that ssh lays. Once you give a limit-access box at least read access to the client systems it is supposed to monitor, you must write scripts to do the actual monitoring. Given an NFS mount, you can write scripts out of simple system utilities such as &man.find.1; and &man.md5.1;. It is best to physically md5 the client-box files boxes at least once a day, and to test control files such as those found in /etc and /usr/local/etc even more often. When mismatches are found relative to the base md5 information the limited-access machine knows is valid, it should scream at a sysadmin to go check it out. A good security script will also check for inappropriate suid binaries and for new or deleted files on system partitions such as / and /usr. When using ssh rather than NFS, writing the security script is much more difficult. You essentially have to scp the scripts to the client box in order to run them, making them visible, and for safety you also need to scp the binaries (such as find) that those scripts use. The ssh daemon on the client box may already be compromised. All in all, using ssh may be necessary when running over unsecure links, but it's also a lot harder to deal with. A good security script will also check for changes to user and staff members access configuration files: .rhosts, .shosts, .ssh/authorized_keys and so forth… files that might fall outside the purview of the MD5 check. If you have a huge amount of user disk space it may take too long to run through every file on those partitions. In this case, setting mount flags to disallow suid binaries and devices on those partitions is a good idea. The nodev and nosuid options (see &man.mount.8;) are what you want to look into. You should probably scan them anyway at least once a week, since the object of this layer is to detect a break-in whether or not the break-in is effective. Process accounting (see &man.accton.8;) is a relatively low-overhead feature of the operating system which might help as a post-break-in evaluation mechanism. It is especially useful in tracking down how an intruder has actually broken into a system, assuming the file is still intact after the break-in occurs. Finally, security scripts should process the log files and the logs themselves should be generated in as secure a manner as possible – remote syslog can be very useful. An intruder tries to cover his tracks, and log files are critical to the sysadmin trying to track down the time and method of the initial break-in. One way to keep a permanent record of the log files is to run the system console to a serial port and collect the information on a continuing basis through a secure machine monitoring the consoles. Paranoia A little paranoia never hurts. As a rule, a sysadmin can add any number of security features as long as they do not effect convenience, and can add security features that do effect convenience with some added thought. Even more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up a bit – if you use recommendations such as those given by this document verbatim, you give away your methodologies to the prospective attacker who also has access to this document. Denial of Service Attacks DOS attacks This section covers Denial of Service attacks. A DOS attack is typically a packet attack. While there is not much you can do about modern spoofed packet attacks that saturate your network, you can generally limit the damage by ensuring that the attacks cannot take down your servers. Limiting server forks. Limiting springboard attacks (ICMP response attacks, ping broadcast, etc.). Kernel Route Cache. A common DOS attack is against a forking server that attempts to cause the server to eat processes, file descriptors, and memory until the machine dies. Inetd (see &man.inetd.8;) has several options to limit this sort of attack. It should be noted that while it is possible to prevent a machine from going down it is not generally possible to prevent a service from being disrupted by the attack. Read the inetd manual page carefully and pay specific attention to the , , and options. Note that spoofed-IP attacks will circumvent the option to inetd, so typically a combination of options must be used. Some standalone servers have self-fork-limitation parameters. Sendmail has its option which tends to work much better than trying to use sendmail's load limiting options due to the load lag. You should specify a MaxDaemonChildren parameter when you start sendmail high enough to handle your expected load but no so high that the computer cannot handle that number of sendmails without falling on its face. It is also prudent to run sendmail in queued mode () and to run the daemon (sendmail -bd) separate from the queue-runs (sendmail -q15m). If you still want real-time delivery you can run the queue at a much lower interval, such as , but be sure to specify a reasonable MaxDaemonChildren option for that sendmail to prevent cascade failures. Syslogd can be attacked directly and it is strongly recommended that you use the option whenever possible, and the option otherwise. You should also be fairly careful with connect-back services such as tcpwrapper's reverse-identd, which can be attacked directly. You generally do not want to use the reverse-ident feature of tcpwrappers for this reason. It is a very good idea to protect internal services from external access by firewalling them off at your border routers. The idea here is to prevent saturation attacks from outside your LAN, not so much to protect internal services from network-based root compromise. Always configure an exclusive firewall, i.e., firewall everything except ports A, B, C, D, and M-Z. This way you can firewall off all of your low ports except for certain specific services such as named (if you are primary for a zone), ntalkd, sendmail, and other Internet-accessible services. If you try to configure the firewall the other way – as an inclusive or permissive firewall, there is a good chance that you will forget to close a couple of services or that you will add a new internal service and forget to update the firewall. You can still open up the high-numbered port range on the firewall to allow permissive-like operation without compromising your low ports. Also take note that FreeBSD allows you to control the range of port numbers used for dynamic binding via the various net.inet.ip.portrange sysctl's (sysctl -a | fgrep portrange), which can also ease the complexity of your firewall's configuration. For example, you might use a normal first/last range of 4000 to 5000, and a hiport range of 49152 to 65535, then block everything under 4000 off in your firewall (except for certain specific Internet-accessible ports, of course). ICMP_BANDLIM Another common DOS attack is called a springboard attack – to attack a server in a manner that causes the server to generate responses which then overload the server, the local network, or some other machine. The most common attack of this nature is the ICMP ping broadcast attack. The attacker spoofs ping packets sent to your LAN's broadcast address with the source IP address set to the actual machine they wish to attack. If your border routers are not configured to stomp on ping's to broadcast addresses, your LAN winds up generating sufficient responses to the spoofed source address to saturate the victim, especially when the attacker uses the same trick on several dozen broadcast addresses over several dozen different networks at once. Broadcast attacks of over a hundred and twenty megabits have been measured. A second common springboard attack is against the ICMP error reporting system. By constructing packets that generate ICMP error responses, an attacker can saturate a server's incoming network and cause the server to saturate its outgoing network with ICMP responses. This type of attack can also crash the server by running it out of mbuf's, especially if the server cannot drain the ICMP responses it generates fast enough. The FreeBSD kernel has a new kernel compile option called ICMP_BANDLIM which limits the effectiveness of these sorts of attacks. The last major class of springboard attacks is related to certain internal inetd services such as the udp echo service. An attacker simply spoofs a UDP packet with the source address being server A's echo port, and the destination address being server B's echo port, where server A and B are both on your LAN. The two servers then bounce this one packet back and forth between each other. The attacker can overload both servers and their LANs simply by injecting a few packets in this manner. Similar problems exist with the internal chargen port. A competent sysadmin will turn off all of these inetd-internal test services. Spoofed packet attacks may also be used to overload the kernel route cache. Refer to the net.inet.ip.rtexpire, rtminexpire, and rtmaxcache sysctl parameters. A spoofed packet attack that uses a random source IP will cause the kernel to generate a temporary cached route in the route table, viewable with netstat -rna | fgrep W3. These routes typically timeout in 1600 seconds or so. If the kernel detects that the cached route table has gotten too big it will dynamically reduce the rtexpire but will never decrease it to less than rtminexpire. There are two problems: The kernel does not react quickly enough when a lightly loaded server is suddenly attacked. The rtminexpire is not low enough for the kernel to survive a sustained attack. If your servers are connected to the Internet via a T3 or better it may be prudent to manually override both rtexpire and rtminexpire via &man.sysctl.8;. Never set either parameter to zero (unless you want to crash the machine :-). Setting both parameters to 2 seconds should be sufficient to protect the route table from attack. Access Issues with Kerberos and SSH SSH Kerberos There are a few issues with both kerberos and ssh that need to be addressed if you intend to use them. Kerberos V is an excellent authentication protocol but there are bugs in the kerberized telnet and rlogin applications that make them unsuitable for dealing with binary streams. Also, by default kerberos does not encrypt a session unless you use the option. ssh encrypts everything by default. ssh works quite well in every respect except that it forwards encryption keys by default. What this means is that if you have a secure workstation holding keys that give you access to the rest of the system, and you ssh to an unsecure machine, your keys becomes exposed. The actual keys themselves are not exposed, but ssh installs a forwarding port for the duration of your login and if a attacker has broken root on the unsecure machine he can utilize that port to use your keys to gain access to any other machine that your keys unlock. We recommend that you use ssh in combination with kerberos whenever possible for staff logins. ssh can be compiled with kerberos support. This reduces your reliance on potentially exposable ssh keys while at the same time protecting passwords via kerberos. ssh keys should only be used for automated tasks from secure machines (something that kerberos is unsuited to). We also recommend that you either turn off key-forwarding in the ssh configuration, or that you make use of the from=IP/DOMAIN option that ssh allows in its authorized_keys file to make the key only usable to entities logging in from specific machines. DES, MD5, and Crypt security crypt crypt DES MD5 Parts rewritten and updated by &a.unfurl;, 21 March 2000. Every user on a UNIX system has a password associated with their account. It seems obvious that these passwords need to be known only to the user and the actual operating system. In order to keep these passwords secret, they are encrypted with what is known as a one-way hash, that is, they can only be easily encrypted but not decrypted. In other words, what we told you a moment ago was obvious is not even true: the operating system itself does not really know the password. It only knows the encrypted form of the password. The only way to get the plain-text password is by a brute force search of the space of possible passwords. Unfortunately the only secure way to encrypt passwords when UNIX came into being was based on DES, the Data Encryption Standard. This is not such a problem for users that live in the US, but since the source code for DES could not be exported outside the US, FreeBSD had to find a way to both comply with US law and retain compatibility with all the other UNIX variants that still use DES. The solution was to divide up the encryption libraries so that US users could install the DES libraries and use DES but international users still had an encryption method that could be exported abroad. This is how FreeBSD came to use MD5 as its default encryption method. MD5 is believed to be more secure than DES, so installing DES is offered primarily for compatibility reasons. Recognizing your crypt mechanism It is pretty easy to identify which encryption method FreeBSD is set up to use. Examining the encrypted passwords in the /etc/master.passwd file is one way. Passwords encrypted with the MD5 hash are longer than those with encrypted with the DES hash and also begin with the characters $1$. DES password strings do not have any particular identifying characteristics, but they are shorter than MD5 passwords, and are coded in a 64-character alphabet which does not include the $ character, so a relatively short string which does not begin with a dollar sign is very likely a DES password. The libraries can identify the passwords this way as well. As a result, the DES libraries are able to identify MD5 passwords, and use MD5 to check passwords that were encrypted that way, and DES for the rest. They are able to do this because the DES libraries also contain MD5. Unfortunately, the reverse is not true, so the MD5 libraries cannot authenticate passwords that were encrypted with DES. Identifying which library is being used by the programs on your system is easy as well. Any program that uses crypt is linked against libcrypt which for each type of library is a symbolic link to the appropriate implementation. For example, on a system using the DES versions: &prompt.user; ls -l /usr/lib/libcrypt* lrwxr-xr-x 1 root wheel 13 Mar 19 06:56 libcrypt.a -> libdescrypt.a lrwxr-xr-x 1 root wheel 18 Mar 19 06:56 libcrypt.so.2.0 -> libdescrypt.so.2.0 lrwxr-xr-x 1 root wheel 15 Mar 19 06:56 libcrypt_p.a -> libdescrypt_p.a On a system using the MD5-based libraries, the same links will be present, but the target will be libscrypt rather than libdescrypt. If you have installed the DES-capable crypt library libdescrypt (e.g. by installing the "crypto" distribution), then which password format will be used for new passwords is controlled by the passwd_format login capability in /etc/login.conf, which takes values of either des or md5. See the &man.login.conf.5; manpage for more information about login capabilities. S/Key S/Key security S/Key S/Key is a one-time password scheme based on a one-way hash function. FreeBSD uses the MD4 hash for compatibility but other systems have used MD5 and DES-MAC. S/Key has been part of the FreeBSD base system since version 1.1.5 and is also used on a growing number of other operating systems. S/Key is a registered trademark of Bell Communications Research, Inc. There are three different sorts of passwords which we will talk about in the discussion below. The first is your usual UNIX-style or Kerberos password; we will call this a UNIX password. The second sort is the one-time password which is generated by the S/Key key program and accepted by the keyinit program and the login prompt; we will call this a one-time password. The final sort of password is the secret password which you give to the key program (and sometimes the keyinit program) which it uses to generate one-time passwords; we will call it a secret password or just unqualified password. The secret password does not have anything to do with your UNIX password; they can be the same but this is not recommended. S/Key secret passwords are not limited to 8 characters like UNIX passwords, they can be as long as you like. Passwords of six or seven word long phrases are fairly common. For the most part, the S/Key system operates completely independently of the UNIX password system. Besides the password, there are two other pieces of data that are important to S/Key. One is what is known as the seed or key and consists of two letters and five digits. The other is what is called the iteration count and is a number between 1 and 100. S/Key creates the one-time password by concatenating the seed and the secret password, then applying the MD4 hash as many times as specified by the iteration count and turning the result into six short English words. These six English words are your one-time password. The login and su programs keep track of the last one-time password used, and the user is authenticated if the hash of the user-provided password is equal to the previous password. Because a one-way hash is used it is impossible to generate future one-time passwords if a successfully used password is captured; the iteration count is decremented after each successful login to keep the user and the login program in sync. When the iteration count gets down to 1 S/Key must be reinitialized. There are four programs involved in the S/Key system which we will discuss below. The key program accepts an iteration count, a seed, and a secret password, and generates a one-time password. The keyinit program is used to initialized S/Key, and to change passwords, iteration counts, or seeds; it takes either a secret password, or an iteration count, seed, and one-time password. The keyinfo program examines the /etc/skeykeys file and prints out the invoking user's current iteration count and seed. Finally, the login and su programs contain the necessary logic to accept S/Key one-time passwords for authentication. The login program is also capable of disallowing the use of UNIX passwords on connections coming from specified addresses. There are four different sorts of operations we will cover. The first is using the keyinit program over a secure connection to set up S/Key for the first time, or to change your password or seed. The second operation is using the keyinit program over an insecure connection, in conjunction with the key program over a secure connection, to do the same. The third is using the key program to log in over an insecure connection. The fourth is using the key program to generate a number of keys which can be written down or printed out to carry with you when going to some location without secure connections to anywhere. Secure connection initialization To initialize S/Key for the first time, change your password, or change your seed while logged in over a secure connection (e.g., on the console of a machine or via ssh), use the keyinit command without any parameters while logged in as yourself: &prompt.user; keyinit Adding unfurl: Reminder - Only use this method if you are directly connected. If you are using telnet or rlogin exit with no password and use keyinit -s. Enter secret password: Again secret password: ID unfurl s/key is 99 to17757 DEFY CLUB PRO NASH LACE SOFT At the Enter secret password: prompt you should enter a password or phrase. Remember, this is not the password that you will use to login with, this is used to generate your one-time login keys. The ID line gives the parameters of your particular S/Key instance; your login name, the iteration count, and seed. When logging in with S/Key, the system will remember these parameters and present them back to you so you do not have to remember them. The last line gives the particular one-time password which corresponds to those parameters and your secret password; if you were to re-login immediately, this one-time password is the one you would use. Insecure connection initialization To initialize S/Key or change your secret password over an insecure connection, you will need to already have a secure connection to some place where you can run the key program; this might be in the form of a desk accessory on a Macintosh, or a shell prompt on a machine you trust. You will also need to make up an iteration count (100 is probably a good value), and you may make up your own seed or use a randomly-generated one. Over on the insecure connection (to the machine you are initializing), use the keyinit -s command: &prompt.user; keyinit -s Updating unfurl: Old key: to17758 Reminder you need the 6 English words from the key command. Enter sequence count from 1 to 9999: 100 Enter new key [default to17759]: s/key 100 to 17759 s/key access password: To accept the default seed (which the keyinit program confusingly calls a key), press return. Then before entering an access password, move over to your secure connection or S/Key desk accessory, and give it the same parameters: &prompt.user; key 100 to17759 Reminder - Do not use this program while logged in via telnet or rlogin. Enter secret password: <secret password> CURE MIKE BANE HIM RACY GORE Now switch back over to the insecure connection, and copy the one-time password generated by key over to the keyinit program: s/key access password:CURE MIKE BANE HIM RACY GORE ID unfurl s/key is 100 to17759 CURE MIKE BANE HIM RACY GORE The rest of the description from the previous section applies here as well. Generating a single one-time password Once you've initialized S/Key, when you login you will be presented with a prompt like this: &prompt.user; telnet example.com Trying 10.0.0.1... Connected to example.com Escape character is '^]'. FreeBSD/i386 (example.com) (ttypa) login: <username> s/key 97 fw13894 Password: As a side note, the S/Key prompt has a useful feature (not shown here): if you press return at the password prompt, the login program will turn echo on, so you can see what you are typing. This can be extremely useful if you are attempting to type in an S/Key by hand, such as from a printout. Also, if this machine were configured to disallow UNIX passwords over a connection from the source machine, the prompt would have also included the annotation (s/key required), indicating that only S/Key one-time passwords will be accepted. At this point you need to generate your one-time password to answer this login prompt. This must be done on a trusted system that you can run the key command on. (There are versions of the key program from DOS, Windows and MacOS as well.) The key program needs both the iteration count and the seed as command line options. You can cut-and-paste these right from the login prompt on the machine that you are logging in to. On the trusted system: &prompt.user; key 97 fw13894 Reminder - Do not use this program while logged in via telnet or rlogin. Enter secret password: WELD LIP ACTS ENDS ME HAAG Now that you have your one-time password you can continue logging in: login: <username> s/key 97 fw13894 Password: <return to enable echo> s/key 97 fw13894 Password [echo on]: WELD LIP ACTS ENDS ME HAAG Last login: Tue Mar 21 11:56:41 from 10.0.0.2 ... This is the easiest mechanism if you have a trusted machine. There is a Java S/Key key applet, The Java OTP Calculator, that you can download and run locally on any Java supporting browser. Generating multiple one-time passwords Sometimes you have to go places where you do not have access to a trusted machine or secure connection. In this case, it is possible to use the key command to generate a number of one-time passwords before hand to be printed out and taken with you. For example: &prompt.user; key -n 5 30 zz99999 Reminder - Do not use this program while logged in via telnet or rlogin. Enter secret password: <secret password> 26: SODA RUDE LEA LIND BUDD SILT 27: JILT SPY DUTY GLOW COWL ROT 28: THEM OW COLA RUNT BONG SCOT 29: COT MASH BARR BRIM NAN FLAG 30: CAN KNEE CAST NAME FOLK BILK The requests five keys in sequence, the specifies what the last iteration number should be. Note that these are printed out in reverse order of eventual use. If you are really paranoid, you might want to write the results down by hand; otherwise you can cut-and-paste into lpr. Note that each line shows both the iteration count and the one-time password; you may still find it handy to scratch off passwords as you use them. Restricting use of UNIX passwords Restrictions can be placed on the use of UNIX passwords based on the host name, user name, terminal port, or IP address of a login session. These restrictions can be found in the configuration file /etc/skey.access. The &man.skey.access.5; manual page has more info on the complete format of the file and also details some security cautions to be aware of before depending on this file for security. If there is no /etc/skey.access file (this is the FreeBSD default), then all users will be allowed to use UNIX passwords. If the file exists, however, then all users will be required to use S/Key unless explicitly permitted to do otherwise by configuration statements in the skey.access file. In all cases, UNIX passwords are permitted on the console. Here is a sample configuration file which illustrates the three most common sorts of configuration statements: permit internet 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 permit user fnord permit port ttyd0 The first line (permit internet) allows users whose IP source address (which is vulnerable to spoofing) matches the specified value and mask, to use UNIX passwords. This should not be considered a security mechanism, but rather, a means to remind authorized users that they are using an insecure network and need to use S/Key for authentication. The second line (permit user) allows the specified username, in this case fnord, to use UNIX passwords at any time. Generally speaking, this should only be used for people who are either unable to use the key program, like those with dumb terminals, or those who are uneducable. The third line (permit port) allows all users logging in on the specified terminal line to use UNIX passwords; this would be used for dial-ups. Kerberos Kerberos Contributed by &a.markm; (based on contribution by &a.md;). Kerberos is a network add-on system/protocol that allows users to authenticate themselves through the services of a secure server. Services such as remote login, remote copy, secure inter-system file copying and other high-risk tasks are made considerably safer and more controllable. The following instructions can be used as a guide on how to set up Kerberos as distributed for FreeBSD. However, you should refer to the relevant manual pages for a complete description. 4.4BSD-Lite In FreeBSD, the Kerberos is not that from the original 4.4BSD-Lite, distribution, but eBones, which had been previously ported to FreeBSD 1.1.5.1, and was sourced from outside the USA/Canada, and was thus available to system owners outside those countries during the era of restrictive export controls on cryptographic code from the USA. Creating the initial database This is done on the Kerberos server only. First make sure that you do not have any old Kerberos databases around. You should change to the directory /etc/kerberosIV and check that only the following files are present: &prompt.root; cd /etc/kerberosIV &prompt.root; ls README krb.conf krb.realms If any additional files (such as principal.* or master_key) exist, then use the kdb_destroy command to destroy the old Kerberos database, of if Kerberos is not running, simply delete the extra files. You should now edit the krb.conf and krb.realms files to define your Kerberos realm. In this case the realm will be GRONDAR.ZA and the server is grunt.grondar.za. We edit or create the krb.conf file: &prompt.root; cat krb.conf GRONDAR.ZA GRONDAR.ZA grunt.grondar.za admin server CS.BERKELEY.EDU okeeffe.berkeley.edu ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos.mit.edu ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos-1.mit.edu ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos-2.mit.edu ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos-3.mit.edu LCS.MIT.EDU kerberos.lcs.mit.edu TELECOM.MIT.EDU bitsy.mit.edu ARC.NASA.GOV trident.arc.nasa.gov In this case, the other realms do not need to be there. They are here as an example of how a machine may be made aware of multiple realms. You may wish to not include them for simplicity. The first line names the realm in which this system works. The other lines contain realm/host entries. The first item on a line is a realm, and the second is a host in that realm that is acting as a key distribution center. The words admin server following a hosts name means that host also provides an administrative database server. For further explanation of these terms, please consult the Kerberos man pages. Now we have to add grunt.grondar.za to the GRONDAR.ZA realm and also add an entry to put all hosts in the .grondar.za domain in the GRONDAR.ZA realm. The krb.realms file would be updated as follows: &prompt.root; cat krb.realms grunt.grondar.za GRONDAR.ZA .grondar.za GRONDAR.ZA .berkeley.edu CS.BERKELEY.EDU .MIT.EDU ATHENA.MIT.EDU .mit.edu ATHENA.MIT.EDU Again, the other realms do not need to be there. They are here as an example of how a machine may be made aware of multiple realms. You may wish to remove them to simplify things. The first line puts the specific system into the named realm. The rest of the lines show how to default systems of a particular subdomain to a named realm. Now we are ready to create the database. This only needs to run on the Kerberos server (or Key Distribution Center). Issue the kdb_init command to do this: &prompt.root; kdb_init Realm name [default ATHENA.MIT.EDU ]: GRONDAR.ZA You will be prompted for the database Master Password. It is important that you NOT FORGET this password. Enter Kerberos master key: Now we have to save the key so that servers on the local machine can pick it up. Use the kstash command to do this. &prompt.root; kstash Enter Kerberos master key: Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! This saves the encrypted master password in /etc/kerberosIV/master_key. Making it all run Two principals need to be added to the database for each system that will be secured with Kerberos. Their names are kpasswd and rcmd These two principals are made for each system, with the instance being the name of the individual system. These daemons, kpasswd and rcmd allow other systems to change Kerberos passwords and run commands like rcp, rlogin and rsh. Now let's add these entries: &prompt.root; kdb_edit Opening database... Enter Kerberos master key: Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! Previous or default values are in [brackets] , enter return to leave the same, or new value. Principal name: passwd Instance: grunt <Not found>, Create [y] ? y Principal: passwd, Instance: grunt, kdc_key_ver: 1 New Password: <---- enter RANDOM here Verifying password New Password: <---- enter RANDOM here Random password [y] ? y Principal's new key version = 1 Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ? Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ? Attributes [ 0 ] ? Edit O.K. Principal name: rcmd Instance: grunt <Not found>, Create [y] ? Principal: rcmd, Instance: grunt, kdc_key_ver: 1 New Password: <---- enter RANDOM here Verifying password New Password: <---- enter RANDOM here Random password [y] ? Principal's new key version = 1 Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ? Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ? Attributes [ 0 ] ? Edit O.K. Principal name: <---- null entry here will cause an exit Creating the server file We now have to extract all the instances which define the services on each machine. For this we use the ext_srvtab command. This will create a file which must be copied or moved by secure means to each Kerberos client's /etc/kerberosIV directory. This file must be present on each server and client, and is crucial to the operation of Kerberos. &prompt.root; ext_srvtab grunt Enter Kerberos master key: Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! Generating 'grunt-new-srvtab'.... Now, this command only generates a temporary file which must be renamed to srvtab so that all the server can pick it up. Use the mv command to move it into place on the original system: &prompt.root; mv grunt-new-srvtab srvtab If the file is for a client system, and the network is not deemed safe, then copy the client-new-srvtab to removable media and transport it by secure physical means. Be sure to rename it to srvtab in the client's /etc/kerberosIV directory, and make sure it is mode 600: &prompt.root; mv grumble-new-srvtab srvtab &prompt.root; chmod 600 srvtab Populating the database We now have to add some user entries into the database. First let's create an entry for the user jane. Use the kdb_edit command to do this: &prompt.root; kdb_edit Opening database... Enter Kerberos master key: Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! Previous or default values are in [brackets] , enter return to leave the same, or new value. Principal name: jane Instance: <Not found>, Create [y] ? y Principal: jane, Instance: , kdc_key_ver: 1 New Password: <---- enter a secure password here Verifying password New Password: <---- re-enter the password here Principal's new key version = 1 Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ? Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ? Attributes [ 0 ] ? Edit O.K. Principal name: <---- null entry here will cause an exit Testing it all out First we have to start the Kerberos daemons. NOTE that if you have correctly edited your /etc/rc.conf then this will happen automatically when you reboot. This is only necessary on the Kerberos server. Kerberos clients will automagically get what they need from the /etc/kerberosIV directory. &prompt.root; kerberos & Kerberos server starting Sleep forever on error Log file is /var/log/kerberos.log Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! Current Kerberos master key version is 1 Local realm: GRONDAR.ZA &prompt.root; kadmind -n & KADM Server KADM0.0A initializing Please do not use 'kill -9' to kill this job, use a regular kill instead Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! Now we can try using the kinit command to get a ticket for the id jane that we created above: &prompt.user; kinit jane MIT Project Athena (grunt.grondar.za) Kerberos Initialization for "jane" Password: Try listing the tokens using klist to see if we really have them: &prompt.user; klist Ticket file: /tmp/tkt245 Principal: jane@GRONDAR.ZA Issued Expires Principal Apr 30 11:23:22 Apr 30 19:23:22 krbtgt.GRONDAR.ZA@GRONDAR.ZA Now try changing the password using passwd to check if the kpasswd daemon can get authorization to the Kerberos database: &prompt.user; passwd realm GRONDAR.ZA Old password for jane: New Password for jane: Verifying password New Password for jane: Password changed. Adding <command>su</command> privileges Kerberos allows us to give each user who needs root privileges their own separate supassword. We could now add an id which is authorized to su to root. This is controlled by having an instance of root associated with a principal. Using kdb_edit we can create the entry jane.root in the Kerberos database: &prompt.root; kdb_edit Opening database... Enter Kerberos master key: Current Kerberos master key version is 1. Master key entered. BEWARE! Previous or default values are in [brackets] , enter return to leave the same, or new value. Principal name: jane Instance: root <Not found>, Create [y] ? y Principal: jane, Instance: root, kdc_key_ver: 1 New Password: <---- enter a SECURE password here Verifying password New Password: <---- re-enter the password here Principal's new key version = 1 Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ? Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ? 12 <--- Keep this short! Attributes [ 0 ] ? Edit O.K. Principal name: <---- null entry here will cause an exit Now try getting tokens for it to make sure it works: &prompt.root; kinit jane.root MIT Project Athena (grunt.grondar.za) Kerberos Initialization for "jane.root" Password: Now we need to add the user to root's .klogin file: &prompt.root; cat /root/.klogin jane.root@GRONDAR.ZA Now try doing the su: &prompt.user; su Password: and take a look at what tokens we have: &prompt.root; klist Ticket file: /tmp/tkt_root_245 Principal: jane.root@GRONDAR.ZA Issued Expires Principal May 2 20:43:12 May 3 04:43:12 krbtgt.GRONDAR.ZA@GRONDAR.ZA Using other commands In an earlier example, we created a principal called jane with an instance root. This was based on a user with the same name as the principal, and this is a Kerberos default; that a <principal>.<instance> of the form <username>.root will allow that <username> to su to root if the necessary entries are in the .klogin file in root's home directory: &prompt.root; cat /root/.klogin jane.root@GRONDAR.ZA Likewise, if a user has in their own home directory lines of the form: &prompt.user; cat ~/.klogin jane@GRONDAR.ZA jack@GRONDAR.ZA This allows anyone in the GRONDAR.ZA realm who has authenticated themselves to jane or jack (via kinit, see above) access to rlogin to jane's account or files on this system (grunt) via rlogin, rsh or rcp. For example, Jane now logs into another system, using Kerberos: &prompt.user; kinit MIT Project Athena (grunt.grondar.za) Password: &prompt.user; rlogin grunt Last login: Mon May 1 21:14:47 from grumble Copyright (c) 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. FreeBSD BUILT-19950429 (GR386) #0: Sat Apr 29 17:50:09 SAT 1995 Or Jack logs into Jane's account on the same machine (Jane having set up the .klogin file as above, and the person in charge of Kerberos having set up principal jack with a null instance: &prompt.user; kinit &prompt.user; rlogin grunt -l jane MIT Project Athena (grunt.grondar.za) Password: Last login: Mon May 1 21:16:55 from grumble Copyright (c) 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. FreeBSD BUILT-19950429 (GR386) #0: Sat Apr 29 17:50:09 SAT 1995 Firewalls firewalls security firewalls Contributed by &a.gpalmer; and Alex Nash. Firewalls are an area of increasing interest for people who are connected to the Internet, and are even finding applications on private networks to provide enhanced security. This section will hopefully explain what firewalls are, how to use them, and how to use the facilities provided in the FreeBSD kernel to implement them. People often think that having a firewall between your internal network and the Big Bad Internet will solve all your security problems. It may help, but a poorly setup firewall system is more of a security risk than not having one at all. A firewall can add another layer of security to your systems, but it cannot stop a really determined cracker from penetrating your internal network. If you let internal security lapse because you believe your firewall to be impenetrable, you have just made the crackers job that much easier. What is a firewall? There are currently two distinct types of firewalls in common use on the Internet today. The first type is more properly called a packet filtering router, where the kernel on a multi-homed machine chooses whether to forward or block packets based on a set of rules. The second type, known as a proxy server, relies on daemons to provide authentication and to forward packets, possibly on a multi-homed machine which has kernel packet forwarding disabled. Sometimes sites combine the two types of firewalls, so that only a certain machine (known as a bastion host) is allowed to send packets through a packet filtering router onto an internal network. Proxy services are run on the bastion host, which are generally more secure than normal authentication mechanisms. FreeBSD comes with a kernel packet filter (known as IPFW), which is what the rest of this section will concentrate on. Proxy servers can be built on FreeBSD from third party software, but there is such a variety of proxy servers available that it would be impossible to cover them in this document. Packet filtering routers A router is a machine which forwards packets between two or more networks. A packet filtering router has an extra piece of code in its kernel which compares each packet to a list of rules before deciding if it should be forwarded or not. Most modern IP routing software has packet filtering code within it that defaults to forwarding all packets. To enable the filters, you need to define a set of rules for the filtering code so it can decide if the packet should be allowed to pass or not. To decide whether a packet should be passed on, the code looks through its set of rules for a rule which matches the contents of this packets headers. Once a match is found, the rule action is obeyed. The rule action could be to drop the packet, to forward the packet, or even to send an ICMP message back to the originator. Only the first match counts, as the rules are searched in order. Hence, the list of rules can be referred to as a rule chain. The packet matching criteria varies depending on the software used, but typically you can specify rules which depend on the source IP address of the packet, the destination IP address, the source port number, the destination port number (for protocols which support ports), or even the packet type (UDP, TCP, ICMP, etc). Proxy servers Proxy servers are machines which have had the normal system daemons (telnetd, ftpd, etc) replaced with special servers. These servers are called proxy servers as they normally only allow onward connections to be made. This enables you to run (for example) a proxy telnet server on your firewall host, and people can telnet in to your firewall from the outside, go through some authentication mechanism, and then gain access to the internal network (alternatively, proxy servers can be used for signals coming from the internal network and heading out). Proxy servers are normally more secure than normal servers, and often have a wider variety of authentication mechanisms available, including one-shot password systems so that even if someone manages to discover what password you used, they will not be able to use it to gain access to your systems as the password instantly expires. As they do not actually give users access to the host machine, it becomes a lot more difficult for someone to install backdoors around your security system. Proxy servers often have ways of restricting access further, so that only certain hosts can gain access to the servers, and often they can be set up so that you can limit which users can talk to which destination machine. Again, what facilities are available depends largely on what proxy software you choose. What does IPFW allow me to do? ipfw IPFW, the software supplied with FreeBSD, is a packet filtering and accounting system which resides in the kernel, and has a user-land control utility, &man.ipfw.8;. Together, they allow you to define and query the rules currently used by the kernel in its routing decisions. There are two related parts to IPFW. The firewall section allows you to perform packet filtering. There is also an IP accounting section which allows you to track usage of your router, based on similar rules to the firewall section. This allows you to see (for example) how much traffic your router is getting from a certain machine, or how much WWW (World Wide Web) traffic it is forwarding. As a result of the way that IPFW is designed, you can use IPFW on non-router machines to perform packet filtering on incoming and outgoing connections. This is a special case of the more general use of IPFW, and the same commands and techniques should be used in this situation. Enabling IPFW on FreeBSD ipfw enabling As the main part of the IPFW system lives in the kernel, you will need to add one or more options to your kernel configuration file, depending on what facilities you want, and recompile your kernel. See reconfiguring the kernel for more details on how to recompile your kernel. There are currently three kernel configuration options relevant to IPFW: options IPFIREWALL Compiles into the kernel the code for packet filtering. options IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE Enables code to allow logging of packets through &man.syslogd.8;. Without this option, even if you specify that packets should be logged in the filter rules, nothing will happen. options IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT=10 Limits the number of packets logged through &man.syslogd.8; on a per entry basis. You may wish to use this option in hostile environments in which you want to log firewall activity, but do not want to be open to a denial of service attack via syslog flooding. When a chain entry reaches the packet limit specified, logging is turned off for that particular entry. To resume logging, you will need to reset the associated counter using the &man.ipfw.8; utility: &prompt.root; ipfw zero 4500 Where 4500 is the chain entry you wish to continue logging. Previous versions of FreeBSD contained an IPFIREWALL_ACCT option. This is now obsolete as the firewall code automatically includes accounting facilities. Configuring IPFW ipfw configuring The configuration of the IPFW software is done through the &man.ipfw.8; utility. The syntax for this command looks quite complicated, but it is relatively simple once you understand its structure. There are currently four different command categories used by the utility: addition/deletion, listing, flushing, and clearing. Addition/deletion is used to build the rules that control how packets are accepted, rejected, and logged. Listing is used to examine the contents of your rule set (otherwise known as the chain) and packet counters (accounting). Flushing is used to remove all entries from the chain. Clearing is used to zero out one or more accounting entries. Altering the IPFW rules The syntax for this form of the command is: ipfw -N command index action log protocol addresses options There is one valid flag when using this form of the command: -N Resolve addresses and service names in output. The command given can be shortened to the shortest unique form. The valid commands are: add Add an entry to the firewall/accounting rule list delete Delete an entry from the firewall/accounting rule list Previous versions of IPFW used separate firewall and accounting entries. The present version provides packet accounting with each firewall entry. If an index value is supplied, it used to place the entry at a specific point in the chain. Otherwise, the entry is placed at the end of the chain at an index 100 greater than the last chain entry (this does not include the default policy, rule 65535, deny). The log option causes matching rules to be output to the system console if the kernel was compiled with IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE. Valid actions are: reject Drop the packet, and send an ICMP host or port unreachable (as appropriate) packet to the source. allow Pass the packet on as normal. (aliases: pass and accept) deny Drop the packet. The source is not notified via an ICMP message (thus it appears that the packet never arrived at the destination). count Update packet counters but do not allow/deny the packet based on this rule. The search continues with the next chain entry. Each action will be recognized by the shortest unambiguous prefix. The protocols which can be specified are: all Matches any IP packet icmp Matches ICMP packets tcp Matches TCP packets udp Matches UDP packets The address specification is: from address/maskport to address/maskport via interface You can only specify port in conjunction with protocols which support ports (UDP and TCP). The is optional and may specify the IP address or domain name of a local IP interface, or an interface name (e.g. ed0) to match only packets coming through this interface. Interface unit numbers can be specified with an optional wildcard. For example, ppp* would match all kernel PPP interfaces. The syntax used to specify an address/mask is: address or address/mask-bits or address:mask-pattern A valid hostname may be specified in place of the IP address. is a decimal number representing how many bits in the address mask should be set. e.g. specifying 192.216.222.1/24 will create a mask which will allow any address in a class C subnet (in this case, 192.216.222) to be matched. is an IP address which will be logically AND'ed with the address given. The keyword any may be used to specify any IP address. The port numbers to be blocked are specified as: port,port,port… to specify either a single port or a list of ports, or port-port to specify a range of ports. You may also combine a single range with a list, but the range must always be specified first. The options available are: frag Matches if the packet is not the first fragment of the datagram. in Matches if the packet is on the way in. out Matches if the packet is on the way out. ipoptions spec Matches if the IP header contains the comma separated list of options specified in spec. The supported list of IP options are: ssrr (strict source route), lsrr (loose source route), rr (record packet route), and ts (time stamp). The absence of a particular option may be denoted with a leading !. established Matches if the packet is part of an already established TCP connection (i.e. it has the RST or ACK bits set). You can optimize the performance of the firewall by placing established rules early in the chain. setup Matches if the packet is an attempt to establish a TCP connection (the SYN bit set is set but the ACK bit is not). tcpflags flags Matches if the TCP header contains the comma separated list of flags. The supported flags are fin, syn, rst, psh, ack, and urg. The absence of a particular flag may be indicated by a leading !. icmptypes types Matches if the ICMP type is present in the list types. The list may be specified as any combination of ranges and/or individual types separated by commas. Commonly used ICMP types are: 0 echo reply (ping reply), 3 destination unreachable, 5 redirect, 8 echo request (ping request), and 11 time exceeded (used to indicate TTL expiration as with &man.traceroute.8;). Listing the IPFW rules The syntax for this form of the command is: ipfw -a -t -N l There are three valid flags when using this form of the command: -a While listing, show counter values. This option is the only way to see accounting counters. -t Display the last match times for each chain entry. The time listing is incompatible with the input syntax used by the &man.ipfw.8; utility. -N Attempt to resolve given addresses and service names. Flushing the IPFW rules The syntax for flushing the chain is: ipfw flush This causes all entries in the firewall chain to be removed except the fixed default policy enforced by the kernel (index 65535). Use caution when flushing rules, the default deny policy will leave your system cut off from the network until allow entries are added to the chain. Clearing the IPFW packet counters The syntax for clearing one or more packet counters is: ipfw zero index When used without an index argument, all packet counters are cleared. If an index is supplied, the clearing operation only affects a specific chain entry. Example commands for ipfw This command will deny all packets from the host evil.crackers.org to the telnet port of the host nice.people.org: &prompt.root ipfw add deny tcp from evil.crackers.org to nice.people.org 23 The next example denies and logs any TCP traffic from the entire crackers.org network (a class C) to the nice.people.org machine (any port). &prompt.root; ipfw add deny log tcp from evil.crackers.org/24 to nice.people.org If you do not want people sending X sessions to your internal network (a subnet of a class C), the following command will do the necessary filtering: &prompt.root; ipfw add deny tcp from any to my.org/28 6000 setup To see the accounting records: &prompt.root; ipfw -a list or in the short form &prompt.root; ipfw -a l You can also see the last time a chain entry was matched with: &prompt.root; ipfw -at l Building a packet filtering firewall The following suggestions are just that: suggestions. The requirements of each firewall are different and we cannot tell you how to build a firewall to meet your particular requirements. When initially setting up your firewall, unless you have a test bench setup where you can configure your firewall host in a controlled environment, it is strongly recommend you use the logging version of the commands and enable logging in the kernel. This will allow you to quickly identify problem areas and cure them without too much disruption. Even after the initial setup phase is complete, I recommend using the logging for `deny' as it allows tracing of possible attacks and also modification of the firewall rules if your requirements alter. If you use the logging versions of the accept command, it can generate large amounts of log data as one log line will be generated for every packet that passes through the firewall, so large ftp/http transfers, etc, will really slow the system down. It also increases the latencies on those packets as it requires more work to be done by the kernel before the packet can be passed on. syslogd with also start using up a lot more processor time as it logs all the extra data to disk, and it could quite easily fill the partition /var/log is located on. You should enable your firewall from /etc/rc.conf.local or /etc/rc.conf. The associated man page explains which knobs to fiddle and lists some preset firewall configurations. If you do not use a preset configuration, ipfw list will output the current ruleset into a file that you can pass to rc.conf. If you do not use /etc/rc.conf.local or /etc/rc.conf to enable your firewall, it is important to make sure your firewall is enabled before any IP interfaces are configured. The next problem is what your firewall should actually do! This is largely dependent on what access to your network you want to allow from the outside, and how much access to the outside world you want to allow from the inside. Some general rules are: Block all incoming access to ports below 1024 for TCP. This is where most of the security sensitive services are, like finger, SMTP (mail) and telnet. Block all incoming UDP traffic. There are very few useful services that travel over UDP, and what useful traffic there is normally a security threat (e.g. Suns RPC and NFS protocols). This has its disadvantages also, since UDP is a connectionless protocol, denying incoming UDP traffic also blocks the replies to outgoing UDP traffic. This can cause a problem for people (on the inside) using external archie (prospero) servers. If you want to allow access to archie, you'll have to allow packets coming from ports 191 and 1525 to any internal UDP port through the firewall. ntp is another service you may consider allowing through, which comes from port 123. Block traffic to port 6000 from the outside. Port 6000 is the port used for access to X11 servers, and can be a security threat (especially if people are in the habit of doing xhost + on their workstations). X11 can actually use a range of ports starting at 6000, the upper limit being how many X displays you can run on the machine. The upper limit as defined by RFC 1700 (Assigned Numbers) is 6063. Check what ports any internal servers use (e.g. SQL servers, etc). It is probably a good idea to block those as well, as they normally fall outside the 1-1024 range specified above. Another checklist for firewall configuration is available from CERT at http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/packet_filtering.html As stated above, these are only guidelines. You will have to decide what filter rules you want to use on your firewall yourself. We cannot accept ANY responsibility if someone breaks into your network, even if you follow the advice given above. OpenSSL security OpenSSL OpenSSL As of FreeBSD 4.0, the OpenSSL toolkit is a part of the base system. OpenSSL provides a general-purpose cryptography library, as well as the Secure Sockets Layer v2/v3 (SSLv2/SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security v1 (TLSv1) network security protocols. However, one of the algorithms (specifically IDEA) included in OpenSSL is protected by patents in the USA and elsewhere, and is not available for unrestricted use. IDEA is included in the OpenSSL sources in FreeBSD, but it is not built by default. If you wish to use it, and you comply with the license terms, enable the MAKE_IDEA switch in /etc/make.conf and rebuild your sources using 'make world'. Today, the RSA algorithm is free for use in USA and other countries. In the past it was protected by a patent. OpenSSL install Source Code Installations OpenSSL is part of the src-crypto and src-secure cvsup collections. See the Obtaining FreeBSD section for more information about obtaining and updating FreeBSD source code. IPsec IPsec security IPsec Contributed by &a.shin;, 5 March 2000. The IPsec mechanism provides secure communication either for IP layer and socket layer communication. This section should explain how to use them. For implementation details, please refer to The Developers' Handbook. The current IPsec implementation supports both transport mode and tunnel mode. However, tunnel mode comes with some restrictions. http://www.kame.net/newsletter/ has more comprehensive examples. Please be aware that in order to use this functionality, you must have the following options compiled into your kernel: options IPSEC #IP security options IPSEC_ESP #IP security (crypto; define w/IPSEC) Transport mode example with IPv4 Let's setup security association to deploy a secure channel between HOST A (10.2.3.4) and HOST B (10.6.7.8). Here we show a little complicated example. From HOST A to HOST B, only old AH is used. From HOST B to HOST A, new AH and new ESP are combined. Now we should choose algorithm to be used corresponding to "AH"/"new AH"/"ESP"/"new ESP". Please refer to the &man.setkey.8; man page to know algorithm names. Our choice is MD5 for AH, new-HMAC-SHA1 for new AH, and new-DES-expIV with 8 byte IV for new ESP. Key length highly depends on each algorithm. For example, key length must be equal to 16 bytes for MD5, 20 for new-HMAC-SHA1, and 8 for new-DES-expIV. Now we choose "MYSECRETMYSECRET", "KAMEKAMEKAMEKAMEKAME", "PASSWORD", respectively. OK, let's assign SPI (Security Parameter Index) for each protocol. Please note that we need 3 SPIs for this secure channel since three security headers are produced (one for from HOST A to HOST B, two for from HOST B to HOST A). Please also note that SPI MUST be greater than or equal to 256. We choose, 1000, 2000, and 3000, respectively. (1) HOST A ------> HOST B (1)PROTO=AH ALG=MD5(RFC1826) KEY=MYSECRETMYSECRET SPI=1000 (2.1) HOST A <------ HOST B <------ (2.2) (2.1) PROTO=AH ALG=new-HMAC-SHA1(new AH) KEY=KAMEKAMEKAMEKAMEKAME SPI=2000 (2.2) PROTO=ESP ALG=new-DES-expIV(new ESP) IV length = 8 KEY=PASSWORD SPI=3000 Now, let's setup security association. Execute &man.setkey.8; on both HOST A and B: &prompt.root; setkey -c add 10.2.3.4 10.6.7.8 ah-old 1000 -m transport -A keyed-md5 "MYSECRETMYSECRET" ; add 10.6.7.8 10.2.3.4 ah 2000 -m transport -A hmac-sha1 "KAMEKAMEKAMEKAMEKAME" ; add 10.6.7.8 10.2.3.4 esp 3000 -m transport -E des-cbc "PASSWORD" ; ^D Actually, IPsec communication doesn't process until security policy entries will be defined. In this case, you must setup each host. At A: &prompt.root; setkey -c spdadd 10.2.3.4 10.6.7.8 any -P out ipsec ah/transport/10.2.3.4-10.6.7.8/require ; ^D At B: &prompt.root; setkey -c spdadd 10.6.7.8 10.2.3.4 any -P out ipsec esp/transport/10.6.7.8-10.2.3.4/require ; spdadd 10.6.7.8 10.2.3.4 any -P out ipsec ah/transport/10.6.7.8-10.2.3.4/require ; ^D HOST A --------------------------------------> HOST E 10.2.3.4 10.6.7.8 | | ========== old AH keyed-md5 ==========> <========= new AH hmac-sha1 =========== <========= new ESP des-cbc ============ Transport mode example with IPv6 Another example using IPv6. ESP transport mode is recommended for TCP port number 110 between Host-A and Host-B. ============ ESP ============ | | Host-A Host-B fec0::10 -------------------- fec0::11 Encryption algorithm is blowfish-cbc whose key is "kamekame", and authentication algorithm is hmac-sha1 whose key is "this is the test key". Configuration at Host-A: &prompt.root; setkey -c <<EOF spdadd fec0::10[any] fec0::11[110] tcp -P out ipsec esp/transport/fec0::10-fec0::11/use ; spdadd fec0::11[110] fec0::10[any] tcp -P in ipsec esp/transport/fec0::11-fec0::10/use ; add fec0::10 fec0::11 esp 0x10001 -m transport -E blowfish-cbc "kamekame" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; add fec0::11 fec0::10 esp 0x10002 -m transport -E blowfish-cbc "kamekame" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; EOF and at Host-B: &prompt.root; setkey -c <<EOF spdadd fec0::11[110] fec0::10[any] tcp -P out ipsec esp/transport/fec0::11-fec0::10/use ; spdadd fec0::10[any] fec0::11[110] tcp -P in ipsec esp/transport/fec0::10-fec0::11/use ; add fec0::10 fec0::11 esp 0x10001 -m transport -E blowfish-cbc "kamekame" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; add fec0::11 fec0::10 esp 0x10002 -m transport -E blowfish-cbc "kamekame" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; EOF Note the direction of SP. Tunnel mode example with IPv4 Tunnel mode between two security gateways Security protocol is old AH tunnel mode, i.e. specified by RFC1826, with keyed-md5 whose key is "this is the test" as authentication algorithm. ======= AH ======= | | Network-A Gateway-A Gateway-B Network-B 10.0.1.0/24 ---- 172.16.0.1 ----- 172.16.0.2 ---- 10.0.2.0/24 Configuration at Gateway-A: &prompt.root; setkey -c <<EOF spdadd 10.0.1.0/24 10.0.2.0/24 any -P out ipsec ah/tunnel/172.16.0.1-172.16.0.2/require ; spdadd 10.0.2.0/24 10.0.1.0/24 any -P in ipsec ah/tunnel/172.16.0.2-172.16.0.1/require ; add 172.16.0.1 172.16.0.2 ah-old 0x10003 -m any -A keyed-md5 "this is the test" ; add 172.16.0.2 172.16.0.1 ah-old 0x10004 -m any -A keyed-md5 "this is the test" ; EOF If port number field is omitted such above then "[any]" is employed. `-m' specifies the mode of SA to be used. "-m any" means wild-card of mode of security protocol. You can use this SA for both tunnel and transport mode. and at Gateway-B: &prompt.root; setkey -c <<EOF spdadd 10.0.2.0/24 10.0.1.0/24 any -P out ipsec ah/tunnel/172.16.0.2-172.16.0.1/require ; spdadd 10.0.1.0/24 10.0.2.0/24 any -P in ipsec ah/tunnel/172.16.0.1-172.16.0.2/require ; add 172.16.0.1 172.16.0.2 ah-old 0x10003 -m any -A keyed-md5 "this is the test" ; add 172.16.0.2 172.16.0.1 ah-old 0x10004 -m any -A keyed-md5 "this is the test" ; EOF Making SA bundle between two security gateways AH transport mode and ESP tunnel mode is required between Gateway-A and Gateway-B. In this case, ESP tunnel mode is applied first, and AH transport mode is next. ========== AH ========= | ======= ESP ===== | | | | | Network-A Gateway-A Gateway-B Network-B fec0:0:0:1::/64 --- fec0:0:0:1::1 ---- fec0:0:0:2::1 --- fec0:0:0:2::/64 Tunnel mode example with IPv6 Encryption algorithm is 3des-cbc, and authentication algorithm for ESP is hmac-sha1. Authentication algorithm for AH is hmac-md5. Configuration at Gateway-A: &prompt.root; setkey -c <<EOF spdadd fec0:0:0:1::/64 fec0:0:0:2::/64 any -P out ipsec esp/tunnel/fec0:0:0:1::1-fec0:0:0:2::1/require ah/transport/fec0:0:0:1::1-fec0:0:0:2::1/require ; spdadd fec0:0:0:2::/64 fec0:0:0:1::/64 any -P in ipsec esp/tunnel/fec0:0:0:2::1-fec0:0:0:1::1/require ah/transport/fec0:0:0:2::1-fec0:0:0:1::1/require ; add fec0:0:0:1::1 fec0:0:0:2::1 esp 0x10001 -m tunnel -E 3des-cbc "kamekame12341234kame1234" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; add fec0:0:0:1::1 fec0:0:0:2::1 ah 0x10001 -m transport -A hmac-md5 "this is the test" ; add fec0:0:0:2::1 fec0:0:0:1::1 esp 0x10001 -m tunnel -E 3des-cbc "kamekame12341234kame1234" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; add fec0:0:0:2::1 fec0:0:0:1::1 ah 0x10001 -m transport -A hmac-md5 "this is the test" ; EOF Making SAs with the different end ESP tunnel mode is required between Host-A and Gateway-A. Encryption algorithm is cast128-cbc, and authentication algorithm for ESP is hmac-sha1. ESP transport mode is recommended between Host-A and Host-B. Encryption algorithm is rc5-cbc, and authentication algorithm for ESP is hmac-md5. ================== ESP ================= | ======= ESP ======= | | | | | Host-A Gateway-A Host-B fec0:0:0:1::1 ---- fec0:0:0:2::1 ---- fec0:0:0:2::2 Configuration at Host-A: &prompt.root; setkey -c <<EOF spdadd fec0:0:0:1::1[any] fec0:0:0:2::2[80] tcp -P out ipsec esp/transport/fec0:0:0:1::1-fec0:0:0:2::2/use esp/tunnel/fec0:0:0:1::1-fec0:0:0:2::1/require ; spdadd fec0:0:0:2::1[80] fec0:0:0:1::1[any] tcp -P in ipsec esp/transport/fec0:0:0:2::2-fec0:0:0:l::1/use esp/tunnel/fec0:0:0:2::1-fec0:0:0:1::1/require ; add fec0:0:0:1::1 fec0:0:0:2::2 esp 0x10001 -m transport -E cast128-cbc "12341234" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; add fec0:0:0:1::1 fec0:0:0:2::1 esp 0x10002 -E rc5-cbc "kamekame" -A hmac-md5 "this is the test" ; add fec0:0:0:2::2 fec0:0:0:1::1 esp 0x10003 -m transport -E cast128-cbc "12341234" -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; add fec0:0:0:2::1 fec0:0:0:1::1 esp 0x10004 -E rc5-cbc "kamekame" -A hmac-md5 "this is the test" ; EOF OpenSSH OpenSSH security OpenSSH Contributed by &a.chern;, April 21, 2001. Secure shell is a set of network connectivity tools used to access remote machines securely. It can be used as a direct replacement for rlogin, rsh, rcp, and telnet. Additionally, any other TCP/IP connections can be tunneled/forwarded securely through ssh. ssh encrypts all traffic to effectively eliminate eavesdropping, connection hijacking, and other network-level attacks. OpenSSH is maintained by the OpenBSD project, and is based upon SSH v1.2.12 with all the recent bug fixes and updates. It is compatible with both SSH protocols 1 and 2. OpenSSH has been in the base system since FreeBSD 4.0. Advantages of using OpenSSH Normally, when using &man.telnet.1; or &man.rlogin.1;, data is sent over the network in an clear, un-encrypted form. Network sniffers anywhere in between the client and server can steal your user/password information or data transferred in your session. OpenSSH offers a variety of authentication and encryption methods to prevent this from happening. Enabling sshd OpenSSH enabling Be sure to make the following additions to your rc.conf file: sshd_enable="YES" This will load the ssh daemon the next time your system initializes. Alternatively, you can simply run the sshd daemon. SSH client OpenSSH client The &man.ssh.1; utility works similarly to &man.rlogin.1;. &prompt.root ssh user@foobardomain.com Host key not found from the list of known hosts. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes Host 'foobardomain.com' added to the list of known hosts. user@foobardomain.com's password: ******* The login will continue just as it would have if a session was created using rlogin or telnet. SSH utilizes a key fingerprint system for verifying the authenticity of the server when the client connects. The user is prompted to enter 'yes' only during the first time connecting. Future attempts to login are all verified against the saved fingerprint key. The SSH client will alert you if the saved fingerprint differs from the received fingerprint on future login attempts. The fingerprints are saved in ~/.ssh/known_hosts Secure copy OpenSSH secure copy scp The scp command works similarly to rcp; it copies a file to or from a remote machine, except in a secure fashion. &prompt.root scp user@foobardomain.com:/COPYRIGHT COPYRIGHT user@foobardomain.com's password: COPYRIGHT 100% |*****************************| 4735 00:00 &prompt.root Since the fingerprint was already saved for this host in the previous example, it is verified when using scp here. Configuration OpenSSH configuration The system-wide configuration files for both the OpenSSH daemon and client reside within the /etc/ssh directory. ssh_config configures the client settings, while sshd_config configures the daemon. ssh-keygen Instead of using passwords, &man.ssh-keygen.1; can be used to generate RSA keys to authenticate a user. &prompt.user ssh-keygen Initializing random number generator... Generating p: .++ (distance 66) Generating q: ..............................++ (distance 498) Computing the keys... Key generation complete. Enter file in which to save the key (/home/user/.ssh/identity): Enter passphrase: Enter the same passphrase again: Your identification has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/identity. ... &man.ssh-keygen.1; will create a public and private key pair for use in authentication. The private key is stored in ~/.ssh/identity, whereas the public key is stored in ~/.ssh/identity.pub. The public key must be placed in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys of the remote machine in order for the setup to work. This will allow connection to the remote machine based upon RSA authentication instead of passwords. If a passphrase is used in &man.ssh-keygen.1;, the user will be prompted for a password each time in order to use the private key. &man.ssh-agent.1; and &man.ssh-add.1; are utilities used in managing multiple passworded private keys. SSH Tunneling OpenSSH tunneling OpenSSH has the ability to create a tunnel to encapsulate another protocol in an encrypted session. The following command tells &man.ssh.1; to create a tunnel for telnet. &prompt.user; ssh -2 -N -f -L 5023:localhost:23 user@foo.bar.com &prompt.user; -2 this forces &man.ssh.1 to use version 2 of the protocol. (Do not use if you are working with older ssh servers) -N indicates no command, or tunnel only. If omitted, &man.ssh.1; would initiate a normal session. -f forces &man.ssh.1; to run in the background. -L indicates a local tunnel in localport:localhost:remoteport fashion. foo.bar.com is the remote/target SSH server. An SSH tunnel works by creating a listen socket on the specified local host and port. It then forwards any connection to the local host/port via the SSH connection to the remote machine on the specified remote port. In the example, port 5023 on localhost is being forwarded to port 23 on the remote machine. Since 23 is telnet, this would create a secure telnet session through an SSH tunnel. This can be used to wrap any number of insecure TCP protocols such as smtp, pop3, ftp, etc. A typical SSH Tunnel &prompt.user; ssh -2 -N -f -L 5025:localhost:25 user@mailserver.foobar.com user@mailserver.foobar.com's password: ***** &prompt.user; telnet localhost 5025 Trying 127.0.0.1... Connected to localhost. Escape character is '^]'. 220 mailserver.foobar.com ESMTP This can be used in conjunction with an &man.ssh-keygen.1; and additional user accounts to create a more seamless/hassle-free SSH tunneling environment. Keys can be used in place of typing a password, and the tunnels can be run as a separate user. Further Reading OpenSSH &man.ssh.1; &man.scp.1; &man.ssh-keygen.1; &man.ssh-agent.1; &man.ssh-add.1; &man.sshd.8; &man.sftp-server.8;